Lowy Institute report warns of growing missile and submarine capabilities
The rapid expansion of China’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet and long-range missile stockpile is increasing its ability to strike targets in Australia, a new analysis warns, and the threat could rise dramatically over the next decade.
A Lowy Institute report to be published on Monday finds China’s ability to attack mainland Australia will be further enhanced by game-changing developments: the addition of a new long-range bomber to its military arsenal and the ability to move existing assets closer to Australia via a military base in the Pacific.
The article, based on open-source intelligence on China’s military modernization, reveals that the Chinese navy is planned to increase the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines to 25 by 2035, from an estimated nine today.
Australia is scheduled to acquire its second such ship (the United States Virginia-class submarine in service) by this date under the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine pact.
Australia’s distance from China is still a strategic asset, but analysts Sam Roggeveen and David Vallance think the threat of direct attack “is real and increasingly likely through missiles launched primarily from surface ships, submarines and potentially from Chinese territory”.
“China can already strike northern Australia with ballistic missiles deployed at its outposts in the South China Sea, and its capacity to strike Australian land from Chinese territory will increase over the next decade,” Roggeveen and Vallance said. Understanding China’s military threat to Australia.
“As China’s submarine fleet increases in size and sophistication, so will its ability to use these platforms to strike targets on the Australian mainland.”
Roggeveen was most impressed by China’s expansion of its fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines that can travel long distances without requiring refueling.
“They appear to be on the verge of a construction boom,” he said.
The report reveals that the Bohai shipyard in Liaoning province has started producing 4.5 to six submarines per year, including three to four nuclear-powered attack submarines [SSNs] and two ballistic missile submarines.
“Of the 25 SSNs we estimate to be in service by 2035, all are likely to deploy cruise missiles or perhaps hypersonic missiles,” the authors write.
They think a 25-strong fleet would give China “the capacity to conduct sustained offensive operations against Australian targets, rotating boats through patrol cycles to maintain continuous threat coverage.”
The US aims to produce 2.33 Virginia-class submarines per year by the early 2030s, but annual production has decreased to around 1.3. The US Navy has 53 nuclear-powered attack submarines and hopes to increase that number to 66 by the mid-2030s.
The Chinese navy is also significantly increasing its fleet of surface ships, including destroyers, aircraft carriers and frigates.
The authors emphasize that they are not claiming that China intends to attack Australia, and that Beijing’s primary military focus is closer to the country, particularly across the Taiwan Strait.
“I don’t think it’s alarming to examine the extent of the threat in a serious, fact-based analysis,” Roggeveen said.
“China is unlikely to attack Australia, but governments should look at capability, not just intent.”
Chinese President Xi Jinping showed off China’s military progress at a spectacular parade in Beijing last year.
The authors argue that it is crucial for Australia to understand China’s military capabilities in managing its own defense planning.
“Governments cannot plan their defenses based solely on what a country can do, because
“Intentions can change in an instant,” they say.
“Military action against Australia could occur as part of a larger war involving the United States or as a limited campaign to coerce Australia.”
They discuss scenarios such as China attacking an offshore oil facility or attacking ports, airports, bridges or railway facilities as a form of economic pressure.
The Lowy report finds the People’s Liberation Army’s Rocket Force (PLARF) is China’s most effective means of long-range attack against Australia.
“In the event of a major regional conflict, bases in Northern Australia would be the target of the PLARF,” the authors say.
“The crown jewel of the PLRF is the DF-26, the only Chinese conventional system that can reach Australia without needing to be carried within firing range by a bomber, ship or submarine.”
The DF-26, a non-nuclear ballistic missile that entered service in 2016, was only able to reach northern Australia when fired from one of Beijing’s artificial islands in the South China Sea.
The most significant increase in China’s missile arsenal has been its stockpile of medium-range ballistic missiles. Their range of 4000-8000 kilometers potentially takes them into northern Australia.
China had almost no medium-range ballistic missile capability in 2016, but estimates suggest China could have more than 1,000 such systems by 2035.
China’s H-6 long-range bombers currently have limited ability to attack Australian targets. The report reveals that this situation would change dramatically if it could establish a military base on Pacific islands.
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