Trump and Netanyahu have formed a convenient coalition. Behind it are clear divisions
Friction is a feature of war, and the military coalitions that prosecute them are not immune from its effects. National priorities and rules of engagement may influence targeting considerations, acceptance of risk or willingness to perform certain tasks. But nations that come together to fight usually agree on what the strategic goal of the conflict is.
What is notable about the US-Israeli coalition waging war against Iran are the increasingly public differences between the goals each pursues. US Secretary of War Peter Hegseth said when asked about Israel’s targeting of oil storage facilities near Iran’s capital, sending a large, dense layer of smoke over Tehran. [Israel] They have different goals, they pursued them. Ultimately, we continued to focus on our own business.”
Later, after Israel targeted Iran’s South Pars gas field and carried out a retaliatory attack on Qatar’s energy infrastructure, US President Donald Trump said on the Truth Social platform that he knew nothing about the attack and that “there will be no more attacks by Israel.” Of course, the idea that the United States would be unaware of an Israeli attack on South Pars during a long air campaign aimed at deconfliction that requires significant airspace is hardly credible.
The truth is that Israel is pursuing a maximalist agenda whose ideal outcome is regime change in Tehran. Trump’s agenda is probably less ambitious and certainly less articulated. Regardless, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes Trump finally has an incumbent in the White House who shares his belief in direct military force against Iran and tactical victories without much concern for strategic consequences. This is an opportunity he has no intention of squandering.
As a result, Tel Aviv regularly pursues its own agenda in prosecuting attacks against Iran. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard told the House Intelligence Committee last week that Israel’s targets for attacks on Iran differ from those identified by Trump. While Israel focused specifically on killing Iran’s political and military leadership, the United States focused on Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, production, and the Iranian Navy. He was unaware of Israel’s willingness to support Washington’s desire to achieve a negotiated outcome or Tel Aviv’s willingness to support Trump’s call not to attack Iran’s energy infrastructure.
There is little support for the war outside the bilateral coalition. Even Washington’s traditional allies have struggled to provide support beyond rhetoric, and even that is fairly modest. Polls show that even among Americans, Trump’s support base approves of the war, but most Americans do not. This opposition stems not only from Trump’s failure to lay the political groundwork for the most important decision any president can make, but also from the sense that Washington and Tel Aviv are pursuing goals that often overlap but are not necessarily common.
The fact that Israel is seen as the party that carries out political assassinations and targets the economic infrastructure, while Washington focuses more on military targets, fits the aims of both countries to some extent. The idea of plausible deniability might have been appealing on Washington’s part, but Tehran’s response to attacks on its economic infrastructure and the consequences felt across the global economy have led to a situation in which not only Washington’s allies but also a skeptical domestic public are increasingly unsettled by the impact of a war they do not want or want. Tehran’s response was easily foreseen, but the White House probably did not give the warnings enough weight.
For all the rumors of a rift between Israel and the US, there is little practical indication of this other than some vaguely critical Truth Social posts by the US president. The real tension is likely to arise when the decision is made to halt military operations. Netanyahu believes that the regime could fall if sufficient military pressure is applied and sufficient Iranian military and security assets are destroyed or disrupted. He also believes that if he can crush Lebanon for longer, he can further humiliate Hezbollah. Washington seems less convinced that the regime could fall and is much more concerned with the economic costs of a war without a decisive victory or a negotiated end that Trump can point to as a victory. The targets desired by Washington and Tel Aviv each require different levels of military pressure over different time periods, but it will be the White House that will ultimately decide when to stop the bombing. And when that happens, no one’s goals will likely be achieved.
Dr Rodger Shanahan is a Middle East analyst.
Get a weekly opinion pack that will challenge, defend and inform your own views. Sign up for our opinion newsletter.
