Yunus’ pro-Pakistan shift with Jamaat deal signals huge risk to Bangladesh autonomy | World News

The alliance with the pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami drags Bangladesh into Islamabad’s geopolitical drift and threatens Dhaka’s foreign policy independence. The political realignment in Bangladesh, along with Mohammed Younis’s concessions to the pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami, has raised the ire of observers over a risky political calculation that threatens Dhaka’s independent foreign policy.
Although Yunus frames this shift in Bangladesh’s course as tactical, it reflects his ambition to consolidate political influence within his country and points to much larger consequences for the South Asian country, well beyond the upcoming local elections.
The stakes are high for Bangladesh as its foreign policy has historically been shaped by the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 and its strategic autonomy dictating pragmatism over non-aligned relationships around the world and India’s ties in the region.
Add Zee News as Preferred Source
The Jamaat has always been a pro-Pakistan force in Bangladesh, even before the war of liberation in 1971, when the landmass prepared by its leaders was named East Pakistan because of the injustice and genocide inflicted on its people by the political and military leadership of West Pakistan.
The community has always demonstrated strict Islamism and thus adapted to the Pakistani worldview. The League’s foreign relations instincts were shaped by religious globalism and differed greatly from the secular and nationalist tendencies that Dhaka diplomacy had displayed for decades.
Yunus now embraces the Jamaat’s organizational strength, voter base and conservatism, risking Bangladesh’s future as a secular state and its governance efficiency.
Jamaat’s influence on Yunus is likely to shape his policy priorities, thus diluting Bangladesh’s hard-line rhetoric against Pakistan and re-opening the possibility of Dhaka falling into Islamabad’s orbit. The doors that were closed to Islamabad after the war of independence and independence have now been opened.
Yunus did not make any clear policy changes. It was gradually recalibrated. Diplomacy is mostly done through signaling. The optics of the Yunus-Jamaat pact are seen globally as Bangladesh’s return to East Pakistan.
Since taking over interim rule in Bangladesh, Yunus has gradually diminished his previous emphasis on Pakistan’s responsibility for Dhaka’s war crimes and genocide in 1971. Yunus has a more conciliatory tone regarding historical disputes and human exchanges. Islamist forces guided this change and the strategic orientation of the Yunus administration.
Bangladesh is the foremost partner under India’s Neighborhood First policy. Both countries offer each other strategic advantages in connectivity, security, energy, cultural partnership and a shared vision for the region. But Yunus’s signal raises concerns about the long-term reliability of today’s Bangladesh.
The more disturbing news is that the Yunus-Jamaat alliance puts Islamist conservatism at the top of its ideological positions. Maintaining regional balance is not on the agenda. But historically, Bangladesh’s development and global prominence have relied heavily on its external partnerships, such as ties with India, trade with the West and the Gulf, and active participation in global and regional forums.
The current pro-Pakistan ideological alliance, whether real or perceived, is shaking up the idea of Bangladesh, where the nation was born in 1971. Yunus’ agreement with Islamic fundamentalists like Jamaat is a warning sign for Bangladesh’s Western partners about problems in governance, counter-terrorism and counter-extremism cooperation, uncertainty of political developments and difficulties in trade.
Although Yunus describes his alliance with the Community as temporary and transactional in terms of domestic politics, the developments are worrying enough to allay concerns. History is a witness that political alliances are not limited to electoral struggles.
Such political conveniences often translate into shaping both domestic and foreign policies, positions, decisions and actions. Such alliances remain neither transactional, temporary nor pragmatic and test the core tenets of Bangladesh’s formation, such as strategic independence, sovereignty and liberation. This clearly opens the door to hostile external pressures against Bangladesh.
Whenever its official diplomacy has failed, Pakistan has historically resorted to religious and ideological maneuvers to reassert its influence in South Asia. Bangladesh’s political situation, which deliberately or otherwise strengthens the ideological position of Jamaat, can create a gap in regional harmony by opening such doors to exert pressure on Pakistan through narratives, social influence and its diaspora.
After working so hard for decades to insulate itself from such proxy politics of Pakistan, the decline of Bangladesh’s political climate through the Yunus-Jamaat nexus could cause irreparable damage to its global standing.



