Probe says systems failure led to MSC ELSA 3 sinking near Kerala Coast

Kochi: A preliminary investigation into the sinking of container ship MSC ELSA 3 off the Kerala coast last year revealed a number of faults in the ship’s management and shore-based support systems; Investigators concluded that poor maintenance, defective equipment, inadequate training and poor safety supervision contributed to the disaster.

The findings are contained in an interim report submitted to the Kerala High Court by the central government on behalf of the Directorate General of Shipping, opposing the crew’s request to return to their home country.

On Tuesday, the court allowed the three crew members on the ship – an electrotechnical engineer, a sailor and a mechanic – to return to their home countries.

The Liberian-flagged MSC ELSA 3, built in 1997, sank on May 25, 2025, approximately 38 nautical miles off the coast of Kerala between Vizhinjam and Kochi. The ship was carrying 643 containers, including 13 loaded with hazardous materials, and its sinking triggered environmental concerns off the coasts of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

According to the report, the ship first encountered difficulties on May 24, 2025, when a ballast system failure triggered the first listing.

During the transition, the list rose to 27 degrees within 12 hours. Some containers on deck fell/threw into the sea. It then dropped to 22 degrees starboard and appeared steady for several hours.

“The listing then began to gradually increase. This failure escalated into a complete power outage with the internal power generation systems failing, leaving the ship effectively unable to operate. Without power or the ability to correct the listing status, the situation deteriorated over approximately 24 hours and the ship eventually sank.”

The report stated that the ship’s ballast water system and heel correction system suffered critical failures, resulting in an uncontrollable 26-degree heel to starboard.

“The ship’s tilt tank mechanism was out of service and did not operate in automatic mode,” the report said. He added that the ship routinely corrects its list manually after cargo operations, leading to delays and protests at terminals, including Vizhinjam.

Investigators found the aging ship lacked the redundancy and monitoring capabilities found on modern ships. They said ballast handling equipment was poorly maintained and pointed to long-standing technical faults.

The report stated that classification society Bureau Veritas had issued a “class case” regarding the defective cargo hold bilge pumping system and bilge sensors.

The investigation revealed that several critical flaws remained unresolved for months. Essential spare parts requested as “critical” were not supplied even though eight months had passed since the requests.

“These requests were marked ‘critical’ but were not fulfilled at the time of the sinking,” the report said.

Many ballast system components that were found to be defective in previous inspections were also not replaced. Instead, temporary repairs continued beyond its intended lifespan.

The report identified numerous faults in the ship’s Safety Management System (SMS), including inadequate maintenance protocols, delayed spare parts supply, faulty machinery and inadequate crew training.

Crew members reportedly lacked practical training in emergency ballast operations and power outage situations. Although they had theoretical knowledge, most were not familiar with manual override procedures, which are vital during an emergency.

Inspectors also found evidence of compromised watertight integrity. Water entered through a leaking manhole cover in the No. 5 Double Bottom Tank and a crack in the weld seam of the No. 5 Port Wing Ballast Tank, both of which discharged into the No. 4 Cargo Hold.

“There was no documentation of these defects on the ship, indicating a poor reporting culture,” the report stated.

The report also said hidden structural weaknesses and advancing flooding ultimately led to catastrophic structural and hull failures.

“These structural problems indicate that the ship was unseaworthy at the time it left Vizhinjam Port,” the statement said.

Attention was also drawn to MSC’s shore-based technical management system operated in Limassol, Cyprus.

Investigators found that abnormal pressure readings were present in the ship’s ballast management system for 36 hours before it developed a severe listing. But neither automatic monitoring systems nor shore personnel flagged warning signs.

When the ship first reported stability issues, the shoreside technical team allegedly spent more than three hours gathering experts and communicating effectively.

This was a critical delay at a time when corrective measures could still have prevented disaster, the report said.

It was also revealed that shore support personnel did not have sufficient knowledge about the ship’s ballast system and emergency procedures.

It was stated that communication between the ship and shore support was intermittent and ineffective for the last 12 hours before the sinking.

The company was also criticized for failing to fix long-standing defects such as the tilt system, unmanned machinery control systems, cargo hold bilge systems and auxiliary engine alarm systems.

“The Coastal technical team failed to monitor pending defects, provide spare parts in a timely manner, and provide the necessary support,” the report said.