‘Enemy within’: Ex-CIA officer says US tipped off Pakistani general before nuclear smuggling arrest
In an interview with ANI, Barlow explained that the operation, jointly conducted by the CIA and US Customs, targeted a Pakistani agent named Arshad Parvez, who was trying to purchase 25 metric tons of Maraging 350 steel, a critical material used in uranium enrichment, from a US steel company.
Barlow said Parvez worked under the direction of retired Brigadier General Inam-ul-Haq, who was then known as the procurement agent for Pakistan Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), two institutions responsible for Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program.
“We set up the Nuclear Export Violations Working Group. Soon after the formation of this group, we had many more cases that we were working on, but a person in the Department of Energy informed me that a Pakistani living in Canada named Arshad Parvez had contacted a US steel company to purchase very large quantities of Maraging 350 steel, about 25 metric tonnes,” Barlow told ANI.
“So in this case, we worked with the Customs Service to conduct an undercover operation and eventually arrest Parvez. He was led by a retired Pakistani general named Inam-ul-Haq, and he was supposed to appear at the steel company in Pennsylvania, and there was an arrest warrant for him, too, but Haq did not show up. And I found out that some people in the State Department had tipped off that arrest warrant to the Pakistani government,” he said.
Barlow, who investigated Pakistan’s nuclear supply network during the Cold War, said the tip came from senior State Department officials and effectively derailed the US operation. He described his reaction to the betrayal as shock and anger: “I was distraught. These were the people in my government, the enemies within.” According to Barlow, the incident revealed how elements within the US administration prioritized Pakistan’s role in the Afghan war over enforcing American laws designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said the incident deepened divisions between intelligence officials who wanted to stop Pakistan’s nuclear buildup and policymakers who wanted to maintain close ties with Islamabad during the Soviet-Afghan conflict.
He said his team had gathered overwhelming evidence that the arrested agents were linked to Pakistan’s nuclear facility.
“There was no doubt in this regard that they were agents of the Pakistani government. We had solid evidence of that. So, we had tons of documents, evidence and things that were said and recorded in secret meetings,” Barlow told ANI.
Revelation of the operation subsequently sparked outrage in the US Congress and led to calls from lawmakers to suspend aid to Pakistan under non-proliferation laws such as the Solarz and Pressler Amendments.
“In those days, the arrests were public in the United States. And so Congress found out about the arrest, and you can go look at the Washington Post and the New York Times and newspapers all over the world, Congressman Solars and other members of Congress on the proliferation committee fully understood the consequences of assembling 350 25 tons of steel without a word from the CIA. And they immediately called for the aid to be cut off in the press. So the battle lines on Pakistan were clearly drawn between the State Department and the United States. Barlow said the CIA He added that it has a department that monitors the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Barlow had previously said in the interview: “This was not an intelligence error. This was a policy error. But despite the clear violation, the White House and the State Department found ways to keep military and financial aid flowing to Pakistan.”
“I agree that there was a period in ’86, ’87 when most of us believed that Pakistan had produced all the parts for a nuclear weapon. Lawyers were looking for any way to get around this situation,” Barlow said.
Barlow later testified before Congress alongside National Intelligence Officer David Einsel, who he said was closely connected to the White House, and ordered that aid to the Afghan Mujahideen not be jeopardized.
His testimony exposed deep divisions within the US government over how to deal with Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. “This was not an intelligence error. This was a matter of policy, a wink and a nod,” Barlow said.
He also described how the Reagan administration and the CIA’s operations wing prioritized the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan over nuclear nonproliferation.
“The Cold Warriors were in charge. Fighting the Soviets was the number one issue. They didn’t think it was a problem that Pakistan was getting nuclear weapons because they were looking at everything through a Cold War lens,” Barlow said.
