Australia’s quiet slide into digital dependency

Australia’s deepening digital ties with the US may provide protection, but the price may be control. Paul Budde reports.

IN A PREVIOUS ARTICLE, I argued that technological systems created for efficiency are increasingly being repurposed for control purposes. We will take this concern to the geopolitical level in the next section.

Deepening Australia’s digital integration with the United States through projects such as:Top Secret Cloud” may offer speed and security, but it also carries the risk of surrendering sovereignty.

Until recently, few people questioned the wisdom of these regulations. These were presented as pragmatic steps towards faster data sharing and stronger intelligence cooperation. But the world has changed. The United States, once seen as the pillar of liberal democracy, shows unmistakable signs of authoritarian tendencies.

In one year, we have witnessed the weaponization of justice, the erosion of press freedoms, and the blatant violation of democratic norms. Australia currently faces a moral and strategic dilemma: Can we entrust our most secret systems to a partner who no longer shares our democratic values?

The illusion of secure sovereignty

cloud project developed with Amazon Web ServicesIt will house Australia’s most sensitive intelligence data within a private American network. Under US CLOUD ActUS authorities can legally enforce access to data held anywhere in the world. When our intelligence systems are housed there, they effectively fall under American jurisdiction.

This is not about whether the United States will abuse that access; It’s about the structural error of creating a system that allows this. Sovereignty built on trust is definitely not sovereignty.

From interoperability to dependency

“Top Secret Cloud” forms the basis of this RED TOO (Resilience – Effects – Defense – Space – Intelligence – Cyber ​​– Enablers) program, a $9.9 billion overhaul Australian Signals Directorate It was designed to make it an AI-focused intelligence agency. It also supports AUKUS Column IIIt will integrate Australia’s cyber, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems with US and UK capabilities.

In practice, what appears to be interoperability turns into dependency. When decision systems and digital identities merge across borders, independence is no longer a choice but an illusion. We can never host a Chinese-run cloud, but the moral distance between Washington and Beijing is rapidly narrowing. Authoritarianism remains authoritarianism, whether wrapped in nationalism or exceptionalism.

And as this integration proceeds without serious sovereignty debate, Australia risks being locked into America’s strategic orbit, which by design could automatically lead us into a military conflict with China. The technology that binds our systems together can also bind our foreign policy, limiting our capacity to choose neutrality or restraint when tensions escalate.

Erosion of transparency at home

The reflection of this dependency model on domestic politics is worrying. Albanian recommended by the government Freedom of Information reformsFramed as a defense against “foreign interference,” the law will make it harder for journalists and citizens to scrutinize decisions. Agencies may reject requests requiring more than 40 hours of work or anonymous applications.

The timing is remarkable. Australia is integrating more deeply into US-led defense and intelligence systems, while also tightening internal controls on transparency. The less the public sees, the easier it is for important strategic decisions, including irreversible technological dependencies, to proceed without democratic consent.

Silence from Canberra

Despite these developments, Australia’s political class remains silent. Both major parties cling to the comfort of alliance dependence and are unwilling to question whether our security relationship has become a form of digital obedience.

The problem is not the alliance itself, but the absence of borders. Without a clearly defined framework for sovereignty, common security risks turning into common subordination. Australia needs to clearly articulate where cooperation ends and control begins; This is not something that either the government or the opposition is ready to do.

A true alliance between democracies should not require silence. If one partner is drifting towards authoritarianism, the other’s job is to resist, not imitate. Our leaders must recognize that the greatest threat to Australian democracy may come not from China but from blind faith in America’s permanence as a liberal power.

Taking back sovereignty before it disappears

Security and sovereignty are not the same thing. Security can be shared; One must have sovereignty. Australia risks trading independence for assurance by outsourcing the architecture of our defense and intelligence systems to a foreign company governed by foreign laws.

It’s time for a national conversation about technological sovereignty, that is, about what should and should not be included in alliance infrastructure. Oversight mechanisms, data firewalls and in-country control should be non-negotiable.

Australia is not alone. Strong partnerships remain possible with other stable democracies (Europe, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) that continue to maintain transparency, the rule of law, and institutional restraint. Expanding our security base through such relationships will strengthen both our independence and democracy.

Convenience once made us complacent about surveillance. Security can now make us obedient. If we are not careful, the cloud that protects us may one day decide for us.

Paul Budde is an IA columnist and managing director of independent telecommunications research and consultancy Paul Budde Consulting. You can follow Paul on Twitter @PaulBudde.

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