Is Albo’s ‘Richardson Review’ into Bondi independent or for a roving insider?

Following the Bondi terror attack and calls for a Royal Commission, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has launched an ‘independent’ review of federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. former senator Rex Patrick It takes an intrusive look at the “Richardson Review.”
The Prime Minister has appointed Canberra veteran Dennis Richardson to lead the investigation into the Bondi attacks. Is the Richardson Inquiry into the Bondi attacks truly ‘independent’ and have some of its findings already been established?
An internal intelligence error
David Tyler was absolutely right in his last speech. MWM An analysis of the failure of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) in the Bondi Beach massacre.
The alleged perpetrator, Naveed Akram, 24, was investigated by ASIO in 2019 for his close ties to an ISIS cell in Sydney, including links to Isaac Al Matari, who describes himself as the head of the Islamic State in Australia. The ASIO investigation lasted six months before Akram was cleared on the grounds that he “showed no indication of any ongoing threat”.
Billion Dollar Balcony. ASIO’s sovereignty failure
His father, Sajid, meanwhile, held a valid NSW firearms licence; This was a privilege granted not only to citizens but also to permanent residents, and he had legally acquired six long guns. The weapons were located at the family home in Bonnyrigg, a western suburb of Sydney; Here it seems that the mass murder plan was made without being detected.
What is the point of intelligence that can identify environmental protesters but fail to link concealed weapons to a known extremist affiliation? Tyler asked.
Tyler plausibly explained that ASIO, which has been allocated more public money each year (currently $700 million a year) with bipartisan support but little emphasis on performance, has comprehensively failed.
Foreign intelligence error
Taylor’s focus was on ASIO, but it is also reasonable to ask what Australia’s external intelligence agencies (the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)) are doing as well.
Functions of ASIS, Article 6 of the Intelligence Services Actadd “Obtain intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of persons or entities outside Australia, in accordance with Australian Government requirements“. It is an international espionage agency and ASIS’s focus is the world beyond Australia’s borders.
Functions of ASD, Article 7 of the Intelligence Services Lawadd To obtain intelligence in the form of electromagnetic energy, or electric, magnetic or acoustic energy, whether guided or unguided, or both, about the capabilities, intentions or activities of persons or entities outside Australia, for the purpose of meeting Government requirements for such intelligence.
ASD is also an international electronic interception agency; ASD is eavesdropping on people outside Australia.
spies like them
As a general rule, no agency can spy on Australians abroad. However, there are exceptions to this rule, provided that the secretary of state (in the case of ASIS) or the minister of defense (in the case of ASD) approves it. Ministers can only approve spying on Australians overseas for the specific reasons listed below. Article 9 of the Intelligence Services Act. These reasons include when a person poses a risk to the safety of any person or poses a security threat.
Both father and son went to Davao on the Philippine island of Mindanao for almost a month just before the terrorist attack. This is an area where various groups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State operate.
On Tuesday, the Prime Minister and the Australian Federal Police Commissioner released information received from the Philippine National Police after the Bondi attack that the Akrams spent most of their time at a local hotel and apparently did not undertake any training or “logistical preparations” for the attack while in the Philippines.
International connections?
However, Commissioner Krissy Barratt added: “But I want to be clear, I am not suggesting that they are there for tourism..”
All this raises very serious questions.
Why did father Akram and his son go to the Philippines?
Who did they meet with and for what purpose? If not for training, was it for guidance, instruction or moral sanction for what they planned to do at Bondi?
Perhaps they were “lone wolves” as the Federal Government claimed; but it is also clear that they have international networks in some way.
So why did Australian law enforcement learn of the Davao connection after the horror in Bondi?
Naveed Akram was the subject of a security investigation related to terrorism. His name should have been on the Border Force’s watch list, triggering an alarm when he left the country for a known terrorism hotspot, right?
Have ASIS and ASD been warned?
ASIS and ASD may be alarmed. Maybe it was. Akram’s cell phones could have been spied on, geolocated, metadata analyzed, and potentially intervened.
AFP could have linked up with the Philippine National Police, and ASIS could have deployed its long-established networks in the Philippines.
Prime Minister Albanese is therefore right to launch an investigation into Australia’s federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
So did he choose the right man for the job?
Will we get a cold, hard report demanding accountability, or a soft report calling for more budgets and more powers to be implemented in secrecy and without parliamentary oversight?
Richardson has a distinguished career and is an inside traveler
Dennis Richardson, 78, has had a distinguished career of public service; He served as Director General of ASIO from 1996 to 2005, then Australian Ambassador to the United States until 2010, then Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade until 2012, and finally Minister of Defense until 2017.
It can reasonably be said that Richardson is smart.
It can also reasonably be said that it pleased both the Labor and Coalition governments. He attended more than 50 Senate Estimates sessions during his career, but in the halls of Parliament many thought he had never really answered any question, especially a non-controversial one. He has always had a very keen sense of the direction the political wind is blowing in Canberra.
And he hasn’t left since his retirement in May 2017. He is a traveling insider who has done well in retirement, earning over $1.3 million in income from public domains, sole-source businesses.
Dennis Richardson Consultancy Services (Data Source: AusTender)
This post-retirement work included a comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community, a review of Integrity Concerns and Governance at the Regional Processing Authority (Home Affairs), a review of the 2003 Transfer of (non)Cabinet Records, and a review of the structure, management, performance and direction of the Australian Submarine Agency.
It is clear that Richardson had a constant attachment to the public nipple, which undermined his claim to complete independence.
Mark your own homework
Richardson is being asked to do his own homework, in a sense, because of his previous role as Director General and his review of the National Intelligence Community’s framework.
Terms of reference for Bondi investigation It will look at, among other things:
- Interaction and information sharing between Commonwealth agencies and between Commonwealth and state and territory agencies
- What additional measures (if any) should be taken by relevant Commonwealth agencies to prevent similar attacks from occurring in the future.
- Whether they have adequate legislative powers, the correct systems, processes and procedures, and an appropriate enabling environment for sharing information with other federal, state and territory bodies.
- Whether permission and data access regimes and authorizations are sufficient
- Whether any legislative changes are needed
In fact, it could be argued that due to his legislative focus, Richardson will be doing his homework again.
lack of oversight
While Australia’s intelligence community has grown rapidly over the past two decades, the accountability and review mechanisms that oversee these agencies have received much less attention, fewer resources and less authority.
In particular, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) is strictly restricted under the Intelligence Services Act 2001 from examining matters relating to the conduct and expenditure of Australian intelligence agencies.
PJCIS is expressly prohibited from examining the operations of Australian intelligence agencies. PJCIS is prohibited under the Intelligence Services Act 2001 from examining the intelligence collection priorities and operations of Australian intelligence agencies, or the assessments and reports they produce.
The committee is also prohibited from examining sources of information, operational activities and methods, or any operations undertaken, undertaken, or proposed to be undertaken by intelligence and national security agencies.
Missing the Five Eyes
I spent most of 46he and 47he Parliaments seek to align Australia with our five-eyed partners Subjecting intelligence services to parliamentary scrutiny.
I was not the only person who introduced such a law to the Parliament. Senator Penny Wong was the sponsor of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Intelligence and Security Amendment Bill 2015, which did much the same thing as my Bill.
Wong never bought it by vote and refused to support any of the many amendments I introduced to intelligence-related bills that would require parliamentary oversight of intelligence operations. I conclude that Senator Wong and his colleagues on the Homeland Security Committee have no sense of such oversight.
Instead, in November 2025, in what was clearly a weak response to the need for better oversight and accountability, the Labor Government and the Coalition Opposition passed legislation allowing the PJCIS to request the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to conduct an investigation into the “lawfulness and appropriateness of certain operational activities” that they were still barred from reviewing.
Nothing about oversight of priorities, performance or competence.
All of this is still off the table, or rather under the table.
Meanwhile, we are left with the situation of Caesar judging Caesar. The executive branch of government judges itself when it comes to intelligence matters; Parliament is shirking its constitutional responsibility.
Richardson’s 2019 report recommended: “The remit of the Parliamentary Joint Intelligence and Security Committee should not be expanded to include direct oversight of past or current operational activities.”
Don’t expect him to reconsider this.
Prior to the events of 14 December 2025, intelligence services failed the Australians. We will not see Richardson advising Parliament not to take an active role in intelligence oversight.
Will you reward more money or more power?
The outcome of this investigation will be a soft report and recommendations for greater powers for our intelligence agencies to exercise behind black curtains without parliamentary oversight.
Parliament will be asked to expand the significant powers of intelligence agencies beyond the executive government without effective oversight over those same agencies; just as it was when Richardson was Director-General, and just as preferred by the senior echelons of ministries and agencies who occasionally paid Richardson to work for them.
This is the Prime Minister’s choice. So he once again chose Richardson as “safe hands” to do the job.

Rex Patrick is a former South Australian Senator and formerly a submariner in the armed forces. Known as an anti-corruption and transparency warrior, Rex is also known as “Transparency Warrior“

