Immigration pressures build as net migration stabilises

Treasury forecasts suggest Australia’s migration decline could soon peak and rise well above pre-pandemic levels, setting the stage for a heated political fight. Dr Abul Rizvi reports.

When and at what level will the decline in net migration stop?

In terms of immigration policy, this is a very important question because it depends on what immigration policies the Labor Government will implement over the next few years and the warring Coalition factions (lei etc hasty) offer.

Net migration has been in decline since reaching a peak of over 530,000 in 2022-23. In the 12 months to March 2025, this number fell to 315,000. Consistent with the Prime Minister’s pre-election promise to reduce net migration to pre-pandemic levels, the Treasury currently forecasts net migration will fall to around 260,000 in 2025-’26 and to around 223,000 in 2026-’27. This forecast will be updated in December 2025.

But are we on the right track for this?

In the five months from April to August 2025, net permanent and long-term movements in each of these months were higher than in the same five months in 2024 (see Table 1). Total net permanent and long-term movements for these five months in 2024 were 161,900 compared to 191,870 in 2025.

This may indicate that the decline in net migration has stopped. However, this is definitely not a sufficient indicator. We need to look at other factors as well.

Changes in the stock of key temporary entrants reveal a mixed picture (see Table 2).

The ongoing increase in the number of bridging visa holders is both an indication that the visa system is in dire straits (not only is it unable to cope with the volume of onshore visa applications, but there are also issues with policy settings and visa design).

This also shows that temporary entrants are not leaving as quickly as the Government would like. Part of the bridging visa backlog is students and asylum seekers appealing primary refusal decisions to the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART). That number is now approaching a staggering 100,000.

Another portion of the bridging visa backlog will consist of temporary entrants awaiting decisions on their onshore permanent visa applications, as well as students, temporary graduates and temporary skilled entrants awaiting decisions on other onshore applications.

The continued increase in the number of New Zealand citizens is the combined result of a relatively weak New Zealand labor market leading to a record number of New Zealand citizens leaving their country, as well as changes in the Australian Government’s policy to provide a direct route to Australian citizenship without first obtaining a permanent residence visa.

The increase in the stock of New Zealand citizens in Australia excludes those who have secured Australian citizenship. More than 33,000 New Zealand citizens acquired Australian citizenship in 2024–25 (many more than any other nationality). This averages out to around 2,800 per month, or 13,000 in five months.

New Zealand citizens continue to make a strong contribution to net migration, probably around 30,000 per year, three to four times higher than pre-pandemic levels.

The student stock in Australia (excluding those on bridging visas) has fallen by almost 30,000 since the end of March 2025. This may be the result of students leaving permanently, securing other onshore visas (temporary and permanent) and a decline in offshore student applications.

But when the Government announced a 25,000 increase in student planning levels for 2026 and more importantly an increase of 15 universities being promoted From level 2 to level 1 for student visa processing, we will see a strong increase in offshore student applications and grants over the next few months and throughout 2026.

The government may well regret its decision to significantly increase the number of level 1 universities for student visa proof purposes; as this would limit the decline in the student contribution to net migration and increase ongoing pressure on the permanent migration program (see below).

The continued increase in the number of temporary graduate visa holders reflects both the explosion in student numbers in 2022-24 and the fact that temporary graduates will no longer be able to apply for student visas onshore. The majority of Australia’s 232,000 temporary graduates will eventually apply for either a temporary skilled visa or a permanent visa. Jobs and Skills Australia confirmed this. This will also limit the increase in net migration outflows. It will put further pressure on the backlog of applications for permanent migration.

The number of qualified temporary entrants has continued to increase since March 2025, reaching a new record of 229,179. This does not include applicants for skilled temporary visas in bridging visa accumulation. A significant part of the increase in the stock of temporary skilled entrants is due to temporary graduates; especially as these graduates now only require 12 months of skilled work experience to obtain a skilled temporary visa.

Skilled temporary migrants are increasing pressure on the permanent migration programme, including employer-assisted permanent migration, where the backlog is currently over 58,000 but the planning level is just 44,000 in 2025-’26.

The good news for the government is that the working holidaymaker stock has fallen by 23,000 people. While some of this decline will be due to a steady seasonal decline in the number of working holidaymakers in the Australian winter, some of this will also be due to working holidaymakers clearing visa backlogs, as well as working holidaymakers gaining permanent residence.

The government has significantly increased the size of permanent migration compared to before the pandemic (see Table 3).

Moreover, the headline size of the migration program now understates the true level of permanent migration because:

• ’23-’24 New Zealand citizens no longer need to obtain permanent residence. These places are now used by people of other nationalities, effectively increasing the size of the immigration program, while New Zealand citizens have direct access to Australian citizenship; And
• Pacific Engagement Visas, which are permanent residence visas, are not included in the permanent immigration program without any valid reason.

The large increase in net migration in ’22-24 led to a large increase in permanent immigration applications, particularly from joint visa applicants (current backlog around 98,000 versus 40,500) and employer-sponsored visas (current backlog around 58,000 versus 44,000).

At some stage soon, the Government will likely need to address this backlog by increasing the size of its permanent migration programme.

The above suggests that in the current policy environment the decline in net migration could bottom out in 2025 or early 2026. Moreover, it may bottom out at a level much higher than the pre-pandemic levels promised by the Prime Minister.

This will undoubtedly be exploited by the Coalition (both Ley and Hastie will fight this, including Hastie’s apparent desire to abandon Australia’s non-discriminatory immigration programme), but they will do so by providing few details on how they will reduce net migration to their preferred level. That’s how it was dutton And Tahan approached the subject.

As in many other countries, it is difficult to find good and transparent policy on immigration.

Dr Abul Rizvi Independent Australian columnist and a former Deputy Secretary of the Immigration Service. You can follow Abul on Twitter @RizviAbul.

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