How Pakistan’s Military Keeps Civilian Politics On A Short Leash | India News
Pakistan’s security establishment often claims to have moved beyond past excesses. However, the campaign against Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) points in the opposite direction. A familiar playbook—updated, quieter, and more calibrated—is being used to discipline a mass political movement that once again refuses to fall into line.
This assessment is not based on conspiracy theories or a single dramatic event. Instead, it draws on Pakistan’s own record of intelligence-driven political manipulation, most clearly seen in the dismantling of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi and now increasingly reflected in the treatment of PTI at the national level.
Ending Parties Without Banning them
Add Zee News as Preferred Source
The disintegration of the MQM was never declared official policy. Yet journalists, human rights groups, and former officials have long described this as a classic example of political engineering: a popular urban party weakened not by electoral defeat but by engineered divisions, selective pressure, and the promotion of compatible alternatives.
Operation Cleanup in June 1992 set the template. MQM’s leadership was followed, its organizational structure was disbanded, and its street power was neutralized. At the same time, a separatist group was allowed to operate with apparent state tolerance. Human rights reports from the time clearly noted the asymmetry; While one group was facing relentless force, the other was facing effective protection.
The signal was unmistakable. Violation would be punished; Compliance will be rewarded. Electoral democracy remained formally intact, but actual political choices were narrowed under military supervision.
The same logic resurfaced in August 2016 after Altaf Hussain’s controversial speech. The MQM was rapidly restructured through media blackouts, selective policing, and official recognition of a new, “acceptable” leadership. The party survived in name but not in independence.
At no stage did ISI openly acknowledge participation. It rarely happens that way. Political engineering is rarely allowed in Pakistan; is evident from the results.
Normalization of PTI and Print
The situation PTI is currently facing follows this pattern that has become prevalent across the country.
Since the ouster and subsequent imprisonment of Imran Khan, the party has been subjected to mass arrests, prolonged legal pressure, media ostracism and sustained efforts to undermine its leadership. Although these actions are officially attributed to civilian authorities, their coordination, timing, and political selectivity suggest a more organized design.
The military trial of former ISI chief Lieutenant General Faiz Hamid was also widely read as part of this recalibration; This weakens PTI’s autonomous leadership while creating space for figures deemed more manageable within the existing order.
Most significant is the promotion of internal division.
Senior PTI leaders who call for “dialogue” and compromise with the military-backed political framework are allowed to operate. Grassroots leaders, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who continue to press for protest and resistance are facing harsher crackdowns. Some voices are being quietly rehabilitated; others disappear from television screens, party tickets and electoral contests.
Political relevance once again appears conditional.
As with the MQM, the aim is not to eliminate PTI outright but to contain it so that it becomes a party that can contest elections without challenging the military’s supremacy in civilian politics.
Why Should This Alarm the World?
The organisation’s supporters argue that PTI’s confrontational policy justifies extraordinary measures. Similar allegations were once made about MQM. The result was not stability but institutional erosion, political alienation, and prolonged urban unrest.
If the goal were democratic stability, manipulation would not be the chosen tool. If the rule of law were the priority, implementation would not depend on political harmony. What emerges instead is a system designed to discipline voters as much as politicians.
Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state with a population of over 240 million. A political order in which the country’s most popular party can be weakened through repression rather than defeat at the ballot box is fragile, not durable.
Karachi lived with the consequences for decades. Pakistan as a whole now risks repeating this experience.
Until the army and ISI withdraw from civilian politics in practice rather than rhetoric, MQM will remain a warning and PTI will not be the last casualty. Democracy will remain incomplete and the country will continue to oscillate between hybrid rule and outright military domination.
