How Australia supplies weapons to Israel

Since October 7, 2023, Australian Government He has consistently maintained that he “did not supply weapons to Israel.” But this claim is based on a narrow legal framework and is a technical fact that hides a more worrying truth, writes Tyson Parker.

The line between where Australian sovereignty ends and ally/contractor logistical control begins has blurred. through mechanisms F-35 In the supply chain, Israel can benefit from a pooled support system that is constantly fed by: over 70 Australian companies without the need for Australia to approve exports or supply components directly.

Australia through international agreements, legislative changes, supplier contracts and pooled logistics growing role in the program with every F-35 Built with Australian made components.

On June 5, 2024, the Department of Defense provided the clearest expression of administrative reality.

Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense when asked whether Australian-made components in the global F-35 pool are used by the Israel Defense Forces Hugh Jeffrey stated:

“The question of whether the F-35 was used in the crisis in Israel is not important for the question of whether we should grant an export permit.”

Declassified Australia documented shipments of 68 Australian-made F-35 components shipped to Israel between October 2023 and September 2025; 51 of them were sent to Nevatim air base, home of Israel’s F-35 squadrons.

Inside October 2025The Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Legislation Committee heard questions about reports that F-35 components were sent from Australia to Israel during the war in Gaza.

Replying to Declassified Australiaarticle by Jeffrey in question, “The Australian Government has no direct relationship with the Israeli Government regarding the F-35 programme”.

A close examination of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program reveals that the Australian Government’s position is correct; but this is only because component exports are outsourced.

Unlike traditional arms sales, where a manufacturer sells tanks or rifles to another country, the F-35 operates under the Global Support Solution (GSS).

‘ underProduction, Sustainment and Continuous Improvement (PSFD) Memorandum of Understanding’The relationship is legally asymmetrical.

While the USA should carry out ‘preliminary consultation’ Australia’s (or any other country’s) F-35 components with partners before transferring parts to a third party‘prior written consent’ of the U.S. Government (sections 13.1 and 13.2 of the PSFD).

Effectively this gives Washington a veto over Australian supply decisions.

Even if Canberra wanted to supply the parts directly to Israel, it would need express permission from the United States.

Conversely, if the US decides to redistribute Australian-made parts, Australia has limited legal authority to override that decision, except with consultation.

In 2024, as a result of the AUKUS agreement, another mechanism was introduced that further restricts the ability of Australian authorities to assess and determine exports.

Defense Trade Controls Amendments Act of 2024Designed to facilitate the AUKUS alliance, it creates a permissionless environment for shipments to the US and UK.

Within the scope of these changes, the requirement for individual export permits for goods sent to the US global pool has largely been eliminated.

Human rights assessment trigger in Regulation 13E Customs (Export Prohibition) Regulations 1958 – This regulation, which requires certain exports to be assessed for the risk of facilitating serious human rights violations, does not appear to apply equally to transfers within the AUKUS unlicensed environment.

Although exporters must still report details about shipments, this is a notification rather than an approval process, and despite the requirement to provide information about the initial destination, there is no obligation to report a final end point.

This is a deliberate policy decision by the Australian Government, and as a result Australian-made F-35 components could flow into the US inventory without departmental oversight or approval.

It is clearly stated in the specification 2025-29 Defense Enterprise Plan Defense aims to significantly reduce ‘the number of export permits to the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia facilitated through the AUKUS License-Free environment’ to reduce the ‘regulatory burden’.

This is enabled ‘Removal of approximately 900 export permits required under previous export controls from Australia to the United States and the United Kingdom’ As of September 1, 2024.

One Auditor General Report (2018-19) It clearly states that participation in the F-35 global pool includes: ‘[U.S.] Spare parts are state property And ‘centralized supply chain management’.

This means that a component, for example a gun adapter produced by Ferra Engineering or gun bay systems If it enters the supply chain from Rosebank Engineering, Australian ownership or control ceases.

Components are then shipped from Australian manufacturers to regional warehouses around the world (including warehouses located in Williamtown, New South Wales).

This system ends most of Australia’s legal obligations when transferred to the US, either at the Williamtown gate or after shipment to another global warehouse in the Netherlands or the US.

Components in the US inventory are managed primarily by a computerized logistics system (ALItransition ODIN) distributes parts based on global operational priority and remains US property until installed in an aircraft.

This system only creates further complexity in blocking materials destined for Israel.

For Australia to effectively prevent parts from going to Israel, components would need to be completely blocked from entering the global supply pool.

This will collectively affect all participants in the program, including regional partners such as Japan and South Korea.

This fact is most clearly summarized as follows: UK Supreme Court decision (Al-Haq / Minister of State for Trade and Commerce) delivered in mid-2025.

The court heard that Ministry of Defense Air Director General Keith Bethell said that the system ‘…it is not designed to enable any of the Participants to make unilateral decisions to change the organization and structure of the programme’.

Mr. Bethell also stated: ‘The only way for the UK to ensure that components do not reach Israel is to suspend all exports to the F-35 programme’This is consistent for all participating countries.

The lawsuit also acknowledged:

‘…with respect to the Global Spare Parts Pool it was often not possible to determine who the end user would be’

It is extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible, for partners in the F-35 program to deny individual components to specific end users.

There is another consequence that has a more direct impact for Australia.

Under the current system, if the US decides to prioritize supplies to other countries (including itself and Israel), Australia could easily be left without critical components to keep its own fleet operational.

This risk is further increased by persistent spare parts shortages and documented sustainability deficiencies. Australia, England And WE audit reporting.

The F-35 program established a precedent in which industrial integration within the US military-industrial complex could limit independent export control and sovereign decision-making.

It raises serious questions about what visibility and influence Australia has over Australian-made components once they enter the F-35 support system, and how much this impacts our own defense capabilities.

The great powers began to use economic integration as a weapon, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, and supply chains as vulnerabilities to exploit.

You cannot live in the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination.

~ Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, World Economic ForumJanuary 2026