Let’s stop pretending AUKUS makes us safer
A few weeks ago Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasized the need to “name the truth.” Accordingly, we should call wishful thinking AUKUS. While it is clear that Australia needs a reliable submarine capability, the AUKUS plan is neither reliable nor capable of meeting Australia’s defense needs. The Australian Defense Force has correctly defined it as: a high risk project – Without Plan B.
It is highly doubtful whether a few nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) will be effective in defending Australia: too large for our northern waters, too few, difficult to man-build, unreliable and likely to be obsolete by 2050, if not sooner. But don’t worry; They will probably never come.
According to this regulation, it is very unlikely AUKUS Pillar I agreementGiven US regulations, ongoing difficulties in maintaining US shipyards, and major construction delays, the US will sell us three to five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines.
US legislation is very clear. AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization ActCode 10431 says the transfer of Virginia-class submarines to Australia “will not impair the submarine capabilities of the United States.”
The US needs to establish two Virginia class SSNs per year to meet its own needs. To supply Australia requires construction at a rate of 2.33 per year; The current rate is 1.13 and has proven to be quite resistant to increases despite large increases in funding (some $9 billion since 2018). Australia’s $3.3 billion contribution is not enough. In addition, the United States is now prioritizing the construction of much larger Columbia submarines, further reducing the likelihood of increased production rates for Virginia-class submarines.
Operational availability is also an issue, although it is rarely mentioned. Rear Admiral Jonathan Rucker“With Virginia-class Attack submarines experiencing maintenance issues and low operational availability, the U.S. Navy is working to ensure the next Attack submarine is easier to sustain,” said the attack submarine program executive. This makes it even less likely that the United States will be able to spare submarines. Even if they do, how accessible will they be? Indeed, if US submarines also needed spare parts during a conflict, could we get spare parts?
How many times do we have to tell Australia that this is a very remote possibility? Last year, U.S. Navy Chief of Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle He stated that there is no “magic bean” that will increase US shipbuilding capacity. Subsea building in the UK is even further behind, but that’s another story.
Elbridge Colby, US undersecretary of defense for policy. He said in 2024 “It would be madness for the United States to sacrifice its most important asset for a conflict with China over Taiwan when it doesn’t already have enough money… it’s not just money; it’s also the limits of our time and manpower, so both sides of this vital alliance need to face the facts.”
Late last year his AUKUS’s review of the Pentagon It was reportedly significantly modified by the president’s office before Trump declared that AUKUS was “full steam ahead.”
US Congressional Research Service He suggested in October 2024 that Australia had not received any US SSNs but was focusing on other defense capabilities. “Prior to the announcement of the AUKUS Pillar I project… there is little indication that an analysis of alternatives, or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis, was undertaken to examine whether Pillar I would be a more cost-effective way to spend defense resources,” he said.
So why is the United States willing to move forward on this issue? The benefits of this are clear. Far more important than billions of dollars (non-refundable) is having a new base on Garden Island and a new maintenance yard at Henderson, WA. Even better, the AUKUS agreement locks us into US war plans for the next 40 years. Decisions about whether Australia will enter the war will be made in DC, not Canberra.
Current US missile and warhead developments mean that Virginia-class submarines (in effect US-operated submarines) will likely carry nuclear missiles by the early 2030s. The initial assurance that they would not be nuclear-armed has disappeared, just as the initial assurance that we would not encounter weapons-grade nuclear waste has disappeared.
Fuel for these submarines requires serious enrichment technology, which significantly weakens nuclear non-proliferation norms. Japan, South Korea, Iran and Türkiye are now interested in this technology. And which lucky community will host high levels of nuclear waste?
By hosting these submarines (and the nuclear-capable B-52 bombers in the Northern Territory), we not only lose our sovereignty, but also become a target ourselves. These submarines are too large to defend Australia’s northern waters and there will be too few – if any – to provide any meaningful defence. Advances in underwater detection technology will likely render them obsolete by 2050, if not sooner.
Finally, the enormous cost of these submarines will undermine spending on other, more effective defensive weapons. Funding for health, education and other critical social needs will also be limited. Austerity policies in the UK have severely damaged the NHS, once a source of national pride. Don’t think it can’t happen here.
AUKUS Pillar II and UK submarines are also extremely problematic, but that needs another article.
We must have a public, independent review of AUKUS. We need to consider alternatives that are more cost-effective and in line with our national interests. Sovereignty is important.
Defensive secrecy is no excuse and wishful thinking is a very poor strategy. It’s time to stop gaslighting the public.
Dr Margaret Beavis is vice president of the Medical Society for the Prevention of War.
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Dr Margaret Beavis is vice president of the Medical Society for the Prevention of War.
