China’s Ukraine lesson: What Xi is learning from Putin’s war

The world is watching the Ukrainian conflict carefully. What was supposed to be a short and sharp Russian “military operation” turned into a bloody and drawn-out war of attrition. The Russia-Ukraine War is the first full-scale war between peer enemies in many years, and there are plenty of lessons to be learned.

China and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are mired in static warfare after its friend Russia failed to evaporate its invasion of Ukraine. Supported by Europe and the United States, Kiev used numerous Western weapons and platforms to defend its homeland. Clearly, knowing what works and what doesn’t is of acute interest to the PLA.

Mick Ryan, a former Australian Army Major General, said: “China is unlikely to begin learning and adapting slowly in a conflict as Russia did in 2022. The Chinese have been active learners of modern warfare since the Falklands conflict, and much of their ongoing military transformation stems from observations of the 1991 Gulf War.” He added that the PLA is “a careful and meticulous student of modern warfare, especially the US style of warfare.”
The Ukrainian war changed the way war was waged, and in fact it is often referred to as the “first drone war.” Unmanned systems – in the air, on the ground or on the water – are revolutionizing the way future wars are fought.

Like Vladimir Putin, with his quest to conquer Ukraine, China is also not shy about expressing its desire to subjugate Taiwan. Successfully invading Taiwan, though, is another question entirely. Although Russia was able to advance along land borders from Russia and Belarus, it was unable to capture Ukraine. It adds new levels of complexity and difficulty for China to successfully bridge the rough waters of the Taiwan Strait.

“A reinforced lesson for the Chinese military is the need for greater integration of air, land, sea, rocket, space and information activities. Developing joint theater commands and improving command relationships for the PLA rocket force and space, information and cyber activities represent their learning in this area,” Ryan said. Many of China’s military transformation programs have begun before 2022, and the Ukraine conflict will only reinforce that China is on track. Kevin Polpeter of the China Aerospace Research Institute (CASI) under the auspices of the US Air Force published a report titled “Russia-Ukraine For Consurwanes From Their Russia.” His article offered lessons from Ukraine to any potential conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan. First, he determined the moral direction. In Ukraine, a smaller army resisted a larger army, also showing greater willingness to fight. However, there are questions about the Taiwanese people’s resolve to fight for their freedom against China.

Second, polpeter turns out, demography is not destiny. Russia has sustained 7,90,000 casualties since 2022, or about 2.2% of its men aged 20-40, but the country continues to fight. China now has a declining population, but heavy PLA losses are believed to have less impact on its ability to prosecute any military campaign. This is especially true because China’s national security apparatus will quash any dissent.

Third, quantity has its own quality. Conflicts often last longer than the attacker expects. “At the strategic level, wars of attrition will be won by the ability to mobilize personnel, industrial capacity to replace material losses, geographic depth to absorb defeats, and technologies that prevent quick gains.”

China has advantages in all of these, and its defense industry is already on a war footing. Consider, for example, the PLA’s precision strike capabilities, as it has the world’s most diverse arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles.

Later, Pollpeter emphasized the interconnectedness of the world’s military-industrial complex. Russia was able to focus its economy on supporting the war despite Western sanctions. Ironically, China has been described as the “decisive facilitator” of Moscow’s war. As an example, Reuters recently reported that Chinese drone experts visited Russian drone manufacturer IEMZ Kupol, which has allegedly been carrying out technical development work since the second quarter of 2024. The company also received shipments of Chinese-made A140 and A900 Loitering munitions, as well as other surveillance drones through a Russian-brokered TSK Vektor.

As with Russia, it would be difficult to isolate China in a future war, and Taiwan’s sovereign status also counts against it. That’s why Beijing constantly argues that Taiwan is not a valid country.

Fifth, the CASI report emphasized that nuclear messaging is as vibrant as it was in the Cold War. Moscow used its nuclear saber rattle, and China would likely do the same in any Taiwan War. Remember that China is carrying out the world’s fastest build-up of nuclear weapons – there must be a reason for this.

Then, Pollpeter talked about the importance of logistics. Russia suffered major logistical deficiencies, and the United States and Taiwan would also face them in any war with China. A PLA air and sea blockade would try to cut off Taiwan from supplies, and the island’s roads and railways that bring supplies over friendly land borders like Ukraine are of no use. It would be emphasized as the US military tries to support Taiwan.

The seventh point was the rise of machines, that is, unregulated systems. Although used for lethal attacks, the most common use of aerial drones is for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Any conflict over Taiwan will accelerate the innovative use of unmanned systems.

Subsequently, the Starlink Internet constellation became a game changer for Ukrainian communications and now has 42,000 Starlink terminals. Any war with China would immediately extend into space to deprive Taiwan and the United States of access to satellite communications and imagery.

The ninth factor in the CASI document is the question of whether anyone can achieve air superiority. Ground-based air defense proved decisive in Ukraine. The US has long relied on air superiority, but China has an incredibly dense air defense umbrella.

Finally, Pollpeter said cyber warfare has become a decisive factor in modern conflicts.

Russia used cyber operations to devastating effect before and during the war.

Unfortunately, the US intelligence community states that China “represents the most active and persistent cyber threat to the US government, private sector, and critical infrastructure networks.” Their cyber capabilities are dangerous to everyone. Turning to Ryan, formerly of the Australian Army, he also compared and contrasted the Ukrainian and Pacific theaters. He highlighted four filters that can be applied to the Pacific situation and distinguish it from Ukraine. He listed them as: geography and distance; terrain, vegetation and weather; political and cultural environment; and the capacity of potential competitors.

Taking each in turn, the Pacific covers great distances and is mostly open ocean. However, campaigns like China and Taiwan would cover a much smaller area. While it requires a balance of air, sea and land operations from China against Taiwan, Ukraine is primarily a land conflict. It will be more risky for China and the USA to move their forces to Taiwan. Additionally, mesh sensor networks are harder to achieve, although the potential for surprise is greater in the Pacific.

While China wanted to achieve a quick and decisive victory against Taiwan before the United States could intervene effectively, Beijing would still prepare for the long haul.

China believes that even if the US has a technological advantage, it has an advantage in terms of its defense industrial base.

The second terrain, vegetation and weather filter also varies across Ukraine. Taiwan is 60% covered by vegetation, which improves concealment, while typhoon season runs from May to November, which will affect military operations such as sea crossings and overflights.

The third filter, the political and cultural environment, is very different from Ukraine.

There is no NATO equivalent in the Asia-Pacific, and China has been successful in eroding regional multilateral alliances. China, like Russia, uses disinformation to weave its own narrative and hopes to erode the West’s resolve. Beijing is also trying to fur its own advantage around the Asia-Pacific, while also subverting the existing US security framework. This effort has been accelerated by President Donald Trump’s erratic policies.

China will also want to prevent a strong Taiwanese leader from uniting the nation and gaining the international support that Volodymyr Zelenskyy has for Ukraine.

The capacity of potential competitors is the fourth filter mentioned by Ryan. China’s military and industrial capacity is much greater than Russia’s, and it would also fight on a home front in the Western Pacific and Taiwan. It has a large population that it can mobilize in the event of a prolonged conflict. President Xi Jinping has argued that military leaders — who may be allowed to think or think laterally — have a serious weakness in the heavily centralized PLA and are trying to fix it. The PLA also requires around 6,60,000 soldiers serving for two years, many of whom are poorly trained. However, the mass exists to overcome such weaknesses.

“Technological breakthroughs are one area where China in the Pacific may have a greater capacity for surprise than Russia in Ukraine. China has a much broader and more sophisticated research and development capability than Russia (or any other authoritarian nation in the world) and would lead any conflict in the Pacific,” Ryan said.

To be sure, Russia is giving China close access to the lessons it learned in Ukraine. Beijing is watching how Ukraine is fighting, what is good and bad about Russia, and how Western nations are coming together to support Ukraine.

Still, the PLA has an extremely tough nut to crack if it wants to catch up with Taiwan militarily. This is a formidable mission because it must first cross the 180km wide Taiwan Strait.

Paramount would have the ability to isolate Taiwan from support and eliminate the United States from the equation as quickly as possible.

Ryan also said, “Growing dialogue and cooperation between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran presents a significant challenge for nations in the Pacific and the implementation of relevant lessons from the war in Ukraine. The new authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc will intensify its activities in the Pacific in the coming years.”

Just as China has observed and implemented lessons from Ukraine, regional militaries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States should also be involved if they are to deter and prevent Taiwan from falling into Chinese hands.