Who is RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagolo?

Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as “Hemedti”, has emerged as a dominant figure on Sudan’s political scene, with his paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now controlling half the country.

The RSF recently achieved a notable victory by capturing the city of al-Fasher, the last garrison held by the Sudanese army and its local allies in the western region of Darfur.

Feared and hated by his rivals, Hemedti is admired by his followers for his tenacity, ruthlessness, and promise to overthrow a disgraced state.

Hemedti has humble origins. His family is from the Mahariya segment of the camel-herding, Arabic-speaking Rizeigat community, which spreads across Chad and Darfur.

He was born in 1974 or 1975; Like many people from rural areas, his date and place of birth were not recorded.

His clan, led by his uncle Juma Dagolo, moved to Darfur in the 1970s and 80s, fleeing war and seeking greener pastures, and were allowed to settle.

After leaving school as a teenager, Hemedti earned money by trading camels from the desert to Libya and Egypt.

At that time, Darfur was Sudan’s wild west; it was poor, lawless, and neglected by the government of then-President Omar al-Bashir.

Arab militias known as Janjaweed, including a force commanded by Juma Dagolo, were attacking villages of the indigenous Fur ethnic group.

This cycle of violence led to a large-scale rebellion in 2003, when Masalit, Zaghawa and other groups joined Fur fighters, saying they were ignored by the country’s Arab elite.

In response, Bashir greatly expanded Janjaweed to lead counter-insurgency efforts. They quickly gained notoriety for burning, looting, raping and killing.

A report by African Union peacekeepers also stated that Hemedti’s unit attacked and destroyed the village of Adwa in November 2004, killing 126 people, including 36 children.

A US investigation determined that the Janjaweed were responsible for the genocide.

The Darfur conflict was referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC); The court filed charges against four people, including Bashir, who denied committing genocide.

Hemedti was one of many Janjaweed commanders who were considered too junior at the time to escape the prosecutor’s notice.

Only one of them, Janjaweed “colonel” Ali Abdel Rahman Kushayb, was brought to trial.

He was found guilty of 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity last month and will be sentenced on November 19.

In the years following the peak of violence in 2004, Hemedti played his cards masterfully and became head of a powerful paramilitary force, a corporate empire and a political machine.

This is a story of opportunism and entrepreneurship. He briefly rebelled, demanding payback for his soldiers, a promotion, and a political position for his brother. Bashir gave him most of what he wanted, and Hemedti rejoined the group.

Later, when other Janjaweed units rebelled, Hemedti led government forces that defeated them in the process seizing control of Darfur’s largest artisanal gold mine at a place called Jebel Amir.

Hemedti’s family business, Al-Gunaid, quickly became Sudan’s largest gold exporter.

In 2013, Hemedti requested and received official status as head of the RSF, a new paramilitary group reporting directly to Bashir.

Janjaweeds were recruited into the RSF, receiving new uniforms, vehicles and weapons, and officers from the regular army were also brought in to assist with the upgrade.

The RSF scored a significant victory against the Darfur rebels, had less success fighting the insurgency in the Nuba Mountains adjacent to South Sudan, and signed a subcontract to police the Libyan border.

Hemedti’s commanders, who ostensibly prevented illegal migration from Africa across the desert to the Mediterranean, were also successful in extortion and reportedly human trafficking.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) called on the Sudanese army to send soldiers to fight against the Houthis in Yemen.

The unit’s commander was Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, a general who had fought in Darfur and is now the commander of the army at war with the RSF.

Hemedti seized the opportunity and negotiated a separate, private agreement with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to provide RSF mercenaries.

The Abu Dhabi connection turned out to be very important. This was the beginning of a close relationship with Emirati President Mohamed bin Zayed.

Young Sudanese men (and increasingly from neighboring countries too) marched to RSF recruitment centers for cash payments of up to $6,000 (£4,500) upon registration.

Hemedti partnered with Russia’s Wagner Group, receiving training in exchange for business deals including gold.

He visited Moscow to formalize the agreement and was there the day Russia invaded Ukraine. He denied that RSF received assistance from Wagner after the war in Sudan began.

Although the RSF’s main combat units were increasingly professionalised, it also included a coalition of irregular old-style ethnic militias.

As the regime faced increasing popular protests, Bashir ordered Hemedti’s troops to the capital, Khartoum.

The president saw the RSF as a counterweight to potential coup plotters in the regular army and national security, calling it himayti, meaning “my protector”, a pun on its name.

It was a miscalculation. In April 2019, a vibrant camp of civilian protesters laid siege to military headquarters, demanding democracy.

Bashir ordered the army to open fire on them. Top generals, including Hemedti, met and decided to depose Bashir instead. The democracy movement was celebrated.

Hemedti was known as the new face of Sudan’s future for a while. Young, friendly, actively acquainted with various social groups, he tried to change his political color by positioning himself as someone who challenged the historical structure of the country. This only lasted a few weeks.

While he and Burhan, co-chairman of the ruling military council, stalled on transferring power to civilians, protesters stepped up their demonstrations and Hemedti unleashed the RSF, which killed hundreds of people, raped women and committed violence. The men were thrown into the Nile River with bricks tied to their wrists, according to a report by campaign group Human Rights Watch (HRW)..

Hemedti denied that the RSF had committed atrocities.

Under pressure from the quartet of countries (USA, UK, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) formed to promote peace and democracy in Sudan, generals and civilians agreed to a compromise drawn up by African mediators.

For two years there was an unstable coexistence between the military-dominated ruling council and the civilian cabinet.

Burhan and Hemedti expelled civilians and seized power while a cabinet-appointed committee investigating military, security and RSF-owned companies prepared its final report, revealing how Hemedti rapidly expanded his corporate empire.

But the coup plotters had a falling out. Burhan demanded that the RSF be placed under army command.

Hemedti resisted. Days before the April 2023 deadline to resolve this issue, RSF units moved to surround the army headquarters and capture key bases and the national palace in the capital, Khartoum.

The coup failed. Instead, Khartoum became a war zone, with rival forces fighting street by street.

Violence broke out in Darfur as RSF units launched a violent campaign against the Masalit people.

The UN estimates that up to 15,000 civilians died, and the US has called it genocide. RSF denied the claim.

RSF commanders spread videos of their fighters torturing and killing, publicizing the brutality and sense of impunity.

The RSF and its allied militias attacked Sudan, looting cities, markets, universities and hospitals.

The looted goods are sold in places popularly known as “Dagolo markets”, which extend beyond Sudan to Chad and other neighboring countries. RSF denied that its fighters were involved in looting.

Trapped in the national palace under attack from artillery and air strikes, Hemedti was seriously injured and disappeared from public view in the first weeks of the conflict.

When he resurfaced months later, he showed no remorse for the atrocities committed and was no less determined to win the war on the battlefield.

The RSF acquired modern weapons, including advanced drones, which it used to attack Burhan’s de facto capital, Port Sudan, which played a key role in the attack on al-Fasher.

Investigative reporting by the New York Times, among others, has documented that they were shipped via an airstrip and supply base built by the UAE just inside Chad. The UAE denies arming the RSF.

With these weapons, the RSF finds itself in a strategic stalemate with its former partner, the Sudanese army.

Hemedti is trying to form a political coalition that includes some civilian groups and armed movements, especially his former enemies in the Nuba Mountains.

He took the presidency for himself and established a parallel “Peace and Unity Government”.

With the capture of Al Fasher, the RSF now controls almost all of the populated areas west of the Nile.

Following increasing reports of mass shootings and widespread condemnation, Hemedti announced that an investigation would be launched into what he described as violations committed by his soldiers. During the capture of Al-Fasher.

Sudanese believe Hemedti either sees himself as the head of a separatist state or still harbors ambitions of ruling all of Sudan.

It is also possible that he sees the future as a very powerful political puppet master, the head of a conglomerate that controls businesses, a mercenary army and a political party. In this way, he can pull the strings even if he is not accepted as the public face of Sudan.

And while Hemedti’s troops massacre civilians in El Fasher, he’s certain he’s enjoying impunity in a world that doesn’t much care.

Alex de Waal is executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the US.