From Ethiopia To Somalia: In The Horn’s Uncertainty, China Finds Opportunity With Pakistan As Puppet | World News

Every country claims to want stability in the Horn of Africa. It sounds good in speeches and declarations, and no capital openly admits that it is benefiting from the turmoil. But the unfolding situation in the Red Sea corridor points to something more complex, especially when it comes to China’s interests. Instability can become a kind of currency when carefully managed, and Beijing has learned how to spend it.

Take Djibouti. The country was already struggling with debts and diplomatic pressure when China arrived with big promises of loans and infrastructure. A fragile environment gave Beijing an advantage. He offered “rescue capital” at a time when Djibouti had few alternatives. This opening eventually became China’s first overseas military base. Not because Djibouti is an ideal host, but because it is so vulnerable that the offer seems irresistible.

A similar rhythm is seen elsewhere. Ethiopia and Somalia continue to dispute over maritime access, border issues and political recognition. Each flare-up due to the Somaliland agreements or stalled negotiations creates uncertainty. And uncertainty is fertile ground for any outside force that knows how to present itself as the reliable partner who steps in when others argue.

China plays this role without announcing it. It finances both parties in different ways. It invests in Ethiopia’s industrial zones and telecom networks. It builds ports and urban projects in Somalia. It offers diplomatic language that flatters both governments. When tempers run high, Beijing stays out of the fray, positioning itself as the “loyal side” rather than a party to the dispute.

This is not accidental. A fragmented Horn gives China more room to maneuver. It becomes easier for a region that cannot agree on unified maritime rules to be affected bilaterally. A region struggling with debt continues to be open to new loans, new projects and new “solutions”. Beijing does not need to create the crisis; it just needs to arrive early in the recovery process and stay long enough for gratitude to turn into addiction.

Pakistan fits this bill perfectly. Islamabad’s new defense deal with Somalia adds a new layer to China’s expansive reach. Pakistan may present the agreement as South-South cooperation, but its own military modernization is closely tied to Chinese financing and equipment. When Pakistan trains Somali officers or helps develop naval capacity, the shadow behind this assistance is clear.

Once again, China is avoiding the political cost of direct intervention. This allows Pakistan to handle uniformed presence. It allows Somalia to frame the agreement as “capacity building.” And it is positioning itself as a quiet winner: a major power gaining indirect influence in one of the world’s most strategic corridors, without putting a single PLA boat on Somali soil.

In moments of crisis – border disputes, piracy surges, disagreements within IGAD – Beijing offers talking points for dialogue and development, but always on terms that strengthen the partnerships it favors. By contrast, regional initiatives promoting African-led security frameworks have struggled to gain momentum when bilateral agreements promise faster, simpler results. But these bilateral agreements often come with their own price tags, and those prices are only revealed when the government must renegotiate or resist.

The lesson for India and other Indian Ocean countries is clear. China’s strategy in the Horn is driven by timing, not chaos. It does not cause instability; waits for him. And when the region is distracted, divided or financially strained, Beijing steps in in a way that seems helpful but works like a lever.

The Horn of Africa does not need more external customers offering quick solutions. It needs openness, coordination and a willingness to strengthen rather than bypass regional mechanisms. If this does not happen, crises will continue to return, and China will always be ready to turn these crises into opportunities.