One Nation, One Election — remedy worse than disease

Indonesia held a historic one-day election for the President, national and regional legislatures, and local councils in 2019. This initiative, aimed at reducing costs and simplifying administration, came at a tragic human cost: nearly 900 poll workers died and more than 5,000 became seriously ill. There was a heavy loss again in 2024; More than 100 deaths and nearly 15,000 illnesses. In June 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled that national and local elections should be held separately, two to two and a half years apart, from 2029, citing voter and executive overload and the impact on democratic participation.

Supporters of India’s ‘One Nation, One Election’ (ONOE) proposal argue that synchronizing Lok Sabha (general election) and State Assembly elections will reduce expenditure, limit long-term security deployments, minimize disruptions caused by the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) and prevent political parties from remaining in constant campaign mode. But Indonesia’s experience offers a cautionary lesson.

Comparative constitutional practice offers little support for mandatory electoral synchronization. Federal and provincial elections in Canada are held independently. Synchronization is impossible in Australia: State legislatures have fixed four-year terms, while the federal House of Representatives has a maximum term of three years.

Germany is often misunderstood. Its stability stems not from synchronized elections (Länder polls are deliberately staggered) but from the Constructive Vote of Confidence, which requires the Bundestag to elect a successor before dismissing a Chancellor.

South Africa and Indonesia use proportional representation, which distributes political power and preserves minority voices. India’s first pass system lacks such safeguards, allowing a national wave to wreak havoc on State elections. The United States offers an even weaker analogy: Fixed election cycles operate there because executive tenure is insulated from legislative confidence in the presidential system.

Constitutional Amendment proposal

The most comprehensive plan emerged from the High Level Committee (2023-24) chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, which is now taking legislative form on the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024. The proposed Article 82A empowers the President to notify an “appointed date” on which the terms of all State Assembly tenures will be aligned with the Lok Sabha cycle. Assemblies are constituted after that date Their term of office even if their five-year term has not expired The bill also introduces “unexpired term elections”: If a legislature is dissolved prematurely, the new legislature will only serve for the remainder of its original term, rather than receive a new mandate. These changes raise serious constitutional concerns.

India has consciously adopted a parliamentary system in which governments can survive only as long as they maintain legislative confidence. In the Constituent Assembly, Dr. BR Ambedkar explained that democracy cannot simultaneously maximize stability and responsibility. India chose responsibility; permanent executive responsibility rather than guaranteed tenure.

Articles 75 and 164 establish the collective responsibility of the executive towards the legislature. Articles 83 and 172 do not provide for a guaranteed term for legislatures, but only a maximum term of office of five years. Therefore, early closure is not a flaw but a democratic safeguard that allows voters to renew their mandate when trust collapses. ONOE reverses this logic by treating dissolution as an administrative inconvenience, subtly shifting India towards a semi-presidential model that weakens legislative accountability.

In the case of SR Bommai vs Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court of India confirmed that federalism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. States are not merely administrative units but have an independent constitutional identity. Their democratic rhythms may rightfully differ.

ONOE shakes this principle. It allows State powers to be curtailed not because legislative confidence has collapsed, but to accommodate the national election calendar. If implemented in 2029, a state’s term that elects its legislature in 2033 would expire in just one year.

In contrast, staggered elections to Parliament, State Legislative Assemblies and local bodies create a constant feedback mechanism, ensuring that governments are responsive to public sentiment. In a system without the right to recall, they serve as the next best tool for accountability. James Madison’s ‘Federalist No. As he wrote in 1952, frequent elections ensure that governments “immediate dependence and sympathy on the people.”

‘Unexpired’ election problem

The most problematic situation is the holding of by-elections for the unexpired legislative term. The Constitution no longer recognizes a concept of authority. Although the proposed Articles 83(6) and 172(5) claim that the newly elected Assembly will not be a continuation of the previous one, they effectively preserve the previous election cycles to maintain synchronization. This causes various distortions.

First, it reduces the value of the franchise. Elections held mid-cycle will produce governments with shortened mandates, reducing elections to temporary exercises and risking deeper voter apathy.

Second, residual governments’ lack of structural reform incentives undermines governance and accountability because they encourage populism and policy drift. Unlike the temporary restrictions imposed by the MCC, curtailed powers could weaken the administration for years rather than weeks.

Third, it risks creating a “governance dead zone.” The Amendment Bill does not specify the minimum duration of the “unexpired term” that triggers by-elections.

At the state level, postponing elections could extend Presidential Rule; this conflicts with Article 356(5); this article, Article 356(5), limits this rule to one year; This rule can be extended for up to three years only in cases of national emergency with the approval of the Election Commission of India (ECI).

At the Union level, an interim government could remain in office awaiting synchronized elections, potentially violating Article 85’s requirement that Parliament meet every six months. Such a government, 112-117. It cannot present a full Budget under the Articles and will be limited to a Vote on Account (Article 116), which will hinder fiscal governance.

The “unexpired period” mechanism is therefore legally inoperative at the Union level for more than six months and would require sweeping constitutional amendments that risk distorting the identity of the Constitution and violating the Fundamental Structure doctrine.

The proposed Article 82A(5) empowers the ECI to recommend the postponement of State elections, without clear criteria, time limits or parliamentary scrutiny, if they cannot be held simultaneously with the Lok Sabha. Even Article 356 contains guarantees such as parliamentary approval and time limits. By contrast, Article 82A(5) creates an area of ​​unguided discretion.

In case a State government falls mid-term, the Union government can impose President’s Rule and postpone elections, effectively ruling the State through the Governor. After the elections, the new government can only take over a shortened term.

The question is not whether such abuse is possible, but whether the Amendment makes it constitutionally possible. Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. As he warned in 59 (1788), the constitutional possibility of abuse is in itself “an unanswerable objection.”

In NJAC (2015), the Court held that constitutional validity depends on institutional design, not on guarantees of good faith practice. A change that structurally compromises a fundamental feature is unconstitutional, regardless of how the power is used in practice. ONOE risks violating federalism by allowing the extension of unelected State rule in the name of synchronisation.

cost argument

The financial burden of elections is negligible from a macroeconomic perspective and the numbers do not justify a constitutional overhaul of this magnitude.

Parliamentary Standing Committee estimates show that the total Lok Sabha and State Assembly election expenditure is around ₹4,500 crore (2015-16), around 0.25% of the Union Budget and 0.03% of the GDP. PRS data shows that Lok Sabha election costs have historically ranged from 0.02% to 0.05% of GDP (1957-2014). Elections are being held in phases (82 days in 2024), allowing the ECI to rotate EVMs, VVPATs and security forces. Simultaneous surveys would eliminate this flexibility and require costly new resources, undermining claimed administrative gains.

Is it wise to amend the Constitution and weaken federalism to save even 1% of GDP? Elections are not a burden to be minimized, but a recurring cost for self-government and ensure that the government remains accountable to the people.

The Justice Kurian Joseph Union-State Relations Committee constituted by the Government of Tamil Nadu recommended withdrawal of the Bill in Part I of its Report (February 2026); this is a stance also endorsed by the Tamil Nadu government. While the promised benefits of the ONOE proposal are exaggerated, its structural harms are also profound. It distorts the identity of the Constitution and violates its basic structure. India must avoid repeating Indonesia’s mistake.

MK Stalin is the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu