Ex-CIA Officer Reveals Why He Nicknamed Former Pakistan Nuclear Scientist AQ Khan ‘Merchant Of Death’ | World News

James Lawler, the famous former CIA officer credited with taking down AQ Khan’s nuclear smuggling network, talked about his early experiences that shaped his intelligence career, how he earned the nickname “Mad Dog” and why he called Khan the “Merchant of Death”.

In an interview with ANI, the former head of the CIA’s Non-Proliferation Division detailed his role in exposing and sabotaging global nuclear smuggling networks linked to the Pakistani scientist.

Lawler described how these covert efforts ultimately influenced AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network. The United States had monitored Khan’s role in building Pakistan’s nuclear capacity for years before analysts realized the extent of his outward smuggling.

“We were too slow. We thought it was serious about supplying Pakistan with supplies, but we didn’t imagine it would turn around and become an outward-looking nuclear weapons manufacturer,” he said. “I called AQ Khan ‘Merchant of Death’.”

He described how the CIA confirmed Khan’s operation provided multiple foreign programs. Responding to questions about Pakistan’s involvement, Lawler said, “AQ Khan had some Pakistani generals and leaders on his payroll,” emphasizing that individual complicity did not amount to official state policy.

Lawler’s account detailed his career in counterproliferation, which began when he served in a “beautiful Alpine country” known for advanced technology sought by states seeking nuclear weapons. After returning to CIA headquarters in 1994, he was selected to lead the counterproliferation office in the European division and was later tasked with infiltrating and disrupting Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Expanding on the methods he adopted, Lawler explained how his inspiration from Felix Dzerzhinsky’s “Trust” operation led him to establish secret overseas organizations that appeared to provide nuclear-related technology. “If I want to defeat nuclear proliferation and proliferators, I have to be a proliferator,” he said. These assets were used in operations to distribute compromised materials designed to disrupt illicit nuclear activity. “We did the opposite of the Hippocratic oath. We always caused harm.”

This approach was in line with how AQ Khan’s network developed. Over the decades the network expanded significantly, moving from supply to full-scale smuggling.

Highlighting Khan’s influence and popularity in Pakistan, Lawler said, “Instead of being consumers of this technology, they have become suppliers of technology.”

He attributed the slow early U.S. response to limited resources and geopolitical crises in the 1970s and 1980s, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and conflicts in Latin America. He rejected claims that Saudi pressure shaped US inaction, emphasizing instead that combating nuclear proliferation only became a priority in the 1990s.

A turning point came after analysts presented evidence confirming that the spread was outward. The CIA then expanded its contacts and infiltrated the network in multiple jurisdictions with a small team. Up to 10 officers at headquarters focused exclusively on the operation, supported by overseas personnel.

After September 11, concerns about Libya, which was shown as a sponsor of terrorism, increased the urgency of the mission. Lawler underlined that the CIA intervened in the BBC Chinese cargo ship, which the BBC stated was carrying “hundreds of thousands of nuclear parts.” When U.S. negotiators confronted Libyan officials about the seized material, “You could have heard a pin drop.” Libya later removed its program, recalling that it “did a little happy dance” next to the rescued containers, noting that the move likely prevented Gaddafi from using such weapons years later.

The broader picture of nuclear proliferation included Iran. Lawler described how the Iranian program was based on designs stolen from URENCO, using the same P1 and P2 centrifuge models supplied by AQ Khan. Khan’s network also passed on ballistic missile technology and the Chinese atomic bomb plan. “I think they took it all,” he said.

This led Iran to warn that its nuclear weapon could trigger a “nuclear epidemic”, causing regional powers to seek their own deterrents and sharply increasing the risk of nuclear conflict in the Middle East.

Lawler also touched on why the United States opposes Iran’s nuclear development while tolerating Pakistan’s nuclear development, suggesting that policymakers may have “turned a blind eye” to Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and acknowledged that many decisions have long-term consequences.

His statement included close monitoring of Pakistan’s nuclear assets after 9/11. CIA Director George Tenet and the Counterterrorism Center ensured that AQ Khan did not provide nuclear material to Al Qaeda. Tenet personally confronted then-Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf with evidence of Khan’s proliferation activities.

Defending the CIA’s sabotage methods, Lawler explained that the agency ensured that equipment provided to illegal programs was compromised. Centrifuge plants were particularly vulnerable, and the CIA made certain that “things would constantly break down and not work.”

Reflecting on his decades of work, Lawler said he had no major regrets and found deep purpose in anti-proliferation efforts. He now writes spy novels based on his experiences, all of which are approved by the CIA review board.

In reflecting on his own past, Lawler traced the origins of his “Mad Dog” nickname to an incident while he was stationed in France in the late 1980s. He recalled being attacked by a German shepherd during his morning run, fighting the dog, and later being warned that the dog was probably rabid. “I made a list of people I would bite in case I got rabies. That led to my nickname, which I use quite honestly,” he said, noting that many of his colleagues still use that name.

Underlining the importance of closer cooperation between India and the US, he said previous relations were “in between” and neither adversarial nor fully harmonious. He emphasized common strategic interests and warned that a nuclear exchange in South Asia would leave “only losers” and cause global destruction.

Lawler, who served at the CIA from 1980 to 2005, said that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is vital to reducing nuclear dangers, even if complete disarmament remains distant.