Syed Ata Hasnain | Halting ‘Rising Lion’: The Limits of US Involvement

When Israel’s ambitious operation against Iran, the “rising Aslan Operation”, it turned out that history could repeat itself to many observers. Just as the United States destroyed the war machine of Iraq in 2003, the US-Israeli synergy spoke to dismantle Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is the sponsor of the guardian and strategic operations of Iran’s revolutionary ideology. This means erasing the belt enemy of both countries in a strong common stroke. As a result, Israel had already achieved a significant war area against the deputies – first against Hamas in Gaza and then on the northern front, Hezbollah. Strategically seemed to be an opportunity to make the last coup.

However, the operation was suddenly stopped after the major direct American strike. It is reported not only by Israel’s own calculations, but also in the US. Why did Washington decide to apply brakes? Why would you leave Iran from the hook when the vulnerability is exposed to so much? Answers lies in a mixture of strategic prudence, military foresight and geopolitical balance of power-the layers that are missed in public discourse, but most experienced military minds.

The idea that the destruction of Iran’s war machine can provide Israeli security for decades, but dangerously simple. True, Iran’s deputies – Hamas and Hezbollah – gave birth to the brunt of Israel’s anger, and Iran itself was briefly exposed and shaken. However, the proxy war is not one -dimensional; Actually, Hydra is headed. Its flexibility lies in ideology, not infrastructure. Hamas can be removed from the root of Gaza’s tunnels, but not from the minds of his sympathizers. Hezbollah’s arsenal may deteriorate, but the political gap in the Southern Lebanon can recreate new threats.

Israel’s war area victories are real, but also Pyrrhic. The Gaza Strip was turned into rubble and Hamas leadership is hugging. However, in the shadow of these “gains”, anger Smoulds. Resistance in a form is almost inevitable. Iran’s full -scale decline, the fall of Saddam Hussein, puts the foundations of the Islamic state or ISIS, as a more scattered and unpredictable rebellion in the Middle East paradoxically.

The United States knows this scenario well. When the American forces overturned the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, they destroyed the institutional backbone of the Iraqi state. The Republican guards were destroyed, but on -site sect chaos, a power gap and ultimately the terrible rise of ISIS emerged. Iran is not less complex. This is not just a military enemy – a civilization state with an ideological narrative that transcends borders.

Iran’s completely defeat would not be a clean surgical event. Asymmetric chaos – retaliation, cyber attacks, terrorism and oil economy in the diaspora would release cuts. And most importantly, the US-only air strikes and logistics would be withdrawn in post-study, civil restructuring and political passivity. This is a long game that the US does not want to play again.

Apparently, the United States has no appetite to confuse another Middle East swamp. Washington’s focus should be tightly on Indo-Pacific and the difficulty of the rise of China. Every US aircraft carrier directed to the Middle East, Patriot missile battery or satellite is a source not found in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. It becomes an expensive distraction.

President Donald Trump would have strong political reasons to determine climbing. The presidency was partly built with the promise of “finishing endless wars .. The United States left Afghanistan and maintained a hand-stop standing stance in Ukraine, holding on a third front-hour-he would erode this narrative. The global economic community, which has already dangled from energy shocks and inflation pressure, would see a wider Middle East War as a disaster. Mr. Trump, despite his hawk discourse, would not want to be a bad man of peace.

Another important factor is Israel’s own war sustainability. In Gaza and Lebanon, Israel’s ammunition stocks are running out of two -consecutive conflicts. The iron dome system, which is very vital to defend the city centers from the rocket fire, requires the continuous filling of the measures. Basic artillery shells and even precision guided ammunitions are insufficient. Any expanded campaign in Iran will require great American logistics support, as in the 1973 Yom Yom Kippur War.

Moreover, such a support is not just a military. Diplomatic cover in the United Nations includes the management of oil price volatility, protection of global transport strips and regional stability assurance. These are burdens that the US is increasingly reluctant unless their national interests are directly involved.

Not spoken in Washington, but a real concern is the balance of regional power. A weak Iran shifts the axis of power to the Sunni Arab world – especially in Saudi Arabia, UAE and potentially in various avatars. Unlike Shiite Iran, whose ideological ambitions are largely regional, Sunni political Islam has a more global and sometimes radical appearance. The Post-Arab Spring World is still anxious with the resurrection of Pan-Islamic governance visions.

By restricting Israel, the United States may have tried to avoid the opening of doors for Sunni victory, which can invite the pro -excessive permutation set. From ISIS 2.0 to the radicalized militias in North Africa, the consequences of such imbalance may rapidly spiral. Washington has chosen Iran’s ruled limitation on a destabilizing victory.

According to ordinary observer, Washington’s intervention to stop the rising lion operation may appear as betrayal or weakness. According to Israel’s right -wing political circles, it may seem like a kidnapped historical opportunity. However, when we look at the lens of military realism and strategic prediction, it reflects the moderation based on experience. The Middle East is the chess board of rival situations. Victory is rarely total; And peace is always fragile, especially high-intensity semi-connonal war.

The stopping of the rising lion operation is not the end of the story – in fact it can be the beginning of a new stage. Iran was absolutely bad, but not broken. Israel decided, but also showed the limits. After expanding the strategic aid, the US came in and out of it because it did not want to retreat to another long conflict without a clear end. The message is open for Israel – all future conflicts will need to be managed without relying on American participation.

A retired lieutenant-general, the author is an old goc of the 15 (“Chinar”) Corps based in Srinagar.