Proxy Violence And Manufactured Blame: Pakistan’s Anti-India Play In Bangladesh | India News

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is increasingly accused of masterminding the shooting of Sharif Osman Hadi, the organizer of Inqilab Moncho in Bangladesh, as part of a deliberate attempt to inflame anti-India sentiments during Dhaka’s sensitive post-Hasina transition. The attack at Dhaka’s Purana Paltan on December 12, 2025, in which helmeted gunmen on motorcycles fired at Hadi’s moving rickshaw at close range, follows a familiar pattern associated with the ISI’s proxy operations: targeted violence designed to incite unrest while maintaining plausible deniability.

Bangladesh authorities were quick to attribute the attack to exiled Awami League elements allegedly operating from India. New Delhi denied the charge outright, but Dhaka doubled down by demanding extradition. The rapid assignment of blame despite the absence of corroborated evidence created a narrative environment that Pakistan has historically been adept at exploiting.

ISI’s Trustee Playbook Revisited

ISI’s record in Bangladesh is neither new nor ambiguous. For decades, it has cultivated extremist and ideological proxies, including Jamaat-e-Islami-affiliated networks such as Islami Chhatra Shibir, to stoke pro-Pakistan sentiments and weaken India’s regional influence. After the political turmoil in 2024 and the impeachment of Sheikh Hasina, these networks found a new field of activity.

Investigative reports and local security assessments show that ISI handlers are taking advantage of the resulting instability to channel weapons, coordinate arson attacks and target Hindus, Awami League supporters and critical infrastructure, using unofficial routes and remaining Pakistan-linked areas. The timing of Hadi’s shooting – just as Bangladesh is heading towards 2026 elections – fits this pattern. This allows Islamabad to direct suspicion towards India, while amplifying Hadi’s anti-India rhetoric to maximize public anger.

It is noteworthy that no confirmed evidence has emerged to link India to the attack. Preliminary investigation results reportedly indicate that the suspects fled Bangladesh before any cross-border alert was raised. But the interim government under Mohammed Younis showed little interest in toeing this line, instead promoting an external conspiracy narrative. This type of misdirection is very similar to past ISI deception tactics, where violence was framed as internal discord to mask external regulation.

Post-1971 Reset: Yunus as a Facilitator?

Relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were deeply ruptured after the 1971 War of Independence, warmed significantly during the interim leadership of Yunus. At the D-8 Summit in Egypt in December 2024, Younis met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and called for “passing over” the unresolved issues of 1971, including accountability for war crimes and asset sharing, in the name of trade and cultural cooperation. Bangladesh was described as a “sister” partner and there was a notable change in tone.

By April 2025, high-level talks in Dhaka for the first time in 15 years signaled a broader recalibration, even as Bangladesh’s long-standing demands for a formal apology and $4.5 billion in compensation remained unmet. Critics argue that this rapprochement comes at a strategic cost.

It was reported that under Yunus’ administration, cargo controls on Pakistani shipments were relaxed and avenues were opened for weapons, narcotics and counterfeit money. Security analysts also expressed concern over the renewed ISI operational presence in Dhaka, warning that Bangladesh risks becoming a permissive staging ground for activities targeting India’s Northeast. This shift further strained India-Bangladesh relations, fueling the “India Out” campaigns and intensifying resentment over Hasina’s continued exile in New Delhi.

Weaponizing Hadi and the Street Narrative

Hadi himself was a long-time anti-Hasina agitator and Dhaka-8 election candidate and was known for openly accusing India of election interference and cross-border killings. In the aftermath of the conflict, his rhetoric became a rallying point. The tone of protests organized by Inqilab Moncho, including a meeting at Shaheed Minar on December 15, escalated rapidly.

During one such protest, National Citizen Party leader Hasnat Abdullah warned that Bangladesh could “separate the Seven Sisters from India” if provoked and openly threatened to harbor separatist groups. The statement repeated Yunus’s previous statements. In March 2025, he described Bangladesh as China’s “ocean gateway” to India’s landlocked Northeastern states (Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura). These promises are widely read as strategic signals rather than economic support.

Pakistan has heavily leaned into this narrative, portraying India as a destabilizing force while positioning itself as a supportive partner. The broader goal seems clear: to fuel social polarization, embolden militant actors, and revive long-standing separatist fantasies under the banner of “From Seven Sisters to Seven Nations.”

Strategic Fallout for India’s Northeast

The effects of the Hadi attack extend beyond the streets of Dhaka. India’s Northeast remains geographically vulnerable due to Bangladesh’s critical maritime and transit location. Renewed Pakistan-Bangladesh alignment provides cover for infiltration routes, arms smuggling, and ideological radicalization that dovetail with China’s broader regional strategy.

India’s decision to withdraw transshipment privileges to Bangladesh in April 2025 reflected growing concern about this state of affairs. But Dhaka’s false accusations following the Hadi attack have only deepened mistrust and hardened attitudes.

The risks are local. Unchecked ISI activities could trigger border tensions, strengthen extremist groups such as Hefazat-e-Islam, and further destabilize Bangladesh’s electoral process. India’s response will likely depend on quiet intelligence coordination and sustained diplomacy aimed at exposing proxy manipulation rather than escalating rhetoric.

It is unlikely that the shooting of Sharif Osman Hadi was an isolated criminal act. This bears signs of a broader geopolitical design that takes advantage of Bangladesh’s post-Hasina uncertainty to reopen old fault lines, undermine India’s position, and reintroduce Pakistan into Dhaka’s domestic political calculations.

Muhammad Younis’s access to Islamabad, combined with a tolerant security environment, created the conditions in which ISI influence could once again take root. If this convergence between political misjudgments in Dhaka and strategic intent in Rawalpindi continues unchecked, Bangladesh risks being drawn into a proxy role, threatening not only India’s Northeast but also broader regional stability.

READ ALSO | Delhi Smog Crisis: 50% Work From Home Mandatory for Offices; Strict Penalties for Non-Compliance