Digital sovereignty and the danger of the off switch

Australia’s national security relies on essential digital infrastructure that operates regardless of political disputes, sanctions, export controls or changes in foreign governments, writes Paul Budde.

LAST ARTICLE Amateur Ethicist Christopher The website argued that the way the United States uses laws, sanctions, and national security powers to control access to digital infrastructure is increasingly weakening American technology dominance. Although the language of this article is more provocative than I would use, its central message deserves serious attention.

For decades, much of the world has built its digital economy around American technology. Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Apple, Meta, SpaceX and more recently, leading AI companies have become platforms on which businesses, governments, and citizens are increasingly dependent. There was a simple reason for this: The technology was innovative, scalable and reliable.

But convenience does not guarantee durability or dominance. In fact, the quest for convenience has often increased dependence on foreign-controlled platforms.

This is where the debate gets even more complicated.

For years, the United States, Australia and many European countries have argued that Chinese ICT vendors pose unacceptable national security risks because they could be forced to cooperate with Beijing under Chinese law. This was the main justification for this Except Huawei and ZTE from critical telecommunications infrastructure. Australia was one of the first countries to ban Huawei from 5G networks on national security grounds.

Ironically, exactly the same strategic logic is now being applied to American technology.

through mechanisms such as CLOUD Act Because of export controls, sanctions and national security directives, American companies may find themselves equally obligated to comply with instructions from Washington regardless of where their customers are located. So the issue is no longer whether the risk comes from China or the USA.

The lesson here is that any country that relies heavily on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure will eventually become subject to another country’s legal and political system.

Dutch email scandal shows the point. Microsoft reportedly shared information about Dutch civil servants working for regulators enforcing European digital legislation. From Microsoft’s perspective, it complied with America’s legal obligations. But from a European perspective it confirmed the sovereignty issue: data stored on an American provider remains subject to American jurisdiction.

The Dutch government responded beyond diplomatic protests. It has accelerated its search for cloud alternatives in Europe, tightened policies on the use of foreign cloud providers for government services and strengthened its commitment to digital sovereignty. Wider European pressure on initiatives such as: EuroStack It reflects the same thought.

The same principle is now emerging in artificial intelligence. In June 2026, anthropic it was Access suspended ordered by US authorities While national security concerns were evaluated, certain advanced artificial intelligence models were transitioned to foreign nationals. Although temporary, the incident demonstrated how quickly access to critical AI services can become subject to political and security decisions beyond the control of users or even the company itself.

Satellite communications provide another interesting example.

There is no doubt that Starlink is transforming broadband availability in regional and remote Australia. It has proven invaluable during natural disasters and brought welcome competition to the Australian broadband market. It is believed that more than half a million Australians now rely on Starlink for their internet connection.

But Starlink is no longer an ordinary telecommunications provider. It becomes part of Australia’s critical communications infrastructure. Emergency services are increasingly relying on it to maintain communications during disasters. Elements of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) also uses Starlink services to increase operational resilience.

This creates a strategic dilemma.

Communication supports almost every aspect of modern society. If broadband, satellite connectivity or digital communications become unavailable, the consequences go far beyond inconvenience. They impact emergency response, business continuity, government operations, and national security.

Starlink has already shown how these issues can become geopolitical. During the war in Ukraine, there were well-publicized disputes over the availability of Starlink services for certain military operations. Whatever the specific circumstances, this episode highlighted an important fact: Operational decisions affecting critical communications may ultimately rest with a private company operating under the jurisdiction of another country.

Therefore, Australia faces the same strategic problem that Europe faces. The question is not whether Starlink is a great service; It definitely is. The question is whether an increasing part of Australia’s communications flexibility will ultimately depend on decisions made outside Australia.

This leads to a broader principle that deserves further attention.

Rather than framing the debate as “Chinese risk” or “American risk,” we should discuss the strategic neutrality of infrastructure.

Telecommunications, cloud computing, satellite systems, payment platforms and artificial intelligence are no longer just business services. These have become essential national infrastructure. They support government, defence, emergency services, healthcare, education, finance and nearly every aspect of economic and social life.

Once infrastructure reaches this level of importance, over-dependence on any foreign jurisdiction becomes a strategic vulnerability.

This does not mean that Australia should reject American technology. This does not mean that Europe should separate itself from US innovations. While companies in other countries continue to make valuable contributions, American companies continue to lead the world in many critical technologies.

The aim should not be technological nationalism. The goal should be endurance.

This requires diversity of suppliers, interoperability between systems, local capacity where appropriate, and policies that prevent undue dependence on any foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, Europe’s investment in sovereign cloud capacity, regional payment systems and artificial intelligence infrastructure should be understood not as protectionism but as prudent risk management.

Australia must be having exactly the same argument.

The Huawei controversy has taught us that technology cannot be separated from jurisdiction. The examples of Microsoft, Anthropic and Starlink show that this principle applies equally to our allies. The lesson here is not that one country should replace another as the dominant supplier of digital infrastructure. On the contrary, no modern nation should allow critical national infrastructure to become overly dependent on decisions made elsewhere.

Therefore, digital sovereignty is not anti-America, anti-China, or anti-anyone. This is about national resistance.

In an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment, essential digital infrastructure must continue to operate regardless of political disputes, sanctions, export controls or government changes. The future should not depend on the good will of a single foreign government or company.

Ultimately, this is the purpose of strategic neutrality.

Paul Budde IA is a columnist and managing director of independent telecommunications research and consultancy. Paul Budde Consulting. You can follow Paul on Twitter @PaulBudde.

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