Contributor: Don’t count on regime change to stabilize Venezuela
As the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier heads for the Caribbean, the US military continues to attack drug boats and the Trump administration off the coast of Venezuela discussing what to do One thing is certain about Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro: Venezuela and the western hemisphere will be better off if Maduro packs his bags and spends the rest of his years in exile.
That’s certainly what Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado is working on. This year’s Nobel Prize winner He has spent much of his time lately lobbying policymakers in the United States to persuade Maduro to leave power. Machado, who is constantly in danger of arrest in his own country, give an interview and attending conferences to advocate regime change. The talking points are clearly tailored to the Trump administration: Maduro is the head of a drug cartel poisoning Americans; his dictatorship rests on weak pillars; And the forces of democracy in Venezuela are fully prepared to take over after Maduro is gone. Machado: “We are ready to take over the government” said In a Bloomberg News October interview.
But as the old saying goes, if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. While there is no dispute that Maduro is a despot and an election-stealing fraud, U.S. policymakers cannot simply accept what Machado said. Washington learned this the hard way before the war in Iraq, when an opposition leader named Ahmed Chalabi sold US politicians a bill of goods about how painless it would be to rebuild post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. We all know how the story turned out: The United States faced an invasion that absorbed U.S. resources, produced unforeseen regional consequences, and proved to be more difficult than its proponents had initially claimed.
To be fair, Machado is not Çelebi. The second was a fraudster; The first is the head of an opposition movement whose candidate is Edmundo González Urrutia. Won two-thirds of the votes During the 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections (Maduro nevertheless declared victory and forced González into exile). But just because his intentions are good doesn’t mean we shouldn’t question his claims.
Will regime change in Caracas produce the Western-style democracy that Machado and his supporters expect? None of us can ignore this. But the Trump administration cannot rely on that as a result of the post-Maduro future. Other scenarios are just as likely, if not more so. Some of these could lead to more violence for Venezuelans and more problems for U.S. policy in Latin America.
The biggest problem with regime change is that you can never be quite sure what will happen after the incumbent leader is removed. Such operations are inherently dangerous and destabilizing; Political orders are being deliberately torn apart, the poor are becoming poorer, and masses of voters accustomed to holding the reins of power suddenly find themselves as outsiders. When Hussein was deposed in Iraq, the military officers, Baath Party loyalists, and regime sycophants who had been in power for nearly a quarter of a century had to make do with a completely new situation. The Sunni-dominated structure was overthrown, and members of the previously oppressed Shiite majority now eagerly began to take their place at the top of the system. This, combined with the US decision to ban anyone with ties to the old regime from holding government offices, fed the ingredients for a large-scale insurgency that challenged the new government, precipitated a civil war and killed tens of thousands of Iraqis.
Regime change can also create a complete absence of authority, as occurred in Libya following the US-NATO intervention in 2011. Just like Maduro today, Muammar Gadafi was a despised figure whose death was thought to pave the way for a democratic utopia in North Africa. The truth was nothing but this. Instead, Gaddafi’s removal sparked conflict between Libya’s major tribal alliances, rival governments and a proliferation of terrorist groups in a country just south of the European Union. Fifteen years later, Libya remains a basket case of militias, warlords and weak institutions.
Unlike Iraq and Libya, Venezuela has experience in democratic governance. It has held relatively free and fair elections in the past and has not suffered from the sectarian divisions associated with states in the Middle East.
Still, this is cold comfort to those expecting a democratic transition. Indeed, for such a transition to be successful, the Venezuelan military must engage in the process, either by standing on the sidelines as the Maduro regime collapses, actively arresting Maduro and his senior associates, or by agreeing to shift its support to new officials. But still, this is a difficult task, especially for an army whose leadership is central to the survival of the Maduro regime, accustomed to making obscene amounts of money from under-the-table illegal activities, and whose members are implicated in human rights abuses. Elites who profited greatly from the old system would have to cooperate with the new system. This seems unlikely, especially if their share of the pie will shrink once Maduro leaves.
Finally, although regime change seems like a good solution to the Venezuelan problem, it may exacerbate the difficulties over time. Although the Maduro regime’s jurisdiction is already limited, a complete dissolution of the regime could lead to a free-for-all agreement between elements of the former government, drug trafficking organizations, and established armed groups such as the Colombian National Liberation Army, which has long viewed Venezuela as a base of operations. Any post-Maduro government would struggle to manage all of this while trying to restructure Venezuela’s economy and rebuild its institutions. The Trump administration will then face the possibility that Venezuela will become an even larger source of drugs and immigration, and the White House is working to prevent that.
In the end, María Corina Machado was proven right. But it sells the best-case assumption. The USA shouldn’t be buying this. Democracy after Maduro is possible, but it is not the only possible outcome and certainly not the most likely outcome.
Daniel R. DePetris is a member of Defense Priorities.
