Echoes of inquest into Lindt cafe siege in Virginia Bell’s royal commission
When news broke of the utterly shocking massacre in Bondi on 14 December last year, my thoughts flew to an incident that took place almost exactly 11 years ago, on 15 December 2014. That’s when Islamic State-inspired gunman Man Haron Monis took 18 people hostage at Sydney’s Lindt cafe, and the ensuing standoff with police ultimately claimed the lives of two of those hostages and the injuries of three others.
The scale of the Bondi attack was even more horrific; 15 dead and 40 injured, including children and the elderly.
But for those who have followed the Lindt inquiry, there are already disturbing repercussions from the interim report of Judge Virginia Bell’s Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, which arrived on Thursday.
First, risk estimation. In the Lindt case, the police fell into the trap of indifference. Monis’ increasingly wild posts on social media led to 18 calls to the national security hotline in the week before he launched the attack, but these calls were blithely ignored by security agencies. On the night of the siege, the police convinced themselves that Monis was not a psychopathic killer but the narcissist one would expect.
NSW police judgment in the Bondi brutality case is being questioned once again.
For example, how carefully did they consider the sensitivity of an outdoor and widely publicized event like Hanukkah by the Sea, a mass gathering to celebrate a landmark date in the Jewish calendar at a time when the increasing danger was clearly documented?
Bell warned that the threat level was high, noting that Jewish security volunteers were seeking a constant police presence at Bondi and several other Hanukkah events to be held that week. But while police acknowledged receiving a request for assistance, they apparently denied receiving “a specific request for dedicated police resources.” At the event, they sent three poorly equipped general duty officers and a supervisor to the on-duty inspectors with the express instruction that they did not need to remain for the duration of the event.
Bell has yet to resolve the conflicting narratives here, stating that “any differences… cannot be resolved with the information currently available to the commission” and that more will emerge as it begins gathering evidence.
Another echo of Lindt is the sign of less-than-ideal cooperation between federal and state agencies. As I noted in my book on the cafe siege, there were at times visible tensions between the NSW police, the defense force and ASIO.
Lindt coroner Michael Barnes, recently appointed as the Commonwealth’s inspector general of intelligence and security, called for a review of information sharing between NSW and federal police in 2017, calling for a “basis for concern”. We find Bell pointing out similar issues with a touch of deja vu, with a particular focus on the Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) – the mechanism that aims to combine the efforts of state and federal police, the NSW crime commission and ASIO to thwart terrorist plots.
In his interim report, Bell noted that NSW police and the AFP had provided “shoddy support” to the JCTT and recommended that the regulation be subject to a “comprehensive expert review” focusing on information sharing and relationships between participating agencies. More than a decade after Lindt, mutual distrust appears to persist.
NSW Police Commissioner Mal Lanyon welcomed Bell’s recommendations on JCTT operations as “timely” and a “healthy part of the process”.
The recommendations made public so far are logical steps. But they are struggling with the low hanging fruit. Five of the 14 recommendations in Bell’s interim report remain classified; The royal commissioner cites national security concerns and the need to avoid undermining existing criminal proceedings.
This leaves unanswered for now the fundamental question of whether the Bondi atrocity resulted from a preventable intelligence error.
We might already have some answers here if one-time defense chief and former ASIO chief Dennis Richardson had been allowed to finish the independent investigation he launched late last year when he was asked by the prime minister to assess whether federal agencies, particularly ASIO and the AFP, were demonstrating “maximum effectiveness”.
But after the royal commission was announced in January, Richardson saw his investigation dovetail with Bell’s efforts. And by March he abruptly exited the process, saying he felt “redundant” and would produce a document very different from the interim report Bell had planned.
Meanwhile, ASIO has so far given the impression of circling the wagons.
In December, when Albanese announced Richardson’s investigation, current ASIO boss Mike Burgess issued a statement boldly expressing his belief in his organisation. While Burgess expressed his “deep regret” at the agency’s failure to understand the Bondi plot, he insisted “it does not necessarily mean there was an intelligence error or that my officers made a mistake.” Richardson welcomed his review but added: “I expect the findings will reassure the public that ASIO is acting appropriately, lawfully and proportionately to protect Australians.”
In February ASIO launched: Media Monitoring Host Linton Besser called it “an extraordinary event” that the organization had previously tried to discredit an individual. Four Corners Story airing allegations from an estranged former agent about missed red flags regarding the Bondi attackers.
Burgess is rightly always happy to praise ASIO’s achievements. But it might be beneficial for the organization to follow Lanyon’s example and start signaling a slightly more receptive approach to external scrutiny.
Deborah Snow is a former associate editor and features writer. Sydney Morning Herald.
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