How Australia’s whistleblower inquiry buried the truth

The Senate Inquiry, which promised whistleblower reform, instead suppressed critical evidence, suppressed first-hand evidence and strengthened the system that punishes those who speak out, writes Nigel Carney.

IN THE MIDDLE OF 2025, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee He presented his long-awaited report to the Parliament Whistleblower Protection Power Bill. He appeared restrained in appearance. Actually, it was a rude explosion.

This was supposed to be a turning point, the basis for a solid national regime for the protection of whistleblowers. Instead the committee expressed soft-spoken disappointment. He acknowledged systemic failure without naming the culprits. He pointed to reform but refrained from ordering it,

This outcome was not inevitable. In fact, this was contrary to the weight of the evidence placed before the committee.

31 individuals and organizations made presentations at the 48th Parliament. Legal scholars, advocacy groups, and whistleblowers themselves contributed. Some shared devastating stories: retaliation, mental breakdown, stalled careers and professional sabotage.

Tragically and ironically, 16 of these submissions were never published.

It should be noted that, to date, there has been no publicly known labeling or suppression in any of the government, company and civil society presentations of the 47th Parliament.

Only 15 of them have been made public. The remaining 16 were marked confidential, reviewed by the committee, and then removed from the public record without any explanation, summary, or acknowledgment that their contents shaped the findings. Their removal means a lot.

Professor was among those repressed Peter TregearFormer head of the once prestigious Canberra School of Music at the Australian National University (ANU) and a documented whistleblower. His submission identified three fundamental flaws in the Bill: immunity provisions that hinder judicial review, the absence of independent review and the failure to provide parliamentary oversight.

He explained how he made a protected statement pursuant to Public Interest Disclosure Act (PID) at ANU. The ANU’s internal investigation has failed. The Commonwealth Ombudsman refused to use his statutory powers to compel evidence. He accepted that the ANU’s response was inadequate and closed the case anyway.

This model is not isolated. Robodebt Royal Commission It found that the Ombudsman had failed to use his Article 9 enforcement powers despite knowing that government departments were providing misleading information. This failure allowed Robodebt to continue unchecked.

Professor Tregear’s subdued presentation contained detailed legislative solutions modeled on the legislation’s oversight structures. National Anti-Corruption Commission: Establishment of an Independent Inspector and a special Joint Parliamentary Committee. Neither was in the bill.

Professor Tregear’s criticisms of the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s handling of his case had already been made public through submissions to another parliamentary committee in November 2025. Whistleblower Protection Power Billtransmission suppressed.

Also excluded Fusion PartyHis presentation raised similar concerns about immunity and oversight.

The decision to bury these statements reflects the dysfunction the inquiry was tasked to investigate.

Public interest disclosure is based on trust; not only to legal protection but also to procedural fairness. When Parliament invites testimony from whistleblowers and then removes it from the record, it indicates that this fact is conditional. It is hard to imagine a more damaging message to those considering speaking out.

The committee laid out some facts: declared the current PID Acting “improper” – too complex, too narrow, too prone to administrative delay. But he failed to acknowledge the human cost of this dysfunction: Whistleblowers were prosecuted, punished and publicly discredited under a law that claimed to protect them.

David McBridenow imprisoned for uncovering secret evidence of war crimes, in question from cell:

“We have whistleblower protection laws, but they are scams. They don’t work. Whistleblowers like me are put in jail as if we were criminals.”

The Committee did not oppose this statement. He did not offer any solutions for situations where the current regime failed.

Instead, it deferred responsibility to the Government’s legislative process. He implied that reform would come out of the hands of the committee.

Then came the bait and switch.

Government proposes its own watered-down bill Public Interest Disclosures and Other Legislative Amendments (Whistleblower Protections) Bill 2025 – proposed the establishment of a “Whistleblower Ombudsman” within the existing Commonwealth Ombudsman office; this was the same body that failed to act in both the Tregear and Robodebt cases.

None of the fundamental problems have been resolved. By retaining immunity under section 33 of the Act, the Ombudsman protected itself against civil suits if bad faith was proven, an almost impossible legal standard. There is no inspector. There is no external control. The system is still self-monitoring.

Professor Tregear again raised his concerns with the Attorney General’s Office during a public consultation in September. The structural defects were the same. His application was once again removed from the public list and only became available months later through a Freedom of Information request.

Two Senators – David Pocock And David Shobridge – published dissenting reports. However, their concerns did not alter the final version of the report or the Government’s subsequent legislation.

The suppression of many first-hand accounts fundamentally alters the historical record. It reframes the debate. He’s burying the evidence. Of the 16 applications printed, the public currently knows the contents of only two: those of Professor Tregear and the Fusion Party, both of which highlight critical flaws in the proposed oversight structure. It is unknown what the other 14 applications contain.

What remains is a closed loop: the Ombudsman receives complaints about himself, is immune from legal challenges and cannot be independently reviewed. When it fails, no remedy is available, as has been documented in many cases. The investigation is closed. The damage is repeated.

A Senate Inquiry could break that cycle. Instead, it reinforced it by suppressing the references that made it visible.