Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web destroyed more than aircraft – it tore apart the old idea that bases far behind the front lines are safe
A series of explosions Air bases in the depths of Russia On June 1, 2025, he came to Moscow’s military strategists as a rude awakening. Ukrainian strike in the heart is Russia’s strategic bombing ability traditional War rules: Provides a smaller army a plan to resist the ability of a larger country to start air strikes from the depths of the front fronts.
Ukrainian Spider web operation The 117 remote -controlled drone, who was kidnapped to Russia for a period of 18 months and was thrown towards aircraft parked by operators miles away.
The raid was more destroyed or broken 40 TU-95, TU-160 and TU-22 M3 Strategic BombersAccording to the authorities in Kiev, the A-50 is a bad stimulus jet. This represents roughly one third Russia’s long -range strike fleet and approximately $ 7 billion equipment. Satellite images, even if they withdraw these numbers, are difficult to miss the scale of the damage.
It is even more difficult to ignore the logic behind the strike.
Traditional modern military campaigns revolve around depth. Fighting countries are trying to build the war power relatively safely “backgrounds”-Logistics centers, which are hundreds of thousands of miles from the front front.
Since the occupation of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin has been intensively leaning at the Derin Arhear Bomban Base-more than 2,000 miles in front of the Ukraine. This tactic matched waves with launching The shahed attack drones designed by Iran To keep Ukrainian cities under night threat.
Russian victory theory is mercilessly simple: challenging air force. If the missiles and one -way drones fall into Kiev frequently, the progress of Russian land forces will crack the civilian morale in Ukraine, even if the progress is sunk on the front.
For Kiev’s military planners, destroying launch platforms reduces this theory to a much cheaper than the other single alternative: seizing every cruise missile on the flight so far 80 % success rate However, it is increasingly based on the West -independent equipment that comes in less supply.
Airport vulnerability
Airspace It has always happened Critical goals in the modern war, logic, grounded bombardment planes and fighters are more vulnerable and easier to hit.
II. In the North African desert during World War II, England Special Air Service The estimated 367 enemy planes spread to North Africa used Jeep raids and delayed action explosives to knocked out-Luftwaffe was never renovated. In the same year, German parachutist He seized the air shots on Crete, denied an advanced base of the British Royal Air Force, and overthrew an entire island campaign.
A Later generation in VietnamViet Cong and the North Vietnam Army attack teams, equipped with handbags and mortars, Phan Rang, Da Nang and Bien Hoa’dan US circles again and again penetrated the US circles again, burned fighters on the ramp and forced thousands of American soldiers to direct the basic security.
Since it imposes step costs, the game book underlying the shooting on the ground continues to be effective. Every runway was crater and every bombardment plane, military hit, hardened shelters or fleet’s dispersion over more than one base, forced to pour money on ways to disappoint such attacks. Such air strikes also direct fighters from the front lines to serve as guards.
A new drone war age
Operation Spider Web Ukraine, while trying to repeat this strategy, also took advantage of the surprise to achieve Psychological shock and dislocation.
However, the Ukrainian operation is uniquely in the 21st century direction of the war.
The emergence of the unmanned drone battle saw that military practitioners are more and more talking.air littorals”-Seri speaks for the atmospheric slice sitting on the ground forces under the height of high-performance fighters and bombardment planes traditionally circulated.
Drones develop in this region, where most infantry weapons skip their infantry weapons, and their goals such as fuel trucks or strategic bombardment planes are unable to monitor traditional radar -guided defenses very low to monitor reliable.
Kiev pulled the small drone sets in a few miles of each runway, creating pop-up launch ramps in the depths of Russia and captured the enemy on duty and unprepared.
The economic benefits of Ukraine’s approach are sharp. However, a drone, a lithium-bas and a war title below $ 3,000, a Russian TU -60 Costs in the bomber of $ 250 million.
Its impact on Russia
Ukraine’s operation will have urgent and costly consequences for Russia, even if the strikes are less devastating than Kiev claims.
Survival bombing planes will need to be transported. The protection of the bases from the attacks of the bases, the construction of soil revets to cover possible attack vectors, will mean the establishment of radar -guided 30 mm ball and electronic war jams. All this costs money. More importantly, the operation will guide trained soldiers and technicians who can return to the front to support the next summer attack.
Raid is also drilling a hole in Russia Nuclear weapon skills.
Losing a dozen TU-95 and TU -60 aircraft that folded as two as nuclear bombardment aircraft would be strategically embarrassing and may rethink the Kremlin. long -range air patrols.
Beyond physical and financial damage to Russia’s fleet, Ukraine’s operation comes with a strong psychological effect. It shows that Ukraine, which has more than three years, has entered a war aiming to grind the morale, and can initiate sophisticated operations in the depths of Russian territory.
Ukraine’s security service operation Unexpected, detailed steps in the patient: A meticulous monitoring of the camera angles to ensure that the kits and trucks, which are quietly reunited from the boundaries of 18 -month smuggling, quietly reunited from the boundaries within the cargo, to ensure that they are indistinguishable from normal warehouse traffic in commercial satellite images.
The operators drove these trucks to the foreseen ignition points and then placed their unmanned aerial vehicles on the wooded height.
Since each of the drones is a one -way weapon, it can work close to a dozen pilot launch area or remotely parallel, lead live video streams to parked bombardment aircraft. Strike videos It recommends a large number of impacts between wide runway areas-sufficient to make any temporary small weapon response from environmental guards.
A new facade line?
For Ukraine, the section shows a repeatable method for hitting deep, well defended beings. In principle, the same game book can be adapted to missile storage stores and, more importantly to factories on Russia’s Shahed attack drones.
KYIV had to find a way to resist Drone waves And in recent months, ballistic missile strikes that have damaged more than Russian cruise missiles. Center for Strategic and International Research ‘ Fire Force Strike Tracker It showed that the HAHEDs are now the most common and most common cost -effective Air weapon in the Russian campaign.
However, the effects of the spider operation are far beyond the Russian-Ukraine conflict by undermining the old idea that the backgrounds are safe. Launched from Russia’s own region, relatively cheap drones deleted planes that cost billions and support Moscow’s long -range strikes and nuclear signaling. This is a strategy that can be easily reproduced by other attackers to other countries.
Anyone who can miss, store and pilot can sabotage an enemy’s ability to produce air strikes.
Air force based on large, fixed floors should harden, distribute or accept that its runways are a new façade line.
This article has been re -published here. SpeechAn independent news organization that brings you real and reliable analysis to help you understand our complex world. Written by: Benjamin Jensen– American University International Service School
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Benjamin Jensen does not work from any company or organization to benefit from this article, does not consult, does not receive shares or financing, and did not explain any relevant commitment beyond his academic appointments.
