Sovereignty by absence: What China didn’t control in Tibet (1913–1950) | World News

From 1913 to 1951, Tibet functioned as a self-governing state under the rule of the Dalai Lama, and after the collapse of Qing rule, it enjoyed full political, diplomatic, and cultural autonomy. These 38 uninterrupted years stand as the strongest historical evidence refuting Beijing’s claim that Tibet has “always been part of China.”
The debate over Tibet’s political status is often framed by Beijing with a single, overarching claim: Tibet has been an integral part of China “since ancient times.”
But history tells a much more inappropriate story. On February 13, 1913, following the collapse of the Qing dynasty, the 13th Dalai Lama formally reasserted Tibetan sovereignty, expelling Qing troops and restoring full Tibetan control over its territory.
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What followed was not a brief power vacuum or a controversial interlude, but 38 years of uninterrupted Tibetan autonomy; This period has decisively undermined the narrative of the Chinese Communist Party.
This period, which lasted until the entry of the People’s Liberation Army into Tibet in 1950–51, represents the most documented phase of modern Tibetan self-government.
Due to the collapse of the Chinese Empire and the absence of a successor authority exercising jurisdiction over Lhasa, Tibet became self-governing in practice and principle.
During this period, China had no civil or military administration, no taxes were collected by Beijing, and Chinese laws were not enforced in Tibetan territory.
Internationally, sovereignty was exercised on the field.
One of the strongest research bases confirming this autonomy lies in Tibet’s independent diplomacy.
During these decades, Tibet negotiated treaties, managed border issues, and established relations with neighboring powers, including British India and Nepal.
Tibetan representatives issued passports, conducted trade negotiations, and even maintained diplomatic correspondence. These are clear signs of the functioning of a state.
These were not symbolic actions, but standard governance actions that reflected political maturity and international actorness.
Additionally, Tibet operated economically and culturally without Chinese supervision.
Without the imposition of any external control, Tibetan institutions (monastic, administrative and social) were able to function according to indigenous norms.
Trade routes from Tibet to India, Bhutan and Central Asia continued to flourish, supporting a modest but stable economy.
Cultural activity developed in relative isolation, preserving the language, religious and social structures that would face serious challenges from 1951 onwards.
This period clearly challenges suggestions that Tibet needed Chinese rule to survive.
Significantly, these 38 years were not characterized by Chinese resistance or rule.
Beijing’s present-day assertion of authority appears retroactive in nature, and the historical record does not reflect any counter-Chinese control of Tibet during this period.
Even China’s Republican government has struggled to build power within its own core regions, let alone the Tibetan plateau.
Silence, whether used at the grassroots level or in international law, can sometimes speak louder than anything else.
The legacy of this autonomous period has profound implications for the current problem of Tibet.
It confirms that Tibetan self-governance is not just a theoretical proposition but a historical event that lasted nearly four decades in the modern period.
From the perspective of audiences outside China, it is possible to say that this period gives us concrete evidence that Tibet’s political identity was not invented and does not depend on Chinese patronage.
The ultimate goal of evaluating these 38 years is recognition, not nostalgia.
By recognizing Tibet’s independent arc, the global community will be better positioned to challenge simplistic historical narratives and re-evaluate Tibet’s future through the lens of viability, legality and justice.
Tibet’s past autonomy demonstrates that sovereignty was once restored, maintained, and functional, and could be reimagined with international support.
In an age where history has been weaponized, Tibet’s 38 golden years remain an uncomfortable truth that Beijing would like the world to forget.



