The tipping point: what happens when deaths outnumber births? | Population

There are now companies in Japan that specialize in cleaning the homes of elderly people who die alone and remain undiscovered for weeks or months; and adult incontinence pads have outpaced diaper sales for more than a decade. Villages with declining populations in Italy are selling houses for 1 Euro to attract new residents and ensure services continue. Falling student numbers in the UK have already begun to close schools and classrooms in parts of London.

These are not singular curiosities, but signs of a broader shift taking place across much of the developed world. “In the EU, 21 out of 27 countries will have more deaths than births in 2024,” said Prof Sarah Harper, director of the Oxford Institute on Aging Populations. Many countries in Asia and the Americas, from Japan and South Korea to Cuba and Uruguay, are seeing the same pattern.

This reflects two long-standing demographic changes: People are living longer, and the average number of children, what demographers call fertility, is falling.

In the UK, the latest forecasts from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) suggest that deaths will exceed births every year from 2026, as fertility declines and the large post-war “baby boom” generation, although living longer than previous generations, now reaches later life. The population is still expected to grow, but more slowly than previous estimates, reaching approximately 72.5 million in 2054 and then gradually beginning to decline. Previous forecasts suggested growth would continue until 2096.

Demographer and author of Nobody Left Behind: Why the World Needs More Children, Dr. “While the point where there are more deaths than births is emotionally significant, it is part of a long process,” Paul Morland said. Life expectancy has been increasing since the late 18th century, while fertility has been declining since the late 19th century, except for a brief rebound in the mid-20th century.

“There comes a point where these two lines intersect,” he said.

The reasons why people are having fewer children are complex. A fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman is generally needed for a population to replenish itself over time. The UK rate is 1.44.

“Recent declines in fertility in the UK have been particularly pronounced in those under 30, suggesting some delay,” said Prof Melanie Channon, from the University of Bath. “However, even accounting for the trend toward later parenthood, fertility is still declining.”

These changes are already being felt. From the University of Southampton, Dr. “In the short term, sectors that serve children (maternity care, schools, babysitters) and new parents are feeling birth numbers decline,” Bernice Kuang said. While the decrease in schooling rates has caused some schools to close, businesses such as social play centers and childminders are also experiencing difficulties. Even midwifery education is affected as students have to attend a minimum number of births.

The effects of such struggles extend beyond children. “Working parents (disproportionately mothers) may be forced to leave the workforce or reduce their working hours,” Kuang said, saying this would have consequences for the economy and gender equality.

Meanwhile, longer lifespans contribute to the gradual “graying” of the population, with its own consequences. Morland says that as populations age, they tend to become more risk averse, with investments flowing into safer assets rather than innovation, while a smaller, older workforce may be less entrepreneurial and drive economic growth.

The pressures on public finances are also severe, with fewer workers supporting increased pension, health and social care spending. Older people require much higher levels of support, placing an increasing burden on younger workers.

At the same time, consumption patterns are also changing. Young people spend more on products and devices, while older people spend more on maintenance and other services that can’t be easily automated or outsourced. “As your workforce is depleted, your demand for local hands-on labor is increasing,” Morland said.

Many developed countries face similar pressures. But what is striking is how these trends have spread beyond the richest economies. In many middle- and low-income countries, fertility is falling even as economic development is more limited. In some parts of Latin America, countries such as Jamaica and Thailand, and states in India, including Tamil Nadu and Kerala, have fertility rates comparable to or lower than those in Britain.

“There are countries that are aging before they become rich,” Morland said.

All of this points to a shift in how demographic change occurs. Historically, falling birth rates have followed rising incomes, urbanization, and education (the so-called demographic transition). But now fertility is declining faster than economic development, in part due to changing demands and social norms.

However, the pattern is not uniform. It remains unusual for Israel to maintain much higher birth rates (about 3 children per woman); This suggests that culture may play a role. The UK may also be more resilient than some of its neighbours. “There is a very strong and persistent two-child norm in the UK, which means our fertility rate is slightly higher than in some other European countries where only children are more accepted,” Channon said.

In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, fertility remains high and populations are growing rapidly even as death rates are declining. Meanwhile, in parts of Central Asia, economies grew without the same decline in births.

Immigration also plays an important role. The UK population is expected to increase for now, largely due to net internal migration, although deaths outnumber births, albeit at lower levels than previously assumed.

Demographic projections are not destiny. They do not account for unexpected shocks or policy changes, and migration is particularly difficult to predict. As the ONS puts it: “Projections are not predictions.”

If the direction of travel is clear, the question becomes less about whether demographic change can be reversed and more about how societies will respond to it.

Some changes have already been “baked in,” reflecting what demographers call population momentum, the way large generations moving through populations continue to shape their size and age structure. “Population growth will slow, but it will take a long time to reverse,” Kuang said, pointing to China, where decades of low fertility have only recently turned into population decline.

This means there is time to act. Morland argues that countries with low fertility rates face difficult trade-offs between economic growth, migration, and birth rates; but others suggest the picture is more complex.

Rather than trying to “fix” falling birth rates, policymakers should be preparing for an older population, from rethinking how old-age support is financed to ensuring people stay in work longer. “Simply telling people to have more babies is unlikely to work,” Kuang said.

These changes may need to be far-reaching. As Harper, author of the forthcoming book Aging Societies: Risk and Resilience, puts it: “The real challenge is that 20th-century labor markets, retirement systems, family norms, health care institutions, and long-term care arrangements were built under demographic conditions that are no longer valid.”

Adapting to longer living will therefore require rethinking how people work, retire and are supported in later life. “The traditional linear life course – education, steady employment, sudden retirement – ​​is becoming increasingly obsolete,” Harper said.

Instead, longer lives could include redesigning homes, transportation, and public spaces to support independence and connection in later life, along with more flexible work patterns, retraining, and phased retirement, as well as efforts to combat ageism and promote lifelong learning.

Even if telling people to have more children doesn’t work very well, there may be ways to support them in having the children they want. “Everyone should have the right to decide how many children to have and when to have them,” Channon said. But many fail to do so: in three-quarters of the countries surveyed, more than 40% of women end their reproductive lives with fewer children than they would like; this reflects economic insecurity, work-family conflict and broader social constraints.

Policies that support families, especially affordable child care and parental leave, can make a difference, but are more effective at helping people realize their intentions rather than dramatically increasing birth rates, Channon said.

She and others are also calling for more comprehensive reproductive health education in schools, with Channon noting that “curriculums often fail to cover important topics such as fertility, pre-pregnancy health, pregnancy and miscarriage,” which can impact young people’s ability to make informed choices.

Immigration can help alleviate the labor shortage in the short term, as those who move for work are often young and economically active, but it is not a silver bullet. Immigrants are also getting older, meaning a steady level of immigration will not be enough to keep up with declining fertility and an aging population.

“I am also wary of the ethos of encouraging immigrants to come to the UK solely to fill the labor gap, and that it is extremely difficult to pave the way for settlement or any long-term sustainable future here,” Kuang said.

Others point to broader ethical questions, including the impact on countries losing skilled workers to richer economies.

The good news is that demographic change rarely comes with a jolt. It gradually unfolds until its effects are visible everywhere – in classrooms, health, social care and changing relationships between generations.

The question now is whether these changes continue to quietly accumulate, or whether governments and societies begin to confront them more openly and work on ways to adapt.