Explained: Why Iran, Like Venezuela, Remains Expendable In Russia’s Global Power Game? | World News

The loud chants in some parts of the West over the uprisings in countries aligned with Moscow are based on a simple belief: ‘weaken Russia’s partners, and you weaken Russia itself’. Recent speculation about US action against Venezuela and increasing threats of intervention against Iran have fed this sentiment. But history and Russia’s own behavior reveal a much harsher reality for Moscow’s allies; they are not indispensable, but useful.

Although he once criticized American interventionism, US President Donald Trump now appears caught up in the same regime-change impulses that have defined previous Democratic administrations. The enthusiasm this has generated among hawkish pro-Ukrainian voices reflects an older idea, that of the “export of revolution.”

This policy was made famous by Soviet Russia under Leon Trotsky and led to short-lived pro-Bolshevik governments in places such as Hungary, Bavaria and Latvia. None of them could stand it. A lesser-known example was the Iranian Soviet Socialist Republic, which briefly existed in the Iranian province of Gilan in 1920–21. Designed as a springboard to spread the revolution to India, it collapsed with the withdrawal of the Red Army and the rapid overthrow of local allies.

A century later, Iran once again finds itself the target of foreign ambitions; this time it is being driven by American and Israeli hardliners seeking something similar to the Maidan uprising in Ukraine. Iran’s religious regime is very unpopular and internal resistance is real. But the persistent threat of foreign intervention paradoxically strengthened it. Many Iranians fear that going too far could turn their country into another Syria or Libya.

Iran’s modern history is marked by resistance to external domination by Western powers, Russia or the Soviet Union. It has also been an area where Soviet and Western interests unexpectedly overlapped, from the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh to opposition to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.

But in the final years of Vladimir Putin’s rule, Tehran and Moscow formed a closer partnership; This partnership deepened further when Iran provided Russia with drone technology early in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Iran, Russia, and China share a rare historical feature: all three resisted Western colonialism. His authoritarian tendencies can be traced in part to a long history of mobilization against external pressures. But Russia’s attitude is the most contradictory. Despite its current conflict with the West, it itself was once a European power that sought to dominate parts of both Iran and China.

This explains Moscow’s largely detached view of Iran’s current crisis. The Kremlin is almost entirely focused on a single goal: winning the war in Ukraine, which it sees as a proxy conflict with the West. Russia’s operations in the Middle East and Africa are important only to the extent that they expand Western resources and gain advantage.

In this sense, Russia’s ties with Iran, Venezuela and North Korea are tactical, not emotional. Mostly Tsar III. As a phrase attributed to Alexander puts it, “Russia has only two allies: its army and its navy.” Customer cases are expendable pieces in a much larger game.

Russia’s interventions beyond the former Soviet sphere in Syria, Libya and Africa followed the 2014 Ukraine war and were responses to what Putin saw as Western-backed regime change in Kiev. These initiatives have produced mixed results, including setbacks such as the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2024. But the goal was never to build an empire. The priority has always been Ukraine.

As Russia relentlessly targets Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, making cities like Kiev increasingly uninhabitable during the winter months, Europe is struggling to respond effectively. For Moscow, this is progress towards victory.

Against this single-minded focus stands Trump’s dispersed approach. His administration appears to be involved in many risky projects, from Iran and Venezuela to a curious obsession with Greenland, while also trying to mediate the Ukraine war. For the Kremlin, this confusion is a gift.

But there may be some logic behind Trump’s actions. Tackling Putin directly is difficult, slow and politically dangerous. Easier goals promise quicker rewards. Venezuela and Iran fit this pattern, but even there permanent regime change may exceed Trump’s patience.

What Trump wants above all else is a quick, low-cost public relations victory. This makes softer targets more attractive. Nicolas Maduro proved this. Others may follow.

One such figure is Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has frustrated Trump, can be weakened without military action, and stands in the way of Trump’s ambitions to be seen as a global peacemaker. This suggests that Trump has recently shifted the blame for the lack of peace from Putin to Zelenskyy.

Politically weakened and facing corruption allegations and military stalemate, Zelenskyy appears much more vulnerable than his Russian counterpart. In a world where power often trumps loyalty, Iran, like Venezuela, may discover that Russia’s friendship has clear limits.