Walls, sarees, streets: Why ‘Dhaka, Not Delhi’ is echoing across Bangladesh | World News

Dhaka/New Delhi: A tense political mood has returned at Dhaka University. The walls and corridors are covered with graffiti full of anger, satire and poetry. The articles reflect the youth-led uprising in July 2024 that ousted then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from power after 15 years in power. Many once viewed him as a symbol of democratic resistance. Over time, critics began to view his leadership as increasingly authoritarian.

Students gather in small circles on campus. Political discussions are held in open areas. Red lanterns hanging overhead signal Chinese New Year celebrations. The images show a nuanced geopolitical reality in a country where China and India compete for influence. Many young voters will go to the polls for the first time in the February 12 elections.

After Hasina resigned, she fled to India and Nobel laureate Muhammad Younis took over as the country’s interim leader. A court in Bangladesh sentenced him to death in absentia due to crackdown in 2024. United Nations estimates put the death toll from this violence at close to 1,400, with most casualties linked to the actions of security forces.

The Awami League, once supported by nearly 30 percent voters, was barred from contesting. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is trying to occupy the moderate political space. Jamaat-e-Islami formed an alliance with a new party that emerged from the student movement.

Slogans appearing on campuses and in the streets no longer focus solely on local democracy. Its directions now extend beyond the border.

University walls and even saris are covered with slogans like “Dhaka Not Delhi”. Among young citizens, the word “hegemony” has entered daily speech. It underlines the belief that India has had influence over Bangladeshi politics, especially since 2014.

Public anger over democratic backsliding carries a strong anti-India overtone. Bilateral relations, once envisioned as an exemplary neighborhood partnership, are now at their lowest point in decades. Bangladeshis associate India’s past support for Hasina with her government becoming more authoritarian. The controversial elections in 2014, 2018 and 2024 play a major role in shaping the perception. They believe that democracy has been weakened due to India’s alleged political support for the then Hasina government.

This resentment is also fueled by old grievances. Border killings, water sharing disputes, trade restrictions and inflammatory rhetoric have all contributed to the narrative. A growing segment of society sees India as a dominant power demanding obedience rather than an equal neighbour.

Social media campaigns targeted major newspapers for alleged foreign spies. Visa services between the two countries have been stopped. The fact that a Bangladeshi player was not allowed to play in the Indiam Premier League (IPL) and Bangladesh’s T20 World Cup matches were not moved to another venue made people even more upset.

India has sought to expand political reach. Diplomatic engagement now includes multiple Bangladeshi groups. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar attended BNP leader Khaleda Zia’s funeral and met senior party leaders. Contacts were also opened with Islamist groups. Invitations for dialogue and diplomatic receptions indicate an attempt to rebuild the channels.

These efforts have yet to reverse the broader decline. Seasoned editors in Dhaka describe the current standoff as unprecedented. Cooperation that once encompassed security, transit, trade and cultural exchange has slowed greatly. People’s movements and goodwill gestures have diminished.

Public discourse after Hasina’s dismissal increased tension. Many Bangladeshis expected India to recalibrate its policy after the political change. New Delhi instead granted Hasina asylum and tightened visa and trade restrictions. The response increased the Bangladeshi public’s perception that it carries little weight in Delhi’s calculations.

Cultural backlash followed. Calls for boycott of Indian goods gained traction. IPL broadcasts faced demands for suspension. Cultural exchange was intertwined with political anger.

Dhaka’s interim administration warned against looking at relations solely through the crisis. He described the relationship as a multidimensional one based on geography as well as politics. The two countries share 54 rivers, linguistic ties, historical ties and a 4,096-kilometer border marked by daily trade and movement.

But public sentiment has hardened. Many citizens attribute years of limited freedom of choice to Hasina’s rule and India’s alleged support for her government. His escape to India after the violence in 2024 is a sensitive issue. The perception that he was treated as befitting a state leader increased the resentment.

Media narratives present another battleground. Bangladeshi authorities deny allegations of systematic persecution of Hindu minorities and describe such reports as exaggerated depictions of isolated incidents. India claims independent documents record more than 2,900 incidents of violence against minorities under the interim leader, including murders, arson and land grabs.

Academics in the interim administration see this break as structural. In their view, the relationship has narrowed over time to links between India and a single political leadership rather than the state of Bangladesh.

Historical disagreements increase tensions. Water sharing is also a sensitive fault line. Control over river flows has economic and agricultural consequences. Killings at the border leave emotional scars and shape public perceptions of how Bangladeshis’ lives are valued. India denies that its forces acted unlawfully in many cases.

The political conflict has now spread to the economy. While bilateral trade is close to $13.5 billion, analysts argue that this figure could increase significantly if tariffs and diplomatic barriers are eased.

His street sensibility, although vocal, maintains nuance. Nationalist activists often distinguish between the Indian government and its people. Cross-border family ties, cultural familiarity, and shared neighborhoods still influence daily interactions.

Election rhetoric has silenced clear anti-India messages. Political rivals admit the impossibility of bypassing relations with Delhi. Repairing ties will take time and structural effort rather than symbolic gestures.

Officials in Dhaka believe that elections alone will not reset relations. Fundamental disagreements will continue. Strategic thinkers say there’s still room for recovery. Geography, history and cultural interdependence bring the two countries close enough to prevent long-term alienation.

The future of India-Bangladesh relations now depends on political realignment, public confidence and the ability of both capitals to move beyond the weight that has accumulated in recent years.