Can Tarique Rahman repair India-Bangladesh ties after Yunus interlude? Here’s what is at stake | World News

Bangladesh has made a dramatic political decision. In an election that many believed was going one way, voters decidedly went the other way. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s (BNP) landslide victory not only reshaped Dhaka’s power structure, but also raised a crucial question for the region: Can Tariq Rahman stabilize a country that has endured 18 turbulent months and reset its strained ties with India?

To grasp the magnitude of the moment, it is important to think about what almost happened.

The 13th parliamentary elections were far from inclusive. The Awami League, the country’s largest political party, was banned from contesting. The ban came after pressure from Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), which emerged as the dominant force after former prime minister Sheikh Hasina left Dhaka on August 5, 2024.

In the following period, JeI consolidated its influence throughout the province, with Muhammad Yunus serving as the public face of the interim administration. Over the course of 18 months, key institutions, from the judiciary to the bureaucracy, from universities to the media, were reshaped. High-ranking officials were pressured to resign and be replaced by figures deemed suitable for the new order.

JeI had also moved away from its previous alliances with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), instead forming a coalition of Islamist groups. Among those brought into the interim order were Islamic Andolan Bangladesh, Hizb ut Tahrir and Hefazat-e-Islam, all of which advocated a greater role for Sharia in public life.

The focus shifted to constitutional and structural “reforms,” resulting in the July 2025 National Charter. Critics argued that this effort sought to dilute the secular spirit of the 1972 Constitution and reshape national memory around the 1971 War of Independence. Women’s freedoms and minority rights came under increasing pressure. Law and order deteriorated sharply; mob actions frequently superseded institutional authority.

The elections held on February 12 were expected to strengthen JeI’s rule, either alone or through a union arrangement with the BNP. The party clearly reflected confidence. But the mood in the voting booths told a different story.

Voters, including women, minorities and young citizens, moved decisively towards the BNP. So-called ‘Generation Z’ voters also rejected the National Citizens Party, which consists of figures linked to the July 2024 uprising. The result was striking: BNP crossed the 200-seat mark, while JeI fell far short of expectations, despite winning 68 seats.

The message was clear. After 18 months of economic stress and insecurity, patience had run out.

Tarique Rahman moved quickly to set the tone for his victory. Taking into account past examples such as 2001, when post-election festivities turned into violence against minorities, it banned party workers from street celebrations for victory. In some areas, BNP activists removed locks placed on Awami League offices by the interim administration, signaling tentative moves towards political normalization.

At his first press conference on February 14, Rahman struck a measured note. “Law and order must be maintained at all costs,” he said, acknowledging widespread concerns about public safety. To a Pakistani journalist’s question about Sheikh Hasina’s extradition, he calmly replied, “This is a legal process.”

His first administrative steps include replacing the Cabinet Secretary and beginning to loosen JeI’s grip on the state machinery. But this challenge is huge. JeI’s presence in parliament, especially in constituencies bordering India, ensures that it remains influential.

The risks for India are high. Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the first foreign leader to congratulate Rahman on his “decisive victory”; He expressed support for “a democratic, progressive and inclusive Bangladesh” and was ready to “strengthen our multifaceted relations and advance our common development goals.” This was followed by a friendly telephone exchange that signaled the intention to reset ties.

Two broad issues dominate New Delhi’s concerns: security and economic cooperation.

During the Yunus period, Indian authorities were alarmed by developments that they believed were damaging their security environment. These included alleged renewed support for rebel elements in India’s northeast, the release of convicted extremists, and closer military contacts between Bangladesh and Pakistan. Illegal migration, cattle smuggling and anti-India rhetoric have again become flashpoints along the long land border of over 4,000 kilometres.

Close coordination between BSF and Bangladesh Border Guards is vital. Protocols for joint border management exist, but they require Dhaka’s political support for their smooth functioning.

Economic ties are equally oppressive. Over the past 15 years, trade and connectivity between the two neighbors have deepened significantly. However, the decisions taken in the interim period disrupted the Bangladeshi garment industry’s access to Indian raw materials such as cotton and yarn. This was followed by factory closures; Thousands of people, especially women, became unemployed. While countries such as Türkiye, Pakistan and the USA are trying to expand their footprint, economic geography still favors cooperation with India.

Rahman talked about pursuing a “Bangladesh first” foreign policy. India, on the other hand, continues to frame its regional approach as “Neighborhood First”. There is no need for two ideas to clash. However, good will alone will not be enough.

Restoring institutional balance in the country, managing the influence of Islamist blocs in parliament and rebuilding trust with New Delhi will require stable leadership. Whether Tarique Rahman can translate electoral momentum into lasting stability and repair relations that have become strained over the last 18 months will shape not only the course of Bangladesh but also the strategic landscape of South Asia.