Running interference for the DPP. Has the NACC redefined its role?

The re-investigation of the “Robodebt Six” ended in a whimper, and in the process the NACC failed in its mission. Again. Paul Begley reports.

When the National Anti-Corruption Commission was established in 2022, the Government of Albania committed $262 million to establish and resource this body over four years, followed by an additional injection of funds of approximately $67 million each year from 2025 so that it can maintain its capabilities and carry out its functions.

By 2025, NACC’s staff allocation stood at 220 employees, on a growth trajectory leading to an optimum of 270. The organizational structure consists of one commissioner, three deputy commissioners and a chief executive officer. Six chief executives report to the CEO and are responsible for capabilities such as legal, assessments, investigations, fraud prevention and public relations. The commissioner and the CEO are jointly responsible for management.

a new article He points out that the Albanian Government’s selections for three NACC deputy commissioner positions were held at the lowest possible eligibility threshold, raising questions about whether the anti-corruption body was initially set up for failure. This question was recently put to the test.

Holmes’ letter to Hurley

At the end of the Robodebt Royal Commission, Commissioner Catherine Holmes sent a sealed document to the Governor-General containing the names of five senior public officials and a sixth person mentioned by Holmes in his report. cover letter “For civil or criminal prosecution.” Chief among them were former Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Department of Human Services Secretary Kathryn Campbell, the plan’s creators.

Two years later, the NACC found that no further action was necessary to pursue the six men, and that decision was later overturned.

‘Robodebt Six’ and the NACC scam. What is fraud?

For reasons he may one day decide to reveal, Holmes referred these six to the fledgling NACC rather than the Director of Commonwealth Prosecutions (CDPP); Looking back, this was a better option.

Kilgour’s ‘wisdom’

In March this year, Deputy Commissioner Kilgour published his reinvestigation report into the NACC’s 2024 decision on ‘Robodebt sub’ under the title Operation Myrtleford. His report set out details of 39 witnesses whose testimony he heard in secret hearings. His assessment of this evidence and the conclusions he draws from it shown ($) naive at best, if not grossly incompetent.

The deputy commissioner’s working profile describes an ambitious, mid-level bureaucrat with a law degree, but falls well short of a suitably qualified person to conduct a critical reinvestigation.

This effectively puts Australia’s anti-corruption agency on trial.

Leaving aside the fact that Holmes had expressly referred the Robodebt sextet for civil or criminal prosecution, Kilgour argued that Holmes could not make such a referral because decisions on that order rested with the CDPP. Having made this observation, Kilgour brazenly assumed the role of prosecutor in deciding what the ‘required standard’ was to be placed before the court. This is the relevant paragraph, with emphasis in bold:

“Ministers and senior public servants should have known that income averaging based on ATO data is an unreliable basis for collecting and recovering debts from social security recipients. However, being able to prove to the required standard that they actually knew that the operation of the Robodebt system was illegal is a completely different thing. There is little in the materials to suggest that the evidence rises to this level. I remembered the aphorism that given the choice between stuffing (even a very large conspiracy) and conspiracy, one should generally choose stuffing.”

The phrases he chooses to highlight refer to the ‘wisdom’ that when looking at a set of circumstances that could be described as a fabrication or a conspiracy, the former is a more likely explanation than the latter.

Disregarding the basic principles of the investigation

It goes without saying that one of the main purposes of an official investigation by a taxpayer-funded anti-corruption body with significant investigative powers and ample resources is to distinguish between fabrications and conspiracies.

Therefore, it is a reasonable expectation to assume that a competent investigator will use these powers and resources to reach an evidence-based conclusion with acceptable certainty or probability, or to provide credible reasons for remaining inconclusive. Instead of doing this, Kilgour resorted to the following method:

The feeling of greased guts emitted by a random vomit fly in a bush bar.

A determination on this distinction is particularly necessary given that the main actors of the investigation made significant personal gains at the huge public cost in the lives of half a million defenseless citizens. The citizens suffered greatly and many did not recover. An unknown number of people committed suicide.

In addition, many Australian citizens have varying memories of hearing witness statements from perpetrators during the live-streamed public hearings of the Robodebt Royal Commission; these hearings portrayed them in a damning light.

If the Operation Myrtleford investigation was to somehow enable these witnesses to present themselves in a more frank manner, it was imperative that at least the evidence given to Kilgour’s NACC inquiry be heard in public hearings rather than in secrecy.

As the NACC lurches from one dysfunctional misfortune to another, with no material success after three years of existence, Australian taxpayers may legitimately ask whether there is any point in persisting with a national body seemingly maintaining integrity in the public sector, at a time when the most important issue it faces is about its own integrity.

“Enough is enough”. Why did Brereton have to resign from the NACC?