Explained: How US policy is reshaping Kurdish politics across the Middle East | World News

The US telling the Syrian Kurds that their partnership had “expired” turned out to be a betrayal rather than a policy update. The message came at the worst possible time, amid fierce fighting between Kurdish forces and the Syrian army, and carried the clear implication that Washington was now on the side of Damascus, not the Kurds.

The implications were clear to Kurds in the Middle East, watching from Syria, Iraq, Türkiye and Iran. Once seen as a reluctant but useful ally, the United States is now seen as unreliable, especially when it comes to protecting minority partners under pressure.

This change is already changing Kurdish political calculations in the region.

Syrian Kurds and fear of central government

U.S. support for Damascus under interim President Ahmed al-Shara has revived one of the Kurds’ deepest concerns: the return of a strong, centralized Syrian state. For Kurdish communities, this is not an abstract concern, but a lesson learned from decades of experience.

Central states in the Middle East have constantly marginalized the Kurdish population and suppressed their language, identity and political rights. Syria under the Assad regime was a clear example of this. Kurds were not recognized as a separate group, the Kurdish language and names were banned in public life, and many people were denied citizenship altogether.

Al-Sharaa has taken small steps to signal change. The presidential decree of January 16 promised limited rights, and the agreement signed between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on January 30 included a cautious recognition of the Kurdish collective identity. Particularly striking was the reference to “Kurdish regions,” a language that has long been absent from official Syrian discourse.

But these gains are modest and fragile. These are developing within a transitional framework that ultimately aims to re-establish central authority. For Syrian Kurds, the fear is not what is promised today, but what may be taken away tomorrow.

Most Kurdish groups now agree that armed resistance is not a realistic option. But trust in Washington has been greatly damaged, and any future relationship with the United States will be viewed with deep suspicion.

Iraq: A surprising Shiite-Kurdish rapprochement

In Iraq, US policy on Syria is fueling a broader political realignment. After years of rivalry and mistrust, Shiite and Kurdish actors are finding common ground not because of shared ideology but because of shared fears.

In 2003, their alliance was built on a shared history under Saddam Hussein. Today, a common concern about future marginalization in an unstable region is taking shape.

This shift is evident both among political elites and the broader public. For the first time in years, many Iraqi Kurds are no longer enthusiastic about regime change in Iran; This would have been unthinkable just a few weeks ago.

This change became even more evident last month when Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework nominated Nouri al-Maliki for the post of prime minister. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the dominant Kurdish force, publicly welcomed the move.

This support did not stem solely from anger over US actions in Syria. This also reflected the internal politics of the Kurds. KDP is in competition with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) over Iraq’s Kurdish-reserved presidency. Support for al-Maliki strengthens the KDP’s hand in Baghdad.

From Washington’s perspective, a Kurdistan Regional Government aligned with the KDP working closely with the al-Maliki-led administration could complicate U.S. efforts to limit Iran’s influence in Iraq. However, Kurdish leaders argue that their position cannot be understood without taking into account US behavior in Syria. In the eyes of the Kurds, Washington did not act as a neutral broker.

Türkiye’s peace process: damaged but not derailed

For much of last year, many believed that Türkiye’s talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) depended heavily on developments in Syria and the future of the SDF. It seems that the conflicts between Damascus and the SDF, supported by Ankara and Washington, put this process at risk. But unexpectedly, the negotiations did not end in failure.

Instead the two pieces appear to be treated separately. Talks with the PKK are likely to continue within Türkiye, and PKK leaders have not translated their disappointment with the weakening of the SDF into a complete rejection of dialogue with Ankara.

One of the main reasons for this is that the SDF has not been fully disbanded and not enough space has been left to keep diplomatic channels open.

Iranian Kurds step back from conflict

Iranian Kurds, although geographically distant from Syria, drew their own conclusions. The SDF’s stepping aside has reinforced their view that US support for minorities is unpredictable and transactional.

Despite ongoing US rhetoric against Tehran, Iranian Kurdish groups have consciously avoided leading recent protests or allowing themselves to be used by Western media. This restriction is striking.

There is little excitement about the return of Reza Pahlavi, who enjoys Washington’s support. For many Kurds, the memory of the Shah’s repression remains fresh, and Western-based opposition groups have offered no credible guarantees of Kurdish rights.

Some Iran-based Kurdish armed groups operating in Iraq have carried out limited attacks near the border. However, the main actors avoided escalating tensions. Their calculations are shaped by uncertainty about the ultimate goals of the United States and Israel and the knowledge that any serious conflict would likely trigger Iranian retaliation against Iraqi Kurds.

A weakening confidence

Every time Washington abandons a Kurdish partner, it undermines the trust that supports its influence on the ground. Syrian and Iraqi Kurds have learned to live with America’s unpredictability, but that tolerance has its limits.

If the remaining trust is finally broken, the consequences will go far beyond Kurdish politics. As the United States looks for partners in the region, it may find that fewer people are willing to believe that its commitments will continue.