Why Bangladesh’s Protests Over China-Backed Teesta Project Should Alarm New Delhi? | India News

On October 19, hundreds of students and activists gathered at Chittagong University and formed a human chain near the Martyr Minar. Carrying banners and burning torches, they marched in protest, demanding speedy implementation of the long-delayed Teesta River Master Plan and a “fair share” of water from the river, according to state-run news agency Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS). The protest, organized largely by students from the Rangpur district, reflected growing frustration with what many see as ongoing water injustice and India’s alleged influence on Bangladesh’s water policies. The Teesta River, vital to agriculture and livelihoods in northern Bangladesh, has long been at the center of a deadlocked water-sharing dispute with India.

Demonstrators argued that the China-backed Teesta project could transform the country’s north by improving irrigation, creating jobs and accelerating economic development. The protest ended with calls to protect national interests and ensure water justice for Teesta-dependent regions.

This rally follows a series of torchlight demonstrations in five northern districts just days ago, signaling a coordinated grassroots crackdown. Dhaka Tribune newspaper reported that thousands of people took to the streets in Rangpur district to demand immediate implementation of the Teesta Master Plan.

Why is Teesta Important?

The Teesta River originates in the eastern Himalayas, passes through West Bengal in India and enters Bangladesh before joining the Jamuna. For decades, Dhaka has accused New Delhi of restricting water flows during the dry season, damaging agriculture and livelihoods. However, during the monsoon season, the river frequently floods, prompting Bangladesh to demand better water management throughout the year.

Despite numerous meetings, a formal agreement could not be reached. West Bengal’s strong opposition to water sharing has repeatedly stalled a potential deal. Meanwhile, public impatience has grown in Bangladesh, especially in the north where farmers and residents are heavily dependent on the river.

The issue took a new turn in March this year when Bangladesh’s interim head of government, Mohammed Younis, visited Beijing and formally requested China’s support for its 50-year river management master plan. The proposal includes extensive river engineering, dredging, dam construction and water storage facilities to better manage both drought and flood conditions. Chinese companies were also invited to the project, which is estimated to cost 6,700 crore taka in the first phase.

China’s involvement in the Teesta plan has created unrest in Delhi, especially due to the strategic location of the river. The proposed project area is located near the narrow Siliguri Corridor, commonly referred to as the Chicken Neck, a 20-kilometer strip connecting India’s northeast with the rest of the country.

Security Concerns and Regional Impacts

Indian security analysts see the plan as more than a development project. Its proximity to Chicken’s Neck raises red flags, especially amid reports that Bangladesh is reviving the nearby Lalmonirhat air base. Although Bangladeshi military officials deny any role for China in the development of the base, strategic experts remain cautious.

Commentator Brahma Chellaney warned that China’s involvement in both the river project and the nearby air base could increase Beijing’s surveillance capabilities in a sensitive region. The possibility of Chinese personnel or infrastructure being located near the Indian border has added a new layer to the Teesta dispute, turning the issue from a bilateral issue into a potential regional flashpoint.

Bangladeshi analyst Kallol Mustafa echoed these concerns in The Daily Star, noting that India’s discomfort stemmed from the possibility of Chinese engineers and technicians being deployed near a critical military corridor.

Political Currents

The growing momentum behind the Teesta project also reflects the changing political dynamics in Dhaka. As the general elections approach, opposition parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) are reportedly supporting the China-backed plan. Tariq Rahman, the exiled son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and the de facto leader of the BNP, announced his support for the project.

While Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had previously signaled her preference to work with India on the Teesta plan, recent public pressure and the changing political landscape appear to be pushing Dhaka closer to Beijing. Bangladesh has also further deepened its ties with China by signing the Belt and Road Initiative.

Earlier this year, former Cabinet Secretary Kabir Bin Anwar told The Independent (UK) that the Teesta project would allow Bangladesh to build a large reservoir to store water during the monsoon season and reduce dependence on India during the dry months.

A River Caught Between Three Powers

With the 1996 Ganga Water Agreement scheduled to expire in 2026, unresolved water sharing issues and China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh are raising fresh concerns in Delhi. For India, the Teesta issue is no longer just about water; Strategic space in South Asia is about influence and delicate balance.

While Bangladesh continues its own plans, probably without India’s involvement, Delhi is forced to confront a changing reality on the eastern front. The Teesta, once a symbol of shared resources, is now fast becoming a point of division caught up in currents of politics, development and geopolitics.