The EU’s Hungary problem won’t be solved even if Viktor Orbán is ousted | World news

How do you solve a problem like Viktor Orban? Cross your fingers and hope it goes away in more than three weeks. But even if the European Union’s chief disruptor is removed from office in next month’s elections (which is far from certain), Europe’s Hungary problem is unlikely to disappear overnight.

EU leaders will meet in Brussels on Thursday and Friday for another summit that Orbán, Hungary’s illiberal prime minister, will at least partially miss.

The US-Israeli attack on Iran and the ensuing energy crisis have already derailed the main agenda. But the biggest unresolved issue that awaited the summit and infuriated Orbán’s other EU leaders was Orbán’s decision to block a planned €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine, which 27 members unanimously agreed to last December.

As Brussels correspondent Jennifer Rankin told me: “Reneging on a deal agreed by heads of state and government strikes at the heart of the functioning of the EU. And there is no desire to create an alternative fiscal plan for Ukraine.”

Of course, this is not the first time Orbán has threatened to throw a spanner in the works of the EU. In fact, Hungary’s vetoes have become so widespread that diplomats claim the bloc has not even tried to table some proposals.

Hungary, CSIS think tank notesIt accounts for just 1.1% of the EU’s GDP and 2% of its population. But Orbán’s attack on the rule of law, his rejection of the rights and values ​​enshrined in EU treaties and his persistent opposition to EU foreign policy have caused a completely disproportionate number of headaches in the bloc.

CSIS researchers Donatienne Ruy and Maria Snegovaya say Budapest “threatened to veto new sanctions against Russia or help Ukraine make concessions.” For example, the release of funds held by Brussels due to democratic backsliding.

“He continued to purchase large amounts of oil and natural gas from Russia. Orbán has met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at least four times since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (and approximately 15 times since Orbán came to power in 2010).

Accordingly Euractiv tallyHungary is blocking not only the €90 billion loan but also accession negotiations with Kiev; New sanctions package against Russia; sanctions against violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank; Countermeasures against Georgia’s ruling party and more.

German Green MEP Daniel Freund emphasizes that Orbán is also the “poster boy of the illiberal movement in Europe,” gathering around him a disruptive team of like-minded leaders for the EU, such as Slovakia’s Robert Fico, the Czech Republic’s Andrej Babiš and – perhaps later this month – Slovenia’s Janez Janša.

But on April 12, in what is almost certainly the most important vote in (and for) Europe this year, Hungarians will elect a new parliament and government, and for the past 15 months Orbán has been trailing in the polls.

Polls, populist campaigns and policy changes

So will everything change? Unfortunately, there are various reasons why this does not happen. First of all, Orbán may not actually lose. Poll averages show his centre-right rival Péter Magyar and the Tisza (Respect and Freedom) party ahead by a margin of between 9 and 11 percentage points; That’s a big difference, but not big enough to prevent Orbán from winning.

First, surveys can be unreliable; This is partly because Orbán and his Fidesz party spent four terms in government trying to change the system to their own advantage, making hundreds of changes to electoral rules that effectively overstated Fidesz’s majorities.

Victories in a small number of constituencies can have a huge impact on the overall outcome: in 2014, Fidesz won almost 70% of the vote with just under 45%. Tisza may need a six-point lead in the popular vote to gain a parliamentary majority.

The 62-year-old prime minister is running a classic populist campaign. I’m telling the voters They can choose Hungary, protecting it as “an island of security and tranquility,” or they can drag the country into chaos and war by choosing the Magyar, whom Brussels and Kiev portray as evil agents.

Orbán, who had an increasingly harsh dispute with Ukraine due to the closure of the Druzhba pipeline carrying Russian oil to Hungary after Russia’s attacks, accused Kiev of threatening his family, seizing Ukrainian armored bank vehicles and confiscating Ukrainian armored bank vehicles. I ordered extra security In critical energy fields, claiming they are at risk.

Four years ago, immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its fearmongering and generous cash handouts to selected groups of voters paid off. It seems less effective this time, but it may work again.

Second, if Orbán loses, especially by a narrow margin, he could refuse to resign, leaving the EU with what the European Policy Center think tank calls “an unprecedented situation: an illegal and illegitimate government sitting at the table.”

“He could rely on the captured courts and the outgoing parliament to pass constitutional laws or block the transition of power.” European Policy Center analyst Eric Maurice saysHe calls on the EU to clearly state its “ultimate red line” – electoral manipulation and refusal to accept democratic results.

Finally, even if Magyar wins and Orbán concedes defeat, it is unclear what exactly the new Prime Minister can do. “Orbán has been in power for 16 years,” says Freund, who returned from his research mission to Hungary last weekend.

“He has appointed everyone in the public media, in the courts, in state institutions, in the central bank… If his appointees refuse, for example, to approve the new government’s budget, Tisza could face early elections within a year.”

Freund noted that Polish prime minister Donald Tusk had a hard enough time rolling back the previous nationalist government’s judicial and other reforms: “and Law and Justice (PiS) had only been in power there for eight years. Magyar faces a really tough challenge”.

Moreover, Freund says, when it comes to Hungary’s relations with the EU, even though the Tisza-led government “wants to avoid isolation but does not want to veto”; no one should expect a “total policy change” on important issues like Ukraine or immigration.

For now, EU leaders seem confident they can win Orbán over the 90 billion euro loan Ukraine urgently needs, says Jennifer. “A deal is a deal,” said a senior EU diplomat, and if Orbán insists on a path he clearly thinks will win him votes, he will be crossing a bridge that has never been crossed before.

But while relations with the bloc’s most troubled member may improve after next month’s elections, there is no real guarantee that everything will suddenly improve.