FROM WARFARE TO WEALTH — The AUKUS illusion and the death of statecraft

Our new series, WAR FOR THE RICH, is a progressive critique of the Federal Government’s defense and foreign policy conduct. Provides in-depth analysis of Australia’s $368 billion AUKUS commitment and the wider militarization of our economy.

It is planned to be held ahead of the ALP national conference (23-25 July), which will shape the Government’s policy platform and strategic direction for at least the next two years, in the hope that, alongside increasing pressure from wider society, these arguments against militarization may be convincing enough to make their mark.

Chapter 4: The AUKUS illusion and the death of statecraft

This article is the fourth part of the War on Riches: Driving Australia’s Future series. You can read the first part HERE, the second part HERE and the third part HERE. The next episode will be released soon.

This piece is a continuation of Chomsky and Robinson’s analysis. The Myth of American Idealism and asks what this myth means for Australia’s own claim to sovereignty.

The AUKUS pact prioritizes military spending over diplomacy and statecraft, writes Kym Davey.

A LOT has been written and said about him. AUKUSMany are critical of the project’s staggering $368 billion cost, uncertainty over the delivery of both the US and UK versions of the nuclear-powered submarines, and the risks to Australia’s sovereign institution.

In contrast, little was said from the sponsors in the description and defense of the project.

There is no evidence that AUKUS has the social license to proceed in Australia. By this I mean that AUKUS does not have genuine community acceptance and support from the Australian public by building trust and making progress on the delivery of promised weapons systems.

I believe that the lack of social license is a direct result of the AUKUS agreement being designed within raw power politics. This did not result from the development of a policy logic or a coherent defense strategy. He hasn’t shown either yet.

threat narrative

At the heart of the AUKUS case, put forward by successive Australian governments, is the implicit and explicit claim that nuclear-powered submarines are needed to protect Australia from Chinese military aggression.

There is no doubt that China developed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now has the capabilities to assert military superiority in the South China Sea and beyond. But there is a clear distinction to be made between China’s increasing military capability and the level of threat it poses to Australia.

While analysis of the PRC’s growing military capabilities is relevant to our understanding of our self-defense needs, it should be clear that China already has the capacity to disrupt Australia’s trade routes and undersea communications technology, as well as conduct effective cyber operations against our critical communications and energy infrastructure.

None of these require weapons to reach Australian territory.

If we add to this the fact that China is by far Australia’s largest trading partner, taking up a third of all our exports, providing 570,000 direct jobs in Australia and leading two-way trade worth $200 billion a year, the conclusion is surely that China is capable of economically subjugating Australia without firing a shot.

While the rise of China is presented in Australia as a threat requiring military intervention, the reality is much more complex than perceived. The threat narrative omits facts that China’s critics find inconvenient.

A clear example of this is the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. The United States has 120 military bases in Japan, including a US Navy base Yokosuka And Kadena Air Base. South Korea hosts 73 more US bases where the giant ship is docked Camp Humphreys And osan Air Bases. The Philippines gives the United States access to nine more military sites.

Add in US military access to bases in Singapore, Diego Garcia and, of course, Australia, and the picture becomes clear: China is actually surrounded by the land, sea and air power of a large number of US and its allies. It is not surprising that China feels threatened by the United States and has significantly increased its defense forces in response.

progressive patriotism

Minister of Defense Industry in his latest National Press Club speech Pat Conroy revived the concept of misty “progressive patriotism”. Winding “Our investment in defense” Within traditional Labor values of fairness, equality, social justice, democracy and multiculturalism, Conroy evoked Labour’s wartime and security history.

I think Conroy’s speech was a sly horse aimed at repositioning AUKUS within the Labor Party as essential to the defense of the nation.

Conroy aimed to touch the spirit of today, that is, the feeling of patriotism. He did so boldly by criticizing the track record of the Department of Defense, which he has led for the past four years. The result, in terms of media consumption, was the revelation that $29 billion had been wasted on Defense procurement projects (one example) over the last decade.

Phrases for many people “Progressive patriotism” And “Investing in defense to deter aggression” unquestionably, it is truly desirable. In the debate around AUKUS, no one seriously argues that Australia should not be able to defend itself.

However, a closer look at the recent wrangling over defense and security policy in Australia shows that much of the political energy is focused on the level of defense spending and the percentage of GDP Australia must invest to meet Washington’s demands. The problem here for Conroy and the Government is that clever rhetoric does not translate into policy rationale for AUKUS.

Conroy’s speech let the cat out of the bag when he acknowledged the massive cost overruns that have beset Defense tenders for more than a decade. This is a fundamental issue on which all AUKUS critics agree; The huge cost of $368 billion is likely to increase further.

FROM WAR TO RICHNESS — The myth of American idealism

Death of statesmanship

It will probably collapse slowly AUKUS Column 1 The project is not cause for celebration. The impact of the project’s failure would be profound for Australia, given the huge amount of public money already spent and the fact that this is likely to reveal the gap in Australia’s defense capability.

This possible reality begs the question of what can be done to promote workable alternatives to closing the talent gap and how we can better take into account our relationships with China and our Asia-Pacific neighbors.

Throughout this presentation, I have talked about the need for Australia to return to a foreign policy that prioritizes statecraft and relations with China. ASEAN countries due to an aggressive military posture that characterizes AUKUS.

The misplaced importance given to AUKUS by successive Australian governments has distorted both defense and foreign policy priorities. Its failure puts Australia’s prestige and the soft power we have in our region at risk. Allowing AUKUS to dominate Australian defense and foreign policy is a huge mistake. But the mistake is bigger than the possible failure of AUKUS. It is significant that Australia’s international standing and national security are so deeply tied to a flawed defense project.

The deeper problem with Australia’s foreign policy is that our leaders fail to understand the weakening hegemonic power of the United States. Our national security posture is still based on our belief that the United States will remain the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific. This is no longer the case.

It is clear to many in the Labor Party that prioritizing defense over statecraft does not contribute to Australia’s historic strength. No matter how much we spend improving our armed forces to meet the expectations of Pentagon hawks, we cannot expect to counter China’s military might. Neither should we try. But it is realistic to rebuild our diplomatic stocks and embrace our goal of being a creative and independent-minded middle power.

It continues to be recognized by policymakers that the Australian armed forces should be the instrument, not the master, of foreign policy. As former Minister of Foreign Affairs gareth evans and others have long recommended, it is time to craft a foreign policy that balances traditional security and economic interests with moral decency and cooperation to address global challenges.

This article, FROM WAR TO RICH, is the fourth in a multi-part series examining the true costs of our current defense trajectory and exploring the alternatives suggested by Make Peace a Priority.MPAP) offer. You can read the first part HERE, the second part HERE and the third part HERE.