Blood, minerals and broken promises: How Balochistan’s unrest is threatening Pakistan’s deals with China, US | World News

Balochistan Violence: In the Oval Office in September, Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, made a carefully choreographed gesture. Next to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, he opened a briefcase and revealed carefully arranged mineral samples. The message to US President Donald Trump was that Pakistan was ready to open its mineral wealth to American investment.

Five months later, this field looks a lot less safe.

Pakistan’s most valuable mineral deposits are located in Balochistan, the country’s largest province in terms of land area and poorest in all economic terms. The region has endured decades of separatist violence fueled by political exclusion, control of resources and anger over the heavy presence of security forces.

Coordinated attacks across the state on Saturday brought those tensions back to a violent high. Fighters attacked more than a dozen locations, killing 31 civilians and 17 security personnel, while the army announced that 145 attackers were killed.

The timing couldn’t have been worse for Islamabad. Balochistan is not only central to Pakistan’s outreach to Washington. This also forms the backbone of China’s long-term economic goals in the country.

A few hours after the attacks, Interior Minister Muhsin Naqvi pointed to the border. “These were not normal terrorists. India is behind these attacks. I can say with certainty that India planned these attacks together with these terrorists,” he said, without providing public evidence.

The attackers were identified as members of the Baloch Liberation Army, a separatist group that has been fighting the Pakistani state for decades while demanding the independence of Balochistan. In a video circulating online, BLA leader Bashir Zeb described the violence as part of the group’s “Herof 2.0” campaign, following a wave of similar coordinated attacks in August 2024.

New Delhi rejected Pakistan’s claims a day later. “Instead of repeating frivolous claims every time there is violence, it would be better to focus on meeting the long-standing demands of people in the region,” External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal told the media.

Beyond diplomatic spats, analysts say the attacks highlight deeper problems that Islamabad cannot escape as it courts global investors.

The unrest in Balochistan did not emerge overnight. The province is home to approximately 15 million of Pakistan’s 240 million population. Although it has oil, natural gas, coal, gold and copper reserves, it is the poorest region of the country. Revenues from these sources largely flow to the federal government, fueling anger among local communities.

Balochistan, annexed by Pakistan in 1948, has been the scene of many uprisings since the founding of the country. The current phase of the rebellion began in the early 2000s, when demands for a greater share of domestic resources evolved into calls for independence. The state’s response was largely based on security operations. Human rights groups accuse authorities of killing and forcibly removing thousands of ethnic Baloch people suspected of sympathizing with the separatists.

Violence has increased in recent years. In March, BLA fighters attempted to hijack the passenger train Jaffer Express from Quetta to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. After more than a day of operation, more than 300 passengers were rescued. At least 33 fighters were killed.

According to the Pakistan Peace Research Institute, at least 254 attacks were recorded in Balochistan in 2025; this led to more than 400 deaths, a 26 percent increase from the previous year.

This increase comes just days after Pakistan hosted a mining summit aimed at attracting Chinese firms. China has poured billions of dollars into Balochistan, including the development of Gwadar, Pakistan’s only deep-sea port and a critical node in the $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

In September, US-based mining company USSM signed a $500 million memorandum of understanding to invest in mineral extraction.

Instability in Balochistan is ongoing rather than sporadic. This is rooted in long-standing grievances about control of resources, political exclusion and persistent militarization. Large-scale mining projects remain high risk and require heavy security; this makes them suitable mainly for state-backed players rather than market-oriented Western investors. Even projects linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor have faced constant attacks, resulting in the deployment of thousands of troops to protect limited infrastructure.

China and the US are believed to be aware of the risks. Beijing has CPEC investments in the country and Washington signed a mining agreement in September last year, exactly a year after Herof 1.0. Both countries have honored their commitments even after previous attacks, showing that they accept security risks for strategic reasons.

While violence worries investors, these deals are made between governments and are driven by politics rather than market forces.

Economic risks are high. Pakistan narrowly avoided default in 2023 with an IMF bailout and has since received $7 billion under its latest programme, the 25th in its history. Despite official efforts to sell Pakistan as open for business, foreign investment continues to decline. Central bank data shows foreign direct investment fell to $808 million between July and December of fiscal 2026, from $1.425 billion the previous year.

Ongoing violence is seen as a major deterrent to investment. In an environment of extreme volatility, investors are reluctant to invest capital, especially given that the crisis is tied to Islamabad’s handling of the province. Balochistan’s long and porous border with Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan province further reinforces its reputation as a high-risk region.

Recent attacks have also fed into a broader regional narrative. Following the attack on Jafar Express, Pakistan officially designated Baloch separatist groups as “Fitna al-Hindustan”. Such claims appear to require credible evidence, especially when attacks occur in broad daylight and are carried out by local actors. The ability for such attacks to be carried out in major cities has raised serious questions about intelligence and local security failures.

The repeated focus on India appears to be a familiar pattern. It aims to redefine Balochistan as a security issue rather than a political conflict, deflecting internal scrutiny and attracting sympathy from outside. At the same time, there is a growing awareness that enforced disappearances, lack of political autonomy, and deep economic marginalization lie at the heart of the unrest.

Prolonged instability is seen as potentially serving external interests, including China’s efforts to limit its footprint in the region. Funding and support for militancy is seen by some as a way to keep the state in a constant state of uncertainty.

But at their core, the main drivers of violence are internal fault lines. External factors are considered secondary. Without addressing these fundamental gaps, Pakistan faces a weakening of its ambitious promises to both Washington and Beijing in Balochistan.