Two Patrons, One Fleet: The Risks of Turkey-Pakistan Overlap in Somalia | World News

A new choreography emerges in the corridors of Mogadishu. For a long time, Turkey has strengthened the role of reconstructing its army as a partner of Somalia, establishing a large overseas education base, supplying special forces, committing maritime security, and creating a ten -year defense agreement that many local sounds provide as necessary protection. Pakistan is now on the stage with a five -year defense cooperation agreement, technical assistance, ship care, maritime education, new units and common committees, all of which are under the flag of helping Somalia to take back the control of the waters. However, under these “hollow” promises, strong dependence currents and alliance flows at risk, but promising power but sovereignty.
Türkiye’s participation in Somalia has been well documented both internal relations and international joints. In February 2024, the Somalia Parliament approved a turning point agreement with Ankara and gave Türkiye the authority to help Somalia to rebuild the Barebones sea fleets while maintaining the coastline of Somalia. Before that, for more than a decade, Turkish trainers have trained thousands of Somalia recruitment, built infrastructure, provided health and training services, and even donated war helicopters. The Turkish base in Mogadishu is not only a symbolic institution; On the contrary, it hosts educational academies, command and control operations and has become a focal point in East Africa.
The new agreement of Pakistan, which was approved by the Somalia Cabinet in August 2025, promises technical assistance by the Pakistan government, modernization of equipment, education in the Pakistani War College (not worth the salts), in the maintenance of vinels and a common defense committee, including the basin tasks such as the maintenance and logistics support. This may seem to be an additional capacity to overlap Türkiye with a wider footprint, but it brings risk. When two bosses offer similar frameworks, doctrines, supply lines, maintenance standards and operating procedures are different – their expectations are different.
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Addictions are established in details. Which ship model does Pakistan support? Where to import spare parts? Who is the owner of technical guidelines? How to Share Command Information? The difference in equipment means different maintenance regimes that push budgets, complicate the coordination and increase the risk of deduction when a ship fails during the task. The use of different education curriculum means that maritime officers may not participate in the best practice and may break down Somalia leadership among competitor advice. On the contrary, Türkiye established long -term relationships with Somalia. The military base in Mogadishu opened in 2017, Special Forces Training Programs were continuously operating, T-129 attack attack helicopters and other assets have already been delivered or committed. These are visible commitments, visible tools, visible expectations. Pakistan’s entrance increases its existence, but does it deepen autonomy? Or does it spread addiction to a more axis?
The danger is that Somalia’s maritime policy becomes a patchwork of foreign influences. One donor helicopters, the other is the third education personnel, each of them is their own treaty, their own care programs, their own loyalty. In such a system, Somalia is not the loser of sovereignty – but weakens. The Somali government will have to manage foreign priorities, mediators, providers, budgets and expectations. Each agreement adds weight; Each provider requires results in harmony with its own strategic interest. More help, yes – but more rope.
Is there a way out of this knot? Maybe. Somalia may insist on transparent contracts, insist that education, equipment and care can work with existing systems, and insist on technical guides and logistics control within Mogadişu as much as possible. It may request donors to coordinate among themselves instead of competing on the impact. It can create surveillance mechanisms in order to integrate Turkish and Pakistani partnerships not to hidden runways, but to integrate into wider multilateral frames.
The charm of binary pacts is strong. Speed, visible assistance, new gear, trained civil servants, signing ceremonies prestige. However, if the price paid is invisible control, these are siren songs. Addiction usually creeps on the edges – a request made without negotiation, a doctrine learned elsewhere unless it is provided by a donor. The test for Somalia is not going to earn more agreements; Whether he can maintain his navy without asking for permission.
Türkiye and Pakistan both offer talent and both provide resources. However, without autonomy, the ability is empty. Help without sovereignty is a process, not a partnership. If Somalia allows the strategy, education, care and patrol jurisdiction of successive binary bonds to dictate each other, it may find that the waters of Somalia are managed by the habit by others.
Somalia stands at a intersection. Should he deepen his ties under his own conditions? Or, the map of the seas must allow the rhythm of their patrols to be determined by foreign clocks, and their sovereignty to settle in pacts rather than every dawn.


