Trump and Putin prove strategy to trust the US is a roll of the dice

The geographical isolation of Australia makes it difficult to find a complete parallel, but let’s put ourselves on the shoes of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy while watching the Putin-Trump meeting at the weekend.

A major power has launched an attack on the interests of Australia or Australia for competition, where we have made great gains against us and made more demand. The reaction of the United States, which has previously committed to helping us, is to argue to argue an agreement that includes sacrificing important interests without any input of Australia – a proven war criminal – a proven war criminal – a proven war criminal. When no agreement comes, the United States returns the negotiating conditions in favor of our attackers – all of them cheered with a commentator who sees our attacker as an example of the muscular autocracy that the West can do more. And perhaps, American businesses want to take advantage of the conflict.

We all watched this in real time: Trump did not mention that he did not mention Putin, who left Zelenskyy, who left Zelenskyy for his arrest for war crimes – even those who could not be controlled by Russia, even after mentioning an agreement that he had given up an increase in an agreement they have made an agreement.

In the case of Ukraine, Zelenskyy has European leaders under the leadership of Emmanuel Macron, led by Emmanuel Macron, who has an important interest in ensuring that Putin’s crimes are not rewarded at least to reward Putin’s crimes. If Australia encountered a hostile power, there would be no similar international interest.

This is not about Trump as another screed, but about the risk management. In particular, Australia’s risk of entering a kind of conflict – hot, cold, economic, anyway – and not only rely on the support of the United States, but also does not have to stand and watch because the United States meets the demands of this power with our expenses.

Under Trump, this risk has increased significantly to its importance, even if it is not possible. How does the government manage this risk?

So far, he has adopted the same strategy for Trump, which he has followed with Biden – and therefore, the governments of both sides have returned to Gillard and Obama: to integrate Australia further and more into the US military machine in the hope that we are indispensable for Americans.

But under Trump, this plan has two major flaws: seemingly enemies to China, Trump can be very happy to make an agreement with Xi Jinping, which provides a free hand to the leader of China. Trump’s reluctance of economic seizure of China – continues to postpone and postpone the end date for the low tariff regime – it can reach the reluctance to take China.

And the second, Australia provides a B-52 base in Northern Australia, allowing the US to store materials with China for a conflict with China, preparing the US forces to fight China, preparing a nuclear submarine base for the Americans in Perth, and for the US officials, the biggest communication for our US officials, and the intelligence and intelligence, intelligence and intelligence, intelligence and intelligence. It was at the top of our officials. Exmouth. In addition, we are expected to increase our defense expenditures about 40 billion dollars a year – most of them will certainly flow to US defense companies.

In fact, the government’s risk management strategy on Trump was to double the pre -Trump strategy, and it is not clear that it would work.

A much larger version of a more pronounced failure of risk management with AUKUS. In the event that Australia is realized, in the event of an international change, an international change is required for the risk of support of the US – that is, China, the “Wolf Warrior” period, will have to look positively good -natured by the “Wolf Warrior” period, which will be prepared to intervene in other countries in the world. Or, another regional power should emerge with significant capacity and aggressive intention to threaten Australia.

However, for the great failure of the risk management in AUKUS, the only thing needed is the continuation of the status quo: the fact that the United States (and the United Kingdom) cannot produce nuclear submarines at a sufficient extent for their use, rather than providing spare parts for Australia. Basic change is not required – really, not Australia, which is a fundamental change in the production of Virginia-class boat production, will not remain submarines until SSN-AUKUS later arrives later in the century without a nuclear drive unit.

It was as if Australia’s best and brightest defense policy makers thought about how the failure of the risk management was best shown, and decided to choose a scenario that needs to change significantly in order to manifest a huge risk of security, and decided to choose another script that should continue to reveal another tremendous risk.

In both cases, a victory of hope on the experience is whistling in the dark on a giant scale, and the dice are rolling in a bet that will leave the next 30 or 40 million Australian unprotected.