‘Sharks’ in Bay of Bengal: Pakistan tries to reopen a dormant front
Built with Chinese help and equipped with Air Independent Propulsion System (AIP), these submarines provide Islamabad with longer range and greater stealth than ever before. For India, this is not an immediate crisis but a slow shift in maritime balance that requires constant attention.
A new submarine fleet with expanded reach
The Hangor-class submarines (Hangor is a Bangla word meaning shark) are based on the Chinese Type 039A variant and represent a major breakthrough for Pakistan’s underwater fleet. The program, built within the scope of the agreement signed in 2015, includes eight submarines, four of which were built in China and four of which were built at the Karachi Shipyard in Pakistan, within the scope of technology transfer.
What makes these boats important is the Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system. Unlike traditional diesel-electric submarines that must surface or snorkel frequently, AIP-equipped submarines can stay submerged for weeks. This significantly reduces their exposure to aircraft and surface detection systems and allows them to operate with greater endurance, further away from home bases.
For Pakistan, this means that its submarines are no longer merely littoral or regional assets. They are becoming permanently deployable platforms across the Arabian Sea and potentially into the Eastern Indian Ocean.
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The most striking development is that Pakistan has signaled a possible permanent naval presence in the Bay of Bengal, where it has not operated since the 1971 war when another Pakistani submarine called Hangor sank India’s INS Khukri. The messages, including statements made by the Pakistani naval official during escort operations in Colombo, reflect a deliberate attempt to expand maritime geography rather than simply upgrade hardware.
In practical terms, such a move would require more than just submarines. It will depend on access, logistics and diplomatic space. Reports of warming ties with Bangladesh, including renewed naval contacts, port visits and expanded military exchanges, provide at least a theoretical opening to Pakistan. Even limited access to ports like Chattogram would significantly increase the operational reach of long-endurance submarine patrols.
However, this does not automatically translate into a permanent deployment. At present it is more accurate to see this as a signal of intent rather than established fundamental rights. Yet in naval strategy, intent is often almost as important as skill because it forces adversaries to plan for worst-case scenarios.
What does this change for India’s eastern maritime theatre?
For India, the Bay of Bengal has traditionally been a relatively safe area of water dominated by its own navy and protected by geography. The potential for Pakistani submarines to enter this region leads to a psychological and operational change.
The real concern is not that Pakistan can match India’s overall naval presence, but that even a small number of stealth submarines operating at long range can complicate India’s maritime awareness. AIP-equipped submarines can quietly navigate chokepoints, monitor shipping routes, or force naval planners to redirect anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets into broader patrol patterns. This is important because India’s east coast is closely connected to critical infrastructure, naval bases and maritime communication lines. Even limited submarine activity in this region will require expanded surveillance and faster response cycles.
India’s submarine vulnerability and counter-response
India currently operates around sixteen conventional submarines as well as nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines under the Arihant class. Its traditional fleet includes the Kalvari, Sindhughosh and Shishumar class boats, although several older submarines are being phased out. The main challenge India faces is not a numerical shortage but a skills transition gap. Unlike Pakistan’s new Hangor-class submarines, India does not currently have an operational Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarine in service. The Kalvari-class submarines are expected to receive indigenous AIP systems developed by DRDO, with the first likely to become operational in late 2026 or shortly thereafter.
India’s broader response is structured around three layers. The first is surveillance dominance through helicopter-based anti-submarine warfare platforms as well as long-range maritime patrol aircraft such as the P-8I. The second is underwater awareness through sonar networks and coordinated surface fleet operations. The third is fleet modernization through Project 75 (India), a Rs 70,000 crore initiative to build six advanced, diesel-electric attack submarines for the Indian Navy and future indigenous submarine programmes.
However, these efforts are still in transition. The gap between launch timelines means Pakistan’s new submarines could enter operational service months before India’s corresponding upgrades are fully mature.
The China factor and regional maritime competition
The Hangor program also reflects a deeper structural change in the region: the increasing integration of Chinese naval technology into the Pakistani fleet. This extends beyond hardware to training, sensors and combat systems, effectively creating interoperability between China and Pakistan’s submarine warfare doctrines.
This development creates complexity for India because it is no longer engaged in a purely bilateral maritime competition. Instead, Pakistan faces a layered scenario in which its submarines benefit from Chinese design evolution and potential operational support ecosystems. In parallel, the Indian Ocean is becoming more crowded with submarine activities of multiple powers, further increasing the importance of detection networks and maritime domain awareness.
Can Pakistan maintain its presence in the Bay of Bengal?
Even if Pakistan successfully launches all eight Hangor-class submarines, maintaining its continued presence in the Bay of Bengal remains a logistical and operational challenge. Submarines require resupply, maintenance cycles, and secure communications links, all of which become more complex over extended ranges. At best, Pakistan could aim for periodic deployments or symbolic patrols rather than a constant presence. But even intermittent operations can carry strategic messaging value, especially if linked to diplomatic openings in Bangladesh.
India’s strategic buffer remains strong
Despite concerns, India has significant structural advantages. It has a larger submarine fleet, nuclear-powered deterrent capability, and a much more extensive anti-submarine warfare (ASW) network across the Indian Ocean. Maritime surveillance infrastructure is also deeper and more integrated.
The key challenge is timing rather than balance. Pakistan’s Hangor-class submarines are currently entering service; It will take several more years for India’s full AIP capability and next-generation submarine programs to mature, but the first submarine equipped with the indigenous AIP system is planned to be completed by the end of 2026. This creates a temporary phase of adaptation rather than a long-term shift in dominance.
The commissioning of the Hangor-class submarines represents a clear advancement in Pakistan’s underwater warfare capability and an attempt to expand its operational imagination beyond the Arabian Sea. Talk of a presence in the Bay of Bengal adds a new layer of strategic signals that India cannot ignore, even if its practical implementation remains unclear. For India, this challenge is not a serious threat but a matter of pace of progress. The response is already ongoing through surveillance networks, submarine modernization and AIP integration.
