It’s time for U.S. to treat rare earths as power. China already does

In April 2025, China implemented new export controls for seven rare earth elements and permanent magnets derived from them – materials that form the basis of modern life and modern war. Warrior jets, missiles, electric vehicles, drones, wind turbines and even data centers are based on high -performance magnets made of these critical minerals. By restricting the flow of Beijing, he did not only stretch the industrial muscle, but also revealed the rest of the dangerous fragility of America and the world. China’s latest actions show their preparations and abilities for arming American and global addiction.

This is not a new challenge. The United States knows that for more than 15 years, critical mineral supply chains have been very concentrated, very fragile and is very much exposed to China’s leverage and control. Nevertheless, in democratic and republican administrations, we could not respond with urgency or consistency. Now, the consequences of these failures have caught us in the neck and stepped in our commercial and defense sectors.

Following London talks, Washington and Beijing announced a new trade framework on Friday, where China will continue to approve export licenses for Nadir Earths within the next six months. US officials explained the breakthrough to the public – but presented a few details about those given in return. He leaves these big questions unanswered: What were the US exchange? How will the agreement be applied? And what happens when it is full for six months?

Skepticism high. Ford recently stressed that even the futures cuts in Chicago stopped production in the Chicago factory due to a magnet shortage. Paper agreements are not supply chain solutions. Transparency, on time, and without long -term planning, this can easily become one step forward, two steps back, another diplomatic cycle.

Even this limited Repriev is risky. Duzines in Europe and North America announced China’s export license process is extremely invasive -Ask them to offer detailed production data, expiration applications, facility images, customer names and transaction history. It was rejected because some applicants did not give photos or documents of their end users.

Managers say the process means “official information extraction”.

While companies are advised not to share sensitive IP, neglecting the basic details may mean uncertain delays. Inferences for companies in defense supply chains are concerned: valuable commercial intelligence can be used to map competitors, disrupt pricing or advance Chinese substitutes.

This is not just licensing, competitive supervision. And the US continues to be exposed to both deterioration and data risk until critical minerals create a safe, independent capacity along the supply chain.

This vulnerability did not take place overnight. Many have been watching this slow moving train debris for years. In 2010, China cut rare land exports to Japan during a maritime dispute, a warning that the US observed but brushed. In 2014, the Obama administration won a DTO case against China’s export restrictions, but assumed that legal success would determine more manipulation.

Trump, what did Biden do

The first Trump administration defined the rare worlds critically, but they were exempt from 2018 Chinese tariffs, perhaps an uncommon acceptance of US addiction. Biden has received the most structured approach to date: the manager order 14017, critical minerals working group and financing from IIij and IRA. Strategic partnerships such as Mineral Security Partnership emerged. However, progress was slow, prevented by allowing delays and irregular allied commitments.

The second Trump administration returned with more aggressive measures, called Chapter 232, activated the Defense Production Law, and proposed major financing increases in FY2026. A national energy dominance council is now coordinating efforts. Nevertheless, these measures, such as China’s six -month reprieve, will still not displace Beijing. And most importantly, the defense sector continues to be cut without such a undergraduate window.

The last G7 summit in Canada underlined global risks. European Commission President Ursula von der leyen He accused China directly of “arming” On switch materials such as rare soils calling the combined G7 response. Result: A G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan. Although the name of China was not mentioned, the subtext was open. The plan undertakes G7 members to increase ESG and traceability standards for key sources; Mobilize capital for new projects on critical mining and processing; And cooperate in innovation in recycling, substitution and refinery technologies.

As can be estimated, Beijing reacted angrily. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the G7 provoked confrontation with fear of losing market share, and rejected the plan as a “excuse” for protectionism.

Brussels now shows that trade negotiations with Beijing are effectively standing, so China’s retaliation possibilities – especially against the EU – are increasing. If China endures in half, the EU, Japan, South Korea and India are at risk of pushing more tightly to the orbit of Washington – what Beijing hopes to fully avoid.

The dominant position in China in rare land mining

The raw numbers are amazing. China constitutes approximately 70% of global rare soil mining, but more than 90% of refining capacity. It produces 92% of the magnets of the world, which is used in everything from submarines to Teslas, the neodimium-iron-boron (NDFEB) magnets. This domination is not an accident. China subsidized the process that focused on global acquisitions throughout the supply chain and scaled its production much faster than the West could allow a single mine.

US sites Deputy‘Mountain crossing and round top remains incomplete without flowing down. Dod and Doe offered a grant and the FY2026 Trump budget is trying to expand US mining capacity and increase secure access to critical minerals. However, all of this has been going to be dwarf by China’s main start and industrial command and control of the sector for a long time.

China moved to Africa and Latin America in an early and decisive manner and established a partnership with governments in Democratic Congo, Bolivia and Chile; To invest in ports, rails and refined infrastructure. On the other hand, the US’s efforts and participation on these issues have given priority to parts and values, transparency and management, but really important issues, but offer a limited momentum of critical mineral problems. Even with the Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the last mous is symbolically prevented by conflict and instability in these countries.

London talks and the last trade agreement progressing time. However, time is not efficient without strategy. China’s undergraduate regime remains intact, data is not slowing down. The defense sector is closing. Meanwhile, Congress threats to cancel clean energy and industrial policy financing can stop rare land projects just like they gain traction.

This is a decisive moment. China bets that the internal divisions between America’s labor, industry, environmentalists, tribal nations and political groups will prevent the combined, constant type of effort required to compete. They may be right. The US needs to prove that it is wrong.

Critical minerals are geopolitical power

The United States should no longer consider critical minerals as geopolitical power tools, not critical minerals. China is already doing it. Escape from the grip will require more than mineral permits and short -term financing. It requires a consistent, long -term strategy to create a complete supply chain, including not only local capabilities, but also reliable allies and partners. From mining and refining to magnet production and recycling, each connection should be strengthened through the targeted investment, reform permission and strategic coordination.

A successful and sustainable policy requires commitment from one presidency to another. The United States cannot afford to engage with allies and partners. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile and Indonesia (between others) need continuous partnerships supported by financing, technology transfer and critical infrastructure investments, not only our governance conferences.

Six-month exports from China is not a solution-a stress test. It reveals whether the US can finally focus or focus or move back to comfort. Beijing bets that it will be the second. Washington should respond to the scale of urgency, unity and difficulty with an equal strategy. There is still time, but not too much.

–With Dewardric McNealGeneral Manager and Senior Policy Analyst and CNBC participant at LongView Global