Trump’s use of Pakistan as possible mediator with Iran sparks memories of Nixon’s China talks and Bangladesh liberation

Pakistan’s emergence as Washington’s mediator of choice in negotiations with Iran can be explained in various ways. Since Operation Sindoor in May 2025, US President Donald Trump has taken pride in Pakistan’s self-description as “peaceful” and has reportedly established a personal relationship with Pakistan’s Field Marshal, General Asim Munir, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, meeting them several times.

Notably, Mr. Trump hosted General Munir for lunch at the White House in June last year, amid the latest US-Israeli attacks in June 2025, to ensure that Pakistan did not support Iran militarily.

Pakistan’s offer of a critical mining deal to the United States and its decision to join the Gaza Board of Peace (BoP) also helped strengthen the relationship.

For Iran, Pakistan’s advantage over many other potential mediators is not only its proximity but also that it does not recognize Israel and thus is not amenable to concerns or input from the Netanyahu government. This could also benefit Mr. Trump, who is said to have forwarded a 15-point proposal to the government in Tehran that he hopes will lead to a ceasefire.

But given the role of Islamabad and a different General in facilitating US negotiations with China 55 years ago, at the height of the Cold War, Washington’s decision to enlist Pakistan as a facilitator in the talks may also be rooted in history.

At the time, US President Richard Nixon had begun working on a plan to open relations with Beijing (the US still officially recognized Taiwan as the Republic of China (PRC)), but direct Sino-US Embassy talks had failed. Pakistan was not the first option as he and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered other options, including Poland, France and Romania.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China and leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), rejected the French idea because he wanted a “non-Western” channel. The Warsaw line broke up after two rounds of talks between US and Chinese officials, with Mao Zedong protesting US incursions into Cambodia that were part of the US Army’s effort to cut off supplies to Vietnamese troops.

Mr. Nixon’s need for partners in Asia led him to seek out China as the Vietnam war exhausted the United States, while Sino-Soviet tensions gave Mr. Mao a reason to engage with Washington.

The United States tried to reach the Chinese government through Romania through President Nicolae Ceaușescu, but encountered an unexpected obstacle. “We went in thinking that the Romanians were the most independent of the Eastern Europeans and that they were communists, and that’s why the Chinese liked it. It turned out that the only group the Chinese didn’t trust were the communists,” Mr. Kissinger told the journalist Tom Brokaw decades later. Mr. Kissinger explained that Beijing feared Romanian officials would reveal details to the Kremlin, which would try to sabotage the process.

By then, Mr. Nixon had established a secret channel to the PRC’s leadership through Pakistani President General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, whom he first met during his state visit to Pakistan in 1969. “To Nixon, Khan was an attractive intermediary because he had good relations with both US and PRC leaders, and also provided a means to circumvent the US State Department, which Nixon feared would oppose or publicize his initiative.” The U.S. Office of the Historian in a note on the China opening.

According to one rumor, the White House sent two identical notes, one through President Yahya Khan and the other through President Ceaușescu; However, the first person to return with a response was Pakistan’s Ambassador to Washington, Agha Hilali, exactly a month before his Romanian counterpart. In July 1971, Mr. Kissinger went to Pakistan; There he feigned an illness and was taken to Nathiagali (near Murree), away from the eyes of the press and even his own diplomats in Islamabad. General Khan had arranged commercial PIA flight 707 to take him from Rawalpindi to Peking (Beijing) for talks.

Mr. Kissinger, who had been hosted by Indian officials the day before, reportedly used his “Delhi hub” as an excuse to make a 64-hour getaway that included meeting Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and other officials in China for the first time. Planning had begun for Mr. Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972, which he described as ‘the week that changed the world’.

The incident also had deep and lasting effects on South Asia. Mr. Nixon’s preoccupation with his back channel to China and deep resentment against India led him to turn a blind eye to Pakistani troops launching a genocide against Bengalis in East Pakistan. According to the Bangladesh government, on March 25, 1971, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Searchlight, killing an estimated three million people over the next nine months.

On April 28, 1971, Mr. Kissinger sent a memo to Mr. Nixon detailing the options available to the United States: (1) support Pakistan militarily; (2) maintain impartiality; (3) To help “John reach a negotiated solution.”

Despite desperate telegrams of violence from the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka, Mr. Nixon’s instructions were clear. He ticked option (3) and wrote, “Everyone, just this once, don’t bother Yahya.”

The crackdown caused thousands of refugees to flee to India and spurred India’s support for the Muktibahini movement led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who won the Pakistani General elections in December 1970 but was imprisoned. This was followed by the India-Pakistan war, in which the US tried to threaten India by sending a naval fleet, but ultimately Bangladesh was established in December of the same year. India’s perspective was also shaped by the 20-year Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971.

The Trump administration likely did not delve into the historical tensions of its decision to use General Munir to convey its proposal to Tehran or to send senior US officials to Islamabad for talks. Although the similarity in situations ends there, it is clear that some patterns from past relations between the US and Pakistan are repeated, while other ties between India-US and China-Russia have changed immeasurably. Much will now depend on how the Iranian leadership responds, which continues to counterattack despite suffering great damage from US-Israeli attacks, including the targeted killings of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and National Security Advisor Ali Larijani.

It was published – 25 March 2026 11:28 IST