Australia’s ageing immigrant population bomb

While short-term immigration forecasts may reassure Canberra, five decades of compound growth reveal a much bigger story: an aging immigrant population that is quietly reshaping Australia’s demographic future, writes Sheila Newman.

IN AN ARTICLE TITLED Can we trust the Treasury’s latest net migration estimates? Australia’s former top immigration official, Dr. Abul Rizvi analyzes Australian Treasury’s December report 2025 Population TableHe confidently argues that the chances of net overseas migration (NOM) rising to its peak of 550,000 in 2025 are “nil”.

Citing a decline from post-COVID highs (538,000 in 2022-23 to 306,000 in 2024-25), Rizvi said new visa pathways (e.g. higher student limits, Pacific Participation Visas, FRIENDS for Indian professionals) but was offset by increased departures from expiring temporary visas. He is reassuring policy tightenings and labor market dynamics that he believes will prevent excessive fluctuations while keeping migration high but manageable.

But Rizvi’s focus is so narrow that it covers trends spanning less than two years and ignores the broader picture of Australia’s population growth over the last half-century. This short time frame avoids looking at the cumulative effects of continued migration on national demographics, particularly in terms of overall growth rates, accumulated population pressures, and the evolving age structure, including the rapid aging of immigrant groups.

Step back and look at the big picture

To appreciate the limitations of this perspective (shared by many mass media demographics), one needs to look at Australia’s long arc. population history. Over the last 50 years, from 1971 to 2021, the country’s population has almost doubled; increased from 13.1 million to 25.7 million; With an average annual growth rate of 1.4%, it left behind many developed countries. This growth accelerated after World War II, reaching over 2% in the 1950s and 60s amid the baby boom and mass immigration, before settling at 1-1.5% in the 1950s. last decades.

By June 2025, the population reached 27.6 million, with annual growth of 1.5% (420,100 people); this was mainly supported by 306,000 NOMs; accounting for approximately 73% of this figure. increase.

Natural increase (births minus deaths) has steadily declined as a factor, contributing only 114,600 in 2024-25; It has fallen from 60% of pre-2000 growth to about 27%. Today. In contrast, NOM has become the dominant force since the mid-2000s; Between 2005 and 2019, the annual average reached 220,000 and rose rapidly after the pandemic. tapering.

Net migration figures have fluctuated over five-year periods – from 140,000 in the early 2020s to estimates pegging around 235,000 in the long term – but the cumulative effect is profound. Millions of people have been added to migration since 1971 (this rate increased from 23% in 1901 to 29% in 2021). decline in fertility (From 3.1 births per woman in 1921 to 1.7 in 2021). The post-World War II baby boom fueled by cheap oil led to unprecedented global population figures, but it is unreasonable to try to maintain this anomaly indefinitely.

Increasing population growth compounds

Rizvi’s emphasis on short-term trends (less than two years) overlooks how these incremental additions develop into transformative pressures over decades. For example, the average growth rate of 1.4% may seem modest, but it translated into an additional 14.5 million people. since 1971It puts a strain on infrastructure, housing and services in ways that periodic forecasts like Rizvi’s cannot address.

While Rizvi’s NOM forecast of 290,000 for 2025-26 is reasonable on its own (in line with the Treasury’s forecast of 260,000 but accounting for student influxes and skilled visas), it ignores long-term impacts: NOM sustained at 235,000 per year could push the population to 35-40 million by mid-century, further exacerbating urban congestion and environmental pressures. Critics of high immigration highlight these cumulative burdens, arguing that short-term figures mask continued growth without commensurate benefits.

Rizvi’s soothing view overlooks how post-2000s NOM dominance (57% of growth) has locked Australia into an immigration-dependent trajectory that is potentially unsustainable economically, socially, environmentally and infrastructurally.

Aging immigrant population bomb

A little-explored dimension in Rizvi’s writing is the intersection of migration and population aging, which further magnifies long-term problems. Over the last 50 years, Australia’s average age has increased significantly (up 26 years since), from 27.5 years in 1971 to 38.2 years in 2021 and 38.3 years in 2024, due to declining fertility and increasing life expectancy. 1901).

The proportion of people aged 65 and over has increased from approximately 8% in the 1970s to 16% in 2020; It is estimated to reach 20-25% in 2056; The “working age” share peaked at 67.5% in 2009 and has been declining since. In the old industrial paradigm (pre-casualization and AI), working-age immigrants temporarily offset aging by increasing the workforce. But immigrants are also aging, arriving older than natives, contributing disproportionately to senior bulge.

From 1996 to 2016, the overseas-born over-65 population doubled from 0.68 million to 1.38 million (a 104% increase compared to 51% for Australian-born), with their share of the total population increasing from 30.9% to 37.6%. older cohort. Projections to 2056 predict that the number of seniors born abroad will rise to 3.5 million (a 53% increase from 2016 to 2036 alone).

Reports From the Federation of Australian Ethnic Communities Councils (FECCA) highlights these “rapid aging of immigrant communities,” noting that culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) seniors face unique vulnerabilities, such as language barriers, lower retirement and higher disability needs, and that their numbers are expected to increase fivefold in some groups (such as cases of dementia among non-English speakers).

Rizvi’s short-term view, focusing on entries such as skilled young professionals, ignores how these immigrants will eventually swell the aging ranks. potentially doubling aging rates of the workforce.

Rizvi’s view that migration is unlikely to reach peaks in 2025 may be reassuring; but his analysis flounders by limiting itself to ephemeral trends. Australia’s 50-year demographic history shows that: the nation has changed Immigration-driven growth, from a young post-war society to an artificially aged and slowing liberal economy, with 31.5% of residents born abroad.

The real story lies in the accumulating numbers (14 million added since 1971) and the inexorable wave of aging in which immigrants increasingly dominate the older demographic. Policymakers would do well to take this broader context into account, balancing short-term economic gains with long-term sustainability and equity imperatives.

Rizvi’s insights are a useful snapshot, but they capture only the ebb and flow, not the tide.

To move towards a sustainable, lower-population trajectory, Australia could readjust net overseas migration to a range from zero to 70,000 per year. This could be achieved by phasing out non-essential skilled visas (prioritising domestic retraining), limiting family reunions to close relatives only, and ending student visa extensions that increase temporary stays. Zero net alone would allow for natural increase; 70,000 would provide modest flexibility for real skills gaps. Both pathways would reduce annual growth to approximately 0.3-0.6% and increase the population to 27-29 million by 2050.

In the short term, some sectors (aged care, construction) will face workforce shortages, but these can be filled by retraining displaced locals (for example, nurses and doctors who are already here and who once staffed our hospitals and care homes) and incentives for in-home participation, debunking the fraud that we must import carers who will then themselves increase the aging group and Australia’s rate of ageing.

Economically, lower population pressure will reduce the costs of land, housing, energy, water and food, creating a much more hospitable environment for small and medium-sized businesses. Cheaper inputs would help Australian firms compete with other countries globally (most countries have lower housing costs and therefore lower costs of doing business), reverse deindustrialization and raise real wages through real job creation rather than endless population growth to mask structural weaknesses.

Socially and environmentally, it will alleviate housing/infrastructure shortages, reduce inequality and cultural tensions, and protect agricultural land, water, nature and biodiversity. Over time, cheaper land and resources will enable relocalization, rebuilding flexible, low-cost kinship and place-based support networks that industrial urbanization and high-density planning have fragmented.

This natural default (extended family, social reciprocity) is much more durable and affordable than the current model of high-cost, contractual dependency such as salaried work, debt, and professionalized care. Policymakers can choose to support this organic change or continue to support an increasingly fragile industrial system.

Fears of continued population decline without migration often overlook a simple truth: Australia’s and the world’s population numbers are already higher than at any point in history, and in many respects disturbingly high. Under these pressures, economic prospects are declining rather than improving. History and research show that people tend to have more children when they are optimistic about the future, when housing is affordable, wages are rising, and insecurity is replaced by hope.

Professor Virginia Abernethy Fertility Opportunity Hypothesis illustrates this link between perceived opportunity and fertility; Similarly my own analysis Land Ownership and Democracy in France and the Revolution in Birth Control It shows how secure land access and self-determination have historically supported smaller, healthier families.

In a true democracy, fertility is unlikely to remain at current levels indefinitely, nor should it. Populations will likely continue to decline for a generation or two as societies adapt, but there is no credible path to extinction. What we face is not a demographic catastrophe but an overdue correction of an unsustainable peak.

Ideologically, this would be a revolution for our ruling elites because it runs counter to our dominant mass media discourse. Australia will need to greatly diversify the media and allow new ideas and new political actors to transform its mass messaging system. This is probably the most difficult lever to activate the growth machine.

Sheila Newman is a sociologist and the author and editor of several books on energy resources, population, and housing policy systems. https://candobetter.net.

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