Gulf shares concerns with US as Iran’s influence and power continue by proxy | US-Israel war on Iran

As Marco Rubio wrapped up his brief visit to the Middle East on Friday, he tried to shed the best possible light on his talks with leaders of the Gulf states. These leaders are deeply concerned that the agreement reached between Iran and the United States earlier this month has failed to address their concerns about Iran’s ongoing efforts to build power and influence across the region.

“They shared with us some very concrete concerns,” the US Secretary of State admitted, insisting that a definitive agreement would require Tehran to not only curtail its nuclear program but also halt its support for Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

But analysts and Western security officials believe Iran will likely increase its support for such groups after the conflict, confirming much of Tehran’s current strategic thinking.

The activities of irregular fighters funded and armed by Israel and, to a lesser extent, the United States are also likely to intensify, they say.

Although Hezbollah suffered greatly from protracted conflicts with Israel in 2024 and 2025, it remains the mainstay of Iran’s coalition of allied groups and proxies in the Middle East. The militant Islamist organization has also clearly failed to deter a direct attack by Israel, which is its primary strategic role for Iran.

However, Tehran remains loyal to Hezbollah, which was founded in Lebanon more than 40 years ago with the support of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

“The Iranians see this as a temporary bad phase and believe Hezbollah will be revived… It is absolutely vital that the Revolutionary Guard rebuild its proxies in the region and control its decisions,” said Hanin Ghaddar, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Iran has made the ceasefire between the United States and Iran conditional on the end of the conflict in Lebanon, causing serious tensions between Israel and Washington, which wants to advance its attack on Hezbollah.

Yemen’s Houthis, who also have close ties to Tehran, joined the recent conflict only in its final days but have demonstrated their ability to target Israel and threaten international shipping across the Red Sea, inflicting little damage. But they remain more independent from their main sponsors.

“ [Houthis] They are very tough and they were useful during the war, but… they have their own decision-making process that does not involve the Iranians,” Ghaddar said.

In Iraq, Shiite militias, nurtured and supported by Iran for more than two decades, demonstrated their strength during the conflict but never fully used their offensive arsenal. The groups claimed responsibility for dozens of drone and rocket attacks against US assets in the country and targeting Kuwait, but did not take action en masse. Deadly retaliatory airstrikes and complex Iraqi domestic politics have left leaders of many groups wary of escalating any conflict with the United States.

“They are perhaps more risk averse than the Iranians would like,” said Michael Knights, an expert on Iraqi militias at Horizon Engage, a global political risk consultancy.

Shiite militias in Iraq have also been used by Iran to target Kurdish groups and deter them from actively participating in the war. In reality, the Kurds had their own reasons for holding back from any commitment.

At the very beginning of the conflict with Iran in January, the United States and Israel sought to mobilize armed groups among Iran’s ethnic minorities, including Arabs in southwest Iran and Baluch people in Iran’s southeast. The efforts were fruitless. “There were general contacts [with these communities] but they didn’t improve,” says Michael Milshtein, a former intelligence officer who is now an analyst at Tel Aviv University.

Likewise, the US-Israeli strategy against Kurdish groups based in Northern Iraq was not successful, despite historical ties with both countries.

A long-standing U.S. plan in the event of war calls for thousands of lightly armed Kurdish fighters to cross into northwestern Iran accompanied by U.S. special forces, former senior Kurdish and U.S. military officials said. Protected by US and Israeli air forces, these fighters would advance as fast and as far as possible, aiming to destabilize the regime in Tehran and spark uprisings elsewhere. Iran’s conventional military and paramilitary forces were expected to defend against the advancing Kurds, which would subject them to devastating air strikes.

Those with direct knowledge of the plan, which they describe as “on the shelf” for more than 20 years, differ on its chances of success. A former U.S. special forces advisor with long experience in the region said a Kurdish force with embedded U.S. special forces could “run through Iran like a chainsaw”; but another said advancing beyond Kurdish-majority areas in the northwest would be difficult, if not impossible.

In the event, there were only “a few hundred” fighters who could be deployed immediately, and Kurdish leaders had grown wary of the US following what they saw as a “betrayal” by Washington in Syria a few weeks earlier. imposed agreement It brought the Kurdish civil and military authorities under the control of the central government.

While former U.S. and Kurdish officials have said the plan calls for a 12- to 24-month preparation period to train enough fighters, distribute weapons and create a unified command among the Kurds, the White House appeared to think it could be implemented in a matter of days.

A final factor was the strong personal opposition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who persuaded Donald Trump to reconsider after several days in which Israeli warplanes attacked Iranian police stations, barracks and border posts to allow Kurdish groups to launch an invasion.

In addition to its ties with the Kurds, Israeli intelligence services reportedly provided cash, intelligence and weapons To the new Druze militias in Syria. The Military Council was created to protect the beleaguered religious minority, Israeli military officials said last week, but experts point out that it will also resist consolidating the new Syrian government’s authority in its regions to serve Israel’s interests.

Israel created a number of Palestinian militias to fight Hamas in Gaza, and Hamas reestablished its authority over the 2.3 million Palestinians living outside 60% or more of the territory occupied by Israel.

They conducted raids against Hamas and undertook other “very limited” tactical missions, but with very mixed results.

“They will not change the strategic situation in Gaza in any way… Their popular support is zero and… they certainly cannot be an alternative to Hamas,” Milshtein said.

Across the region, there is a push to disarm militias and strengthen state authority to offset growing instability, but the appeal of using proxies remains despite the obvious risks. Recent and ongoing conflicts in Syria, Libya, Sudan and elsewhere have all seen the widespread use of these weapons.

“You can’t trust proxies. They’re not just useless,” Milshtein said. “They cause harm”