South Azerbaijan’s case for political agency

Decades of exclusion and environmental collapse have pushed Southern Azerbaijan beyond reform and into the real question of political power, writes Dr Abraham Alvadi.

Daily life is becoming increasingly difficult for a large segment of the population in the country known as Iran.

This challenge is not expressed only in inflation rates or unemployment figures; It is reflected in the decrease in the quality of life, the erosion of personal and social security, and the disappearance of the sense of a credible future.

But a common analytical mistake is to assume that this situation is the same across the country and can be solved with a single, standard solution. This assumption is rooted in the long-standing belief in a homogeneous, single-nation Iran.

Southern Azerbaijan differs exactly at this point.

Who are the Azerbaijanis in Iran?

Iran’s Azeri people – often referred to as those living in Southern Azerbaijan – constitute one of the largest non-Persian population groups in the country. They are a Turkish-speaking people whose language is closely related to Azerbaijani Turkish and the Turkish spoken in the Republic of Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

Concentrated primarily in the northwestern part of Iran, including the East and West Azerbaijan provinces (Ardabil, Zanjan, Qazvin, Hamadan, and parts of Tehran), the Azerbaijani people have played a central role in the political, economic, and cultural history of Iran. The Azerbaijani people were the founders and ruling elites of many dynasties over the last 1000 years, including the Safavid and Qajar dynasties.

Following the collapse of the Qajar dynasty in 1925 and the establishment of the Pahlavi monarchy under strong external influence, Azerbaijani and other non-Persian identities were increasingly excluded from institutional recognition as the Iranian state pursued an increasingly centralized and culturally homogenizing national project that prioritized Persian (Tajik) language and culture.

For many Southern Azerbaijanis, the issue is not just one of cultural rights but also of political representation; whether they are treated as stakeholders in governance or as a population expected to assimilate into a central national identity.

Crises that are not only discussed but also experienced

For the people of Southern Azerbaijan, crises are not abstract concepts; these are concrete, lived realities. For example, drying Lake Urmia It’s not just an environmental problem; It has become a powerful symbol of the systemic failure to protect the ecological foundations of an entire region.

Land degradation, collapse of agricultural livelihoods, forced rural and urban migration, and the normalization of unemployment among educated youth are now structural features of daily life. These pressures accelerated migration and hollowed out local economies.

Alongside these material crises lies a deeper cultural dimension. The lack of official recognition of Azerbaijani Turkish in education and public administration, combined with persistent cultural marginalization, has intensified feelings of exclusion and existential insecurity.

These are not problems that can be solved by rhetorical change or by replacing one central government with another. In fact, the transition from the Pahlavi monarchy to the Islamic Republic did not bring about any significant improvement in this respect.

Historical memory and the roots of distrust

Southern Azerbaijan carries more than a century of accumulated political experience. Its important role in the industry Constitutional Revolution From the Qajar period, when Azerbaijan functioned as the political core of the state, until the suppression of its one-year autonomous government in the mid-20th century. Cafer PişevariFrom promises that were not fulfilled Revolution of 1979 to decades of rigid centralization.

This historical memory shapes contemporary political consciousness. Trust does not come easily. Broad promises, whether from state or opposition movements, many of which are perceived to be Iran-centered, are consistently met with a single question: What exactly will be different this time?

Why is Persia-centered opposition not the answer?

A fact that is often overlooked is that a significant portion of the population of Southern Azerbaijan does not feel represented by the dominant opposition movements in Iran. This is not necessarily due to ideological hostility but to the absence of genuine political representation.

In much opposition discourse, Southern Azerbaijan’s concerns are marginalized, postponed until after an unspecified “regime change,” or framed as secondary issues. Language rights, political power, environmental survival, regional development and cultural security are often reduced to abstract commitments rather than concrete policy positions.

As a result, the prevailing expectation in Southern Azerbaijan is that the solutions will be voiced by the Azerbaijani elites themselves (intellectuals, economists and political actors who understand the realities of the region from the inside).

Concrete demands, not emotional appeals

The questions asked in Southern Azerbaijan are neither radical nor abstract:

• What is the practical plan to rebuild a sustainable South Azerbaijan economy?
• How will water scarcity, agricultural collapse and environmental degradation be addressed in Southern Azerbaijan?
• What institutional mechanisms will ensure the protection and development of Azerbaijani Turkish?
• How will social security, cultural representation, emerging future prospects and measurable prosperity be restored?

These questions increasingly extend beyond policy reform and into governance itself.

Policy dimension: From reform to self-government

There is a growing awareness in southern Azerbaijan that incremental reforms in a strictly centralized state have repeatedly failed. Neither reliance on external powers nor the assumption that regime change alone will resolve structural inequalities is widely accepted.

Instead, political discourse in Southern Azerbaijan is increasingly turning towards self-government and government independence; this is understood not as an emotional detachment but as a rational response to persistent exclusion.

For many, independence or broad political autonomy is seen as the only framework that can:

• ensuring accountable management;
• protection of linguistic and cultural rights;
• local management of environmental resources; And
• and aligning economic policy with regional needs.

This is not a rejection of coexistence, but a demand for political representation.

There is no point in change without a plan

What can truly change this trend is the emergence of clear, realistic and accountable policy frameworks developed by the Azerbaijani elites themselves. Intellectuals, economists and political leaders who can articulate federal, confederal or independent governance models that directly respond to lived realities.

If such leadership becomes clear, social trust can gradually be rebuilt among Southern Azerbaijan. Change will shift from reactive protests to conscious collective action in Southern Azerbaijan and the region.

Perhaps this is the fundamental question facing Southern Azerbaijan today:

It is no longer a question of who is fighting whom.

He asks: Who has a credible and concrete plan for the future of our Azerbaijan and the authority to implement it?

Dr Abraham Alvandi is an Australian researcher and academic of South Azerbaijani origin. He is actively involved in academic and leadership roles in the digital health sector.

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