When a Canadian woman is suspected of being a spy

(Ottawa) The arrest for alleged espionage of a Canadian intern of Chinese origin stationed at NATO embarrasses Canada and raises questions about security reviews. Deciphering a nebulous affair which could have immense consequences.

What happened?

The news broke on Saturday: the day before, Belgian authorities arrested a Canadian woman of Chinese origin and opened an investigation for espionage after a report to the Belgian military intelligence services. A search took place at her home, but also at her workplace: the NATO command center.

The woman is an intern at NATO’s Strategic Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), located in Mons, and she is suspected of spying for a third country and of belonging to a criminal organization.

“At this time, there is no indication that the operational capacity, command and control arrangements, or ongoing tasks of NATO or SHAPE have been affected. SHAPE continues to fulfill its responsibilities without interruption,” said Col. Martin L. O’Donnell, SHAPE spokesperson.

“Espionage is part of international relations. We spy on them, they spy on us, argued Stephen Saideman, Paterson chair of international affairs at Carleton University. Sometimes spies are caught […]. This is embarrassing for Canada. »

For now, the federal government is limiting its comments in this matter.

“Global Affairs Canada is aware that an individual of Canadian citizenship is detained in Belgium. The agents [du Ministère] are ready to provide consular services and are in contact with local authorities,” said Global Affairs Canada spokesperson Charlotte MacLeod.

Who is the suspect?

Many people in Ottawa are asking this question. For the moment, very little information has filtered out, since the procedure is being carried out in Belgium. No facts have been tested in court, to date.

Nevertheless, the Canadian authorities want to clarify this matter.

For example, did this person have prior experience in the Canadian government? Would she have been in the pay of the third country before her arrival in Canada, before her hiring as an intern in Belgium, or would she have been attracted once there?

Then, what were her tasks and did she have access to sensitive information? After all, this person was an intern.

“But that doesn’t mean she didn’t have access to sensitive things.” Because even as an intern, you receive a certain level of security clearance,” says Phil Gurski, a former strategic analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) who is now president of Borealis Threat and Risk Consulting Ltd.

The latter nevertheless doubts that she had access to “top secret” information, but it is possible that she was exposed to “secret” information as is the case for students who work in federal agencies in the summer.

What does this mean for Canada?

“If some are worried that Canada will be targeted because there was a spy, rest assured, nothing serious will happen to it,” says Stephen Saideman.

“It’s just embarrassing,” he continued. Canada needs to review its procedures and understand why this person was not arrested sooner. »

For former spy Phil Gurski, it is obvious that national security agencies are wondering whether mistakes were made when this person arrived in Canada. For example, we will try, according to him, to determine if the processes were respected, if all the analyzes were done and if the intelligence services were pressured by other federal agencies to hastily authorize applications during this period.

“I know that during the Trudeau years, the government, especially with immigrants, we said ‘yes we have to take the time to do security checks, but we really need these people, so don’t take too much time’,” he explains.

For Mr. Gurski, the Chinese issue is particularly important since this power’s espionage in Canada has been documented for decades.

“We are members of other intelligence alliances around the world and if our allies think that perhaps Canada represents a weak link in these alliances, they may say to themselves that perhaps we should not share too many things, because we cannot trust Canada,” he says.

What is this “third country”?

Belgian prosecutors have not said which government the woman may be trying to help. China quickly came to the forefront of many observers because of its origins, but also because of its espionage activities.

“A person’s ethnicity is often a clue, but it is not necessarily the case. Many of the Russian spies arrested in the United States or Canada had no ethnic, religious, linguistic or family ties to the Soviet Union or Russia, says Stephen Saideman. China is actively spying on the United States, NATO, and Canada, so it wouldn’t be surprising if they tried to use people with this experience. »

The Chinese embassy in Canada did not respond to the email from The Press in connection with this matter.

Why espionage at SHAPE, in Belgium?

SHAPE is not a trivial place.

There are military officers from the 32 NATO member countries who are part of the chain of command, from the field to the highest levels of the alliance in Brussels and at the political level. For example, operations for missions in Afghanistan, Libya, Bosnia or Kosovo in the past were handled at SHAPE.

Currently, due to the war in Ukraine, NATO – including Canada – has soldiers in Latvia. The plans for this mission will therefore go through Mons, at SHAPE.

The Russians, for example, would like to know what is going on there.

With The Canadian Press and Associated Press