Iraq’s political time loop: Why Nouri al-Maliki’s comeback raises fears of another national collapse? | World News

Iraq appears to be returning to a past that many hoped it had left behind. Two weeks ago, Prime Minister Mohammed Shiite al-Sudani announced that he was withdrawing from the race to form a new government; This decision almost completely cleared the way for former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki to return to power. For many Iraqis, this is not political continuity; This is a warning sign.

Al-Maliki’s possible return is widely seen as a symptom of Iraq’s unresolved post-2003 crisis, a state still trapped in sectarian politics, institutional decay and deep-rooted corruption more than two decades after the US-led invasion.

A familiar and troubled record

When al-Maliki first became prime minister in 2006, he received strong support from the administration of US President George W. Bush, who viewed him as a stabilizing figure. This trust diminished rapidly. By November of that year, only six months into his term, US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley was already questioning al-Maliki’s ability to prevent violence against Iraq’s Sunni population.

Despite these concerns, Washington continued to support him; This decision later turned out to be costly. Under al-Maliki, Iraq has steadily moved away from its post-invasion promise of inclusive rule.

During his first two terms, he oversaw the systematic marginalization of Sunnis politically and socially, largely through the selective use of de-Baathification laws. These measures, originally designed to eliminate Saddam Hussein loyalists, became a blunt sectarian tool. In 2010 alone, al-Maliki used the de-Baathist law to ban nine political parties and more than 450 mostly Sunni candidates from participating in parliamentary elections.

Security forces under his command arrested moderate Sunni politicians on suspected “terrorism” charges and suppressed peaceful opposition. One of the most notorious incidents took place in the town of Al Hawija in Kirkuk province in 2013. After weeks of peaceful protests against government discrimination, security forces raided the sit-in, killing at least 44 demonstrators.

At the same time, Baghdad witnessed the forced displacement of Sunni families and the consolidation of predominantly Shiite neighborhoods, an effort widely described as state-sponsored demographic engineering.

These policies have pushed Iraqi politics into dangerous territory where sectarian identity has replaced citizenship and national unity has collapsed. The resulting anger and alienation within Sunni communities created fertile ground for extremist groups, first Al Qaeda and then ISIS (ISIS).

Massive corruption

Al-Maliki’s years in office were also marked by staggering corruption and mismanagement. Iraq’s parliamentary transparency commission estimated in 2018 that $320 billion had been lost to corruption since 2003. Al-Maliki was prime minister for eight of these 15 years.

The money fueled the lavish lifestyles of political insiders, overseas property purchases, shell company networks and secret bank accounts. Iraq’s Federal Integrity Commission documented many of these abuses, but no charges were ever brought. During the Al-Maliki era, judicial independence gradually eroded, making accountability impossible.

The rot has also spread to the security sector. The Iraqi army was filled with “ghost soldiers”, fictitious troops whose salaries were absorbed by commanders. By 2014, the annual cost of this plan to the state was approximately 380 million dollars. Al-Maliki himself reportedly ran a secret prison and commanded a personal force of 3,000 loyal soldiers.

Years of corruption, combined with nearly $100 billion in US military funding, resulted in disaster. In 2014, Iraqi army units collapsed in the face of advancing ISIS forces, abandoning cities and weapons with almost no fighting.

Why is his return important now?

Al-Maliki has not remained politically inactive since leaving office. He has been deeply embedded in Iraq’s power structure for more than a decade, carefully positioning himself for a comeback under the watchful eye of successive U.S. administrations.

A third term will likely intensify sectarian polarization and further weaken state institutions. His preference for shadow networks of loyalists over formal rule risks hollowing out what remains of the Iraqi state.

Regional effects are equally important. Following the overthrow of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah, Iraq became Iran’s most important regional support. Tehran’s influence has rarely been this exposed, and Maliki’s return would all but eliminate a more independent Iraqi foreign policy.

It has already signaled resistance to conflict with Syria’s new leadership. Last year, he opposed interim President Ahmed al-Shara’s attendance at the Arab League Summit in Baghdad and described himself as someone “wanted by Iraqi courts on terrorism charges.”

Relations with Washington may also become tense. The appointment of Mark Savaya by President Donald Trump as the US special envoy for Iraq, the first such assignment in two decades, underscored America’s efforts to thwart Iranian influence. One of the key US demands is the disbandment of the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces and their full integration into the Iraqi army.

This is unlikely under Al-Maliki, who is considered the political architect and “godfather” of these parallel armed groups. Dismantling them would mean fragmenting its own power base and loosening Iraq’s ties with Tehran.

A cycle Iraq cannot break

The deeper problem goes beyond any one leader. Al-Maliki’s resurgence shows how Iraq remains locked in a political cycle that brings little but crisis. It looks like the lessons of 2014 were not learned. Sectarian mobilization and kleptocracy remain valid paths to power.

Iraqi youth have repeatedly taken to the streets to challenge this corrupt system and demand accountability and real reform. But without fundamental changes in how power is distributed, how corruption is punished, and how identity is politicized, Iraq risks reliving its darkest periods.