India-China Standoff: How Doklam Exposed Hollowness In China’s Military Aggression | India News

India-China Military Standoff: Having the world’s largest army, stretching military muscles and showing harsh power aggression is naturally coming to China. From the controversial waters of the South China Sea to the Himalayas, such behaviors were noticed on the land. However, the frequency of Beijing’s military struggle is not evidence of the abilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In fact, aggression is a bluff that China usually hopes that other nations will not address.

The fact that the dragon stops 2017 with India is a remarkable example. For 73 days, the Chinese and Indian forces met at the Himalayan plateau. During this period, Beijing released military retaliation threats on a daily basis. India stood in the face of these statements, which later turned out to be bluff.

When the dust was settled, China silently pulled back its powers, and there was no strategic success to be shown instead of all aggression and long claims. Standoff showed that China’s climbing discourse was nothing but psychological war designed to scare. In fact, in a way that the real abilities that were missing were not needed to be used, he was greatly reliable of intimidation tactics and taking back the enemy.

China’s strategic calculations: risk and reward

Despite the media publishing articles operated by the Communist Party, which threatened to teach India to teach a “painful lesson” and warned the “larger losses” from the 1962 China-Hint War, China clearly understood the costs of disaster costs to accompany any military wrong adventure with its nuclear armed neighbor.

The cooling began when Chinese troops tried to extend a road through Docticated in Bhutan, a strategic plateau in Bhutan, for China’s proximity to India’s proximity to India’s vital Siliguri corridor (called the neck of the chicken) due to shortness and exposure to international borders. India’s rapid reaction to deploying with 270 military bulldozers to stop the construction of Beijing, who does not expect such a direct intervention.

Although China has at least 17 ongoing regional disputes, its primary theater is currently an obstacle to the Pacific, where the US is the primary threat of the US, and to “re -unite” with Taiwan. Considering this context, PLA’s perceptions of threats against India are basically asymmetric. India sees China as the primary threat, but Beijing sees India as a secondary challenge.

This asymmetry means that China can maximize only aggression against India. The strategic costs of military confrontation with the country were very high – Beijing would reveal the US even further. Beijing’s strategic goal continues to avoid two front conflicts with the US and India. Therefore, China cannot take a conflict with India or the USA.

The limits of military confrontation

Doklam also forced Beijing to face a deeper reality. The assumptions of India about the “sub -status ında in the regional power hierarchy were challenged by India’s solution. A military conflict would be costly, and India showed that it was willing to accept the risk of standing.

Instead, China returned to psychological war. State media stolen daily threats. Disinformation campaigns tried to paint India as aggressive. The authorities repeated inevitable defeat warnings. However, none of them shook India’s position on the ground. The threats stolen hollow after it was understood that the Indian forces did not move.

The “Three War” strategy, which uses China’s psychological, legal and media tools designed to scare the war, was tested, and when India was intact, it was found. Beijing’s attempts to present him as a victim party and painting India, because he could not gain international traction, made China’s position further weakened.

Supported bully

Doklam proved that China’s strategy focuses on bullying its rivals, but Beijing is constantly retreating when faced with real resistance. At the end of August 2017, Chinese troops had no choice but to seek separation.

The familiar pattern was seen: the first show show, rising rhetoric, then a silent retreat when faced with determined resistance. China may have continued to build infrastructure in the region later, but the episode has clearly demonstrated the preference of intimidation against confrontation.

After Doklam, he further revealed China’s tactical restrictions. Despite the official withdrawal, China continued to build infrastructure in the region and shows that psychological intimidation remains as Modus Operandi preferred by Beijing rather than real military conflict. This pattern – the first aggression, then the infrastructure consolidation when the direct conflict is very costly, reflects China’s basic strategic weakness: inability to monitor its threats while faced with a stable opposition.

This is not specific to doctlam. From the South China Sea to the Himalayalar, Beijing has repeatedly used his “salami-sishing” tactics-gradually struggling until he faced the healthy resistance, and then he stepped back while consolidating elsewhere. Doklam showed that when he returned, blush was lost.

It offers a clear template for neighboring countries that face Chinese aggression: Continuous resistance, diplomatic patience and psychological war may force Beijing to recalculate his positions.