How the ‘poor man’s cruise missile’ is shaping Tehran’s retaliation

In the wake of Israeli-US attacks on Iran, American allies in the Persian Gulf are hearing a sound that Ukrainian soldiers have long feared: the foreboding hum of the Shahed-136 ‘kamikaze’ drone.

Shahed, which originates from Iran, has already become a fixture in modern warfare after Tehran’s strategic partner Russia used this technology in its years-long occupation of Ukraine.

Now the drones, the most advanced of which is the long-range Shahed-136, have become central to Iran’s retaliatory strategy against the United States and its regional allies, and thousands have been released so far.

At first glance, Shahed pales into insignificance compared to the latest weapons technologies; one analyst refers to it as the “poor man’s cruise missile.”

However, although American allies managed to intercept the vast majority of incoming drones with the help of US-supplied defense systems such as ‘Patriot’ missiles, many Witnesses still managed to hit their targets.

The United Arab Emirates Ministry of Defense said on Tuesday that 65 of 941 Iranian drones detected since the start of the Iran war have crashed on its territory, damaging ports, airports, hotels and data centres.

Analysts say the key to their effectiveness lies in the numbers. Drones are relatively cheap and easy to mass produce, especially compared to the advanced systems used to defend against them.

These factors make the drone ideal for recruiting and overloading air defenses; Each captured drone also represents a more valuable defense asset spent.

“Shahed-136, along with other unmanned aerial systems, provided a cheap way to impose disproportionate costs on states like Russia and Iran,” said Patrycja Bazylczyk, an analyst with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

“They force adversaries to waste expensive interceptors on low-cost drones, diverting power and creating a sustained psychological burden on the civilian population.”

WE government reports They describe the Shahed-136 as a one-way attack drone produced by Iranian entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Compared to ballistic missiles, drones fly low and slow, carry a relatively modest payload and are mostly limited to fixed targets, Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior director of the Iran program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told CNBC.

Public estimates suggest Shahed drones could cost between $20,000 and $50,000 each. Ballistic and cruise missiles can cost millions of dollars each.

In that sense, Shahed and its equivalents “basically serve as ‘poor man’s cruise missiles,’ offering a way to attack and harass enemies “on the cheap,” Taleblu said.

This cost advantage is important for Iran, which faces both international sanctions and restrictions on acquiring advanced weapons.

Meanwhile, the cost of air defense systems used by Gulf countries and Israel can be high. with 3 million dollars $12 million per catcherAccording to U.S. Department of Defense budget documents.

This cost disparity poses a serious problem for Iran’s adversaries: There are a limited number of defensive missiles in their air defense systems, and each captured target represents a valuable wasted asset.

Therefore, in a war of attrition, drones could be used by Tehran to wear down its air defenses and open them up to more damaging attacks, analysts say.

“The logic is to spend early on drones while preserving ballistic missiles in the long term,” said CSIS’s Bazylczyk.

He added that Iran’s ability to sustain mass drone use will depend on its stockpiles, how well it can maintain or restore its supply chain, and whether the United States and Israel can meaningfully disrupt the flow of components or production facilities.

The US has long been trying to prevent Iran’s Shahed-136 production and recently banned Iran’s production. new sanctions It targets questionable component suppliers in Türkiye and the UAE.

However, Russia’s production of Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles shows that such systems can be produced at scale in wartime and under targeted sanctions.

US officials claim As of Wednesday, Iran had launched more than 2,000 drones in the conflict. However, military experts state that it is understood that the country has large stocks and could have the capacity to produce hundreds more each week. reportedly He told the national newspaper.

“Gulf states run the risk of exhausting their interceptors unless they become more cautious about when to fire their interceptors,” said Joze Pelayo, a Middle East security analyst at the think tank Atlantic Council.

“Extinction is not imminent, but it remains a pressing problem,” he said. But he added that attacks on multiple fronts by Iran’s allies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis could put the stockpiles at risk of being depleted within days.

Some analysts They suggested that Iran was taking advantage of Russia’s extensive combat experience with drones, including modifications such as anti-jamming antennas, electronic warfare-resistant navigation, and new warheads.

These warheads typically carry between 30 and 50 kg of explosives and can be very effective, especially when used in large swarms, with advanced versions having a range of up to 1,200 miles.

The Shahed-136 has proven so effective that the United States has reverse-engineered it and deployed its own version on the battlefield against Iranian targets, said Michael Connell, a Middle East expert at the Center for Naval Analyzes.

US Central Command in Iran attacks over the weekend approved He said that it was the first time in the war that he used such low-cost one-way attack drones modeled on Shahed.

As drones become a fixture of the modern battlefield, methods of dealing with them are also evolving.

Ukraine has had some success shooting down drones with fighter artillery fire, a more sustainable deterrent than missile interceptors, according to Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

in Ukraine recently pioneered Development of cheaper mass-produced interceptors that Kiev claims could stop Shahed.

Gulf countries are also expected to adopt more sustainable approaches. Pentagon and at least one Gulf government reportedly It is in talks to purchase cheaper Ukrainian-made interceptors.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s Ministry of Defense announced that in addition to its air defenses on the ground, it also used air force jets to thwart Iranian attacks, including Shahid drones.

Electronic warfare targeting Shahed’s GPS, as well as short-range missiles and directed energy systems such as Israel’s Iron Beam, are also significantly cheaper to operate than conventional interceptors.

Still, analysts say Gulf countries currently lack fast, high-volume anti-drone capabilities. Such systems will likely take years to develop and deploy, said the Atlantic Council’s Pelayo.

“Gulf states that host US bases, such as Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE, benefit from an expanded capability to repel drone attacks through the American-operated system, but this is still not sufficient against massive and sustained attacks.”