China sees an opportunity in Greenland, but not in the way that Trump thinks | China
According to the European Union’s foreign affairs chief, Kaja Kallas, China and Russia must be having a “field day” over Donald Trump’s plans for Greenland, which Kallas says will split NATO.
But according to Trump, his plans stem from his desire to counter the threat identified by Kallas. “World peace is at stake! China and Russia want Greenland and there’s nothing Denmark can do about it,” Trump wrote on Truth Social on Saturday.
From Beijing’s perspective, Trump’s moves towards Greenland represent further evidence that the US-led world order is in disarray; This trend creates a significant opportunity for China. “Most Chinese see this as another manifestation of Trump’s bullying, hegemonic and oppressive behavior,” says Wang Wen, a professor at Renmin University in Beijing. But Wang adds: “Trump’s invasion of Greenland would mean the collapse of NATO, a prospect that would greatly please the Chinese people.”
For years, there has been a growing drumbeat in U.S. foreign policy circles raising alarm about China and Russia’s growing presence in the Arctic. In 2019, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that Beijing’s influence risked creating a “new South China Sea” around the north pole and vowed to strengthen the US presence there.
But when it comes to Greenland, Chinese stakeholders have struggled to gain a significant foothold, partly due to resistance from the United States and Denmark. In 2018, Denmark, reportedly under pressure from the United States, blocked a bid by a Chinese state-owned company to expand its network of Greenland airports. A Chinese company blocked from buying an abandoned naval base in Greenland two years ago.
“I doubt there is a single Chinese strategist who would list the US annexation of Greenland among their security concerns,” says Andrew Small, director of the Asia program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “On the other hand, they viewed the US alliance network as one of the most important aspects of US strategic superiority over China, and the potential for this alliance network to mobilize against China as one of their greatest concerns… The unraveling of US alliances brings a number of benefits [for Beijing]”.
Beijing’s official line is that it opposes US attempts to undermine the UN charter that guarantees the sovereignty of states. On Monday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun urged the United States to stop using the “so-called ‘China threat’” in Greenland as an excuse to impose tariffs on European countries.
‘Polar Silk Road’ Hopes
Yet China’s limited interests in Greenland are not for lack of trying. China’s foreign direct investment in Greenland between 2012 and 2017 represented More than 11% of the region’s GDP, a much larger share than in other Arctic countries. The desire to attract Chinese investment to help Greenland exploit its mineral resources sometimes conflicts with the security concerns of Denmark and other NATO allies who control the region’s security and foreign relations.
China released in 2018 a white paper Outlines Arctic policy. Somewhat implausibly, it defined itself as a “near-Arctic state” with corresponding interests in the region. China “hopes to work with all parties to build an ‘Polar Silk Road’ by developing Arctic shipping routes,” the newspaper said, positioning China’s Arctic strategy as part of Xi Jinping’s signature belt and road initiative. China also highlighted scientific research opportunities in the Arctic.
In October, the first step of the Polar Silk Road bore fruit. A Chinese container ship from Ningbo in eastern China docked at the port of Felixstowe in Suffolk. This arrival marked the first time a ship has traveled from China to Europe via the Northern Sea Route, a shipping route along Russia’s Arctic coastline. According to Chinese sources, the journey on the route operated by a Chinese-controlled container line took just 20 days. state mediaabout half the typical trip time.
However, this trade route is primarily based on cooperation with Russia. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Beijing has moved closer to Moscow and has been viewed with greater suspicion by European countries, especially Russia’s neighbors. For years, Chinese companies have sought to turn mining projects in Greenland into lucrative commercial ventures. Trump’s apparent interest in the region has made things even more difficult.
“Since Donald Trump’s first term as president… Chinese companies in Greenland have faced backlash from the US and Denmark, and Beijing itself appears to have blocked investment there in recent years,” says Patrik Andersson of the Swedish National China Centre. “China’s involvement in Greenland today is extremely limited.”
Some have cited China’s 6.5% stake in the Kvanefjeld mining project in southern Greenland as evidence of China’s interest in rare earths in the region. However, Andersson points out that the project has not been active since the Greenland government banned uranium mining in 2021.
“Given US and Danish opposition to Chinese activities in Greenland and Western efforts to build rare earth supply chains independent of China, it is also unlikely that Chinese companies will be allowed to invest in other rare earth projects in Greenland,” Andersson said.
Regardless, Beijing is trying to figure out how to deal with a U.S. leader who is tearing apart global alliances that counter China’s rise, but whose unpredictability and dictatorial sensitivities could threaten China’s interests.
Additional research by Lillian Yang
